



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
Confederaziun svizra

DeLoG Joint Learning Event on  
**“Local Governance and Sustaining Peace”**  
12<sup>th</sup> - 15<sup>th</sup> March 2019, Brussels

Organized under the lead of UNDP, UNICEF and SDC.  
Hosted by the Belgian Technical Cooperation (ENABEL).

**PARTICIPANT’S  
MANUAL**



## Welcome to Brussels!

Brussels, 12 March 2019

Dear participants,

*the secretariat of the “Development Partners Network on Decentralisation and Local Governance” (DeLoG) warmly welcomes you to the Joint Learning Event on “Local Governance and Sustaining Peace”. This year’s event is organised under the lead of DeLoG’s member organisations UNDP, UNICEF and SDC and is hosted by the Belgian Cooperation (ENABEL). We would like to extend our gratitude to these partners for their close cooperation. Being a network that depends on its members’ and partners’ contributions, we highly appreciate the effort made by every single one of these organisations.*

*DeLoG is a network of 29 bi- and multilateral **development partners** in the field of decentralisation and local governance (DLG). It is our goal to build a common understanding of main aspects of DLG and focus on **policy coherence** and **aid effectiveness** of development approaches in the light of implementing the Sustainable Development agenda at the local level.*

*In the upcoming four days, we will explore the nexus between local governance and sustaining peace in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This learning event has been developed during discussions of different DeLoG member organisations and takes account of the changing landscape for many programmes working in the field of DLG. Significant peace challenges and concerns for human trafficking influence our work as development partners. Most of the recently adopted global policies towards peace and development make a reference to the significance of local processes. Also, the 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of development at and with all levels of government, including local government. Within this framework, this learning event aims to contribute to an enhanced understanding and application among DeLoG member organisations of localized approaches to sustaining peace in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The methodology allows for a structured exchange of information and experiences among participants coming from different organisations and country contexts.*

*We would like to thank each of you for attending and bringing your expertise to the learning event. We wish you four days filled with lively and inspiring discussions and hope that the event will help you deal more effectively and adequately with the challenges in your work!*

Sincerely yours,

Christoph Jansen  
Coordinator, DeLoG Secretariat



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*Please note that the contents of this course do not represent the position of a single DeLoG members but rather seek to convey the common understanding on these topics between our different member agencies.*



# **PART 1:**

# **COURSE**

# **PRESENTATION**



## Course Structure

	<b>Day 1: Opening The Nexus: Local Governance &amp; Peace</b>	<b>Day 2: Local Governance for Service Delivery</b>	<b>Day 3: Local Governance for Social Cohesion</b>	<b>Day 4: Bring-it-back-home Cities &amp; Peace Closing</b>
<b>Start of the day - recap</b>				
<b>Morning Block 1</b>	<b>Session 1: Opening</b>  Welcoming Setting the Stage: methodology	<b>Session 3: Local Governance for Service Delivery</b>  Guest Speaker Case Study: Somalia	<b>Session 4: Local Governance for Social Cohesion</b>  Guest Speaker Case Study: Ukraine	<b>Session 5: Bring it All Back Home</b>  Small Group Discussions
<b>Coffee Break</b>				
<b>Morning Block 2</b>	<b>Session 2: Local Governance and Sustaining Peace</b>  Guest Speaker Key Definitions	<b>Session 3: Local Governance for Service Delivery</b>  Concepts & Approaches	<b>Session 4: Local Governance for Social Cohesion</b>  Concepts & Approaches	<b>Session 5: Bring it All Back Home</b>  Presentations Synthesis
<b>Lunch</b>				
<b>Afternoon Block 1</b>	<b>Session 2: Local Governance and Sustaining Peace</b>  Concepts & Approaches	<b>Session 3: Local Governance for Service Delivery</b>  Conflict Sensitivity	<b>Session 4: Local Governance for Social Cohesion</b>  Conflict Sensitivity	<b>Session 5: Cities and Sustaining Peace</b>  Expert Lecture Dialogue
<b>Coffee Break</b>				
<b>Afternoon Block 2</b>	<b>Session 3: Local Governance for Service Delivery</b>  Context Analysis Key Understandings	<b>Session 4: Local Governance for Social Cohesion</b>  Impact Measurement Key Understandings	<b>Session 5: Local Governance for Social Cohesion</b>  Impact Measurement Key Understandings	<b>Session 5: Closing</b>  Closing Address Final Evaluation
<b>Wrap up and reflections on lessons learned</b>				
<b>Evening</b>		Group Event		



## Course Agenda

### TUESDAY 12 MARCH

**Guest speakers:** Joshua Rogers (Project Manager, Berghof Foundation, Berlin)

**Experts / Facilitators:** Nicolas Garrigue and Noel Matthews

08:30 **Arrival & registration of participants**

#### SESSION 1: OPENING

09:00 **Opening remarks and welcome**

*Jean Van Wetter, Director General, ENABEL  
Lea Flaspöehler, DeLoG Secretariat  
House-Keeping*

09:15 **Setting the Stage**

*Course Objectives & Participants' Survey  
Agenda & Methodology  
Evaluation Process  
Getting to Know Each Other  
Code of Conduct*

10:30 **Coffee break**

#### SESSION 2: THE NEXUS BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINING PEACE

11:00 **Introduction & Learning Outcomes**

11:15 **Setting the Agenda: Understanding the Nexus Between Local Governance and Peace**

*Presentation by Joshua Rogers  
Questions & Answers*

12:00 **Key Definitions**

*Interactive activity to clarify the main concepts used in the Course and ensure a common understanding by all.*

13:00 **Lunch Break**

13:45 **Reflecting on Concepts and Approaches**

*Interactive training activity to explore the theory of change linking changes in local governance with the building of resilient peace, with focus on: (i) the social contract model; (ii) opportunities and risks for transforming local governance in fragile and conflict settings; (iii) the various approaches found among development partners with regards to local governance and peacebuilding / statebuilding; (iv) sequencing change.*

15:30 **Coffee Break**

15:45 **Reflecting on Context Analysis**

*Interactive training activity to discuss the main variables that influence how the theory of change on local governance and peace may play out differently in different contexts, what needs to be prioritized in context analysis prior to programming, and in particular political economy aspects and how they can be analyzed.*

16:45 **Key Understandings & Closing Day 1**



### WEDNESDAY 13 MARCH

**Guest speakers:** Aoife McCullough (Research Fellow, ODI, UK)  
**Case Study:** Somalia (UNDP, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT)  
**Experts / Facilitators:** Nicolas Garrigue and Noel Matthews

#### **SESSION 3: LOCAL GOVERNANCE FOR SERVICE DELIVERY**

- 09:00 **Learning Review (Day 1) & Introduction (Day 2)**
- 09:20 **Setting the Agenda:**  
*Presentation by Aoife McCullough*  
*Questions & Answers*
- 10:00 **Case Study: the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery in Somalia**  
*Presentation by the Programme Team*  
*Questions & Answers*
- 10:45 **Coffee break**
- 11:15 **Reflecting on Concepts & Approaches to Local Governance for Service Delivery**  
*Interactive training activity to explore further how improved and localized service delivery, taking into account different types of services, contributes to strengthening the social contract and eventually can lead to reducing violence and increase state legitimacy, as well as the risks facing the localization of service delivery.*
- 13.00 **Lunch Break**
- 13:45 **Reflecting on Conflict Sensitivity in Localized Service Delivery Programming**  
*Interactive training activity to clarify what conflict sensitivity means in relation to the localization of service delivery and to practice the use of a do-no-harm framework when programming in this area.*
- 15:30 **Coffee break**
- 15:45 **Reflecting on Measuring the Impact of Localized Service Delivery on Fragility & Conflict**  
*Interactive training activity to explore how development actors can improve the way they measure how far their actions in support of localized service delivery supports a pathway out of fragility and conflict.*
- 16:45 **Key Understandings & Closing Day 2**



## THURSDAY 13 MARCH

**Guest speaker:** Dion Van den Berg, Pax for Peace, NL  
**Experts / Facilitators:** Nicolas Garrigue and Noel Matthews  
**Case Study:** Ukraine

### SESSION 4: LOCAL GOVERNANCE FOR SOCIAL COHESION

- 09:00 **Learning Review (Day 2) and Learning Outcomes (Day 3)**
- 09:20 **Setting the Agenda: Local Governance and Social Cohesion in Fragile / Conflict Contexts**  
*Presentation by Dion Von Der Berg*  
*Questions and Answers*
- 10:00 **Case Study: Ukraine**  
*Presentation by Maik Matthes, GIZ Ukraine*  
*Questions & Answers*
- 10:45 **Coffee Break**
- 11:15 **Reflecting on Concepts & Approaches for Building Social Cohesion through Local Governance**  
*Interactive training activity to unpack the quasi-concept of social cohesion, looking at its two main dimensions of social inclusion and social capital, the links between social cohesion and conflict, the different approaches commonly pursued to restore social cohesion and their effectiveness and the risks of worsening social cohesion through a localized approach.*
- 13:00 **Lunch Break**
- 13:45 **Reflecting on Conflict Sensitivity in Social Cohesion Programming**  
*Interactive training session to discuss the use of a conflict-sensitive approach when working with traditional and religious structures in social cohesion programming and the benefits and risks associated with engaging this type of local stakeholders.*
- 15:30 **Coffee Break**
- 15:45 **Reflecting on Impact Measurement for Local Governance and Social Cohesion**  
*Interactive training activity to raise awareness on the complexity and challenges of measuring changes in social cohesion in its various constitutive dimensions and expose participants to different social cohesion measurement tools.*
- 16:45 **Key Understandings & Closing Day 3**





## FRIDAY 15 MARCH

**Guest speaker:** Seth Kaplan (John Hopkins University, USA)

**Experts / Facilitators:** Nicolas Garrigue and Noel Matthews

### **SESSION 5: BRING IT ALL BACK HOME & CLOSING**

- 09:00 **Introduction to Day 4 and Learning Review from Day 3**
- 09:20 **Bring it all back home! (Part 1)**  
*Participants identify and discuss among themselves specific learnings from the training which they find particularly relevant to their professional practice.*
- 10:45 **Coffee break**
- 11.15 **Bring it all back home! (Part 2)**  
*Participants gather by “country groups” and re-conceptualize the main learnings of the course under an action plan which they think development partners should implement in their duty station country to achieve better results in terms of sustaining peace through local governance.*
- 12:30 **Lunch Break**
- 13:30 **Cities and Sustaining Peace**  
*Expert Presentation: The Nexus between Cities and Peace in Fragile Contexts*  
*Facilitated Discussion*
- 15.15 **Final Evaluation**
- 15.45 **Closing Ceremony**  
*- Closing Speech*  
*- Award of Training Certificates*
- 16.15 **End of Day and End of Course**



## Course Outline

### **Aim, scope and objectives**

The Course aims to contribute to an enhanced understanding and use among DeLoG partners of effective localized approaches to sustaining peace in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

Building upon a few case studies, the Course will discuss the nexus between local governance and sustaining peace from a conceptual as well as programmatic point of view. The role of local governance in strengthening service delivery (for social and economic needs), social cohesion and ultimately state legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected settings<sup>1</sup> within an integrated and conflict-sensitive approach, will be prioritized. The Course will discuss approaches and tools for better analyzing local governance contexts, for fomenting inclusive local multi-stakeholder coalitions, for building systems and capacities for conflict-sensitive local decision-making and for monitoring more strategically the impact of programmes. Also, different types of fragile and violent contexts will be explored.

The proposed **objectives** for the JLE course are as follows:

- to raise awareness of and re-affirm the significance of local governance for sustaining peace in fragile and conflict-affected settings.
- to facilitate knowledge- and practice-sharing on local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings, with focus on: (i) the role of localized service delivery for supporting the social and economic recovery of conflict-affected livelihoods in rebuilding state legitimacy; and (ii) the ways in which inclusive local governance can help restore social cohesion.
- to familiarize participants with different programmatic tools for local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings;
- to strengthen the DeLoG network by engaging its members in discussing conceptual and programmatic approaches and identifying potential joint actions such as country-based joint programming.

The Course targets staff from DeLoG member organizations who work and/or are interested in the fields of local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

### **Thematic content**

The Course will be divided into three thematic sessions as follows:

1. Overview of the local governance and sustaining peace nexus
2. Local governance for service delivery
3. Local governance for social cohesion

For each session, concepts, lessons learned, and challenges will be explored building upon evidence gathered from academic research and empirical programme-based case studies. Overall, the key questions guiding the learning process proposed in this Course are listed below.

- How can our actions in support of local governance contribute to overcome fragility and conflict?
- How are our actions in support of local governance affected by situations of fragility and conflict?
- How can we measure better the impact of our actions in support of local governance on reducing sustainably fragility and conflict?

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<sup>1</sup> Fragility as understood for the Course includes dimensions of violence/security, justice, institutions and economic foundations. Disaster-related fragility is considered when it comes as an additional dimension of fragility onto situations of conflict and violence, not as single-factor situation.



The roles of women and youth in the transformation of local governance, and the many challenges they face in doing so, will be addressed throughout the three sessions. Also, whenever possible, the specific case of migrant-hosting communities and the wider impact of migration on local governance, will also be discussed.

- 1. The local governance & sustaining peace nexus:** the role of local governance in contributing to building and sustaining peace is often approached from two angles:
  - (i) its role in providing an inclusive space for dialogue and collective action. Inclusive local governance can shift the incentive structure for local leadership and stakeholders towards cooperation in problem-solving rather than confrontation rested on identity-based grievances and competition for legitimacy.
  - (ii) its role in legitimizing the state by rebuilding its functional presence closer to citizens and making it more responsive to local needs and grievances. Incentives for government actions are changed from a top-down accountability chain towards the alignment to local needs and priorities.

The key assumption behind the nexus is that with a more inclusive, accountable and responsive local governance, state-society relations benefit as well as local governments represent the state authority closest to citizens and are able to link the local to the national. The social contract between state and society can be reshaped, ensuring greater legitimacy to the state and therefore lessen incentives for violent contestation and increase the ability of conflict-affected societies to absorb tensions, sustain shocks and resolve crises peacefully. Responsive and inclusive local governance systems not only provide peace dividends (e.g. services, jobs, security) but more importantly induce state legitimacy and accountability from the bottom up.

While no development partner would contend anymore that local governance must be part and parcel of sustaining peace strategies, there are differences as to what they consider ‘local governance’ for that purpose. On the one hand emphasis is put, mostly by multilateral organizations (UNDP, World Bank, EU), on local governments, decentralization or local political structures within a democracy-oriented and ‘peacebuilding-as-statebuilding’ approach. On the other hand, bilateral donors such as DfID, USAID and a large section of international NGOs put emphasis on non-state and community actors, civil society and traditional structures within a bottom-up peacebuilding approach. Nevertheless, all emphasize the role of local governance in rectifying national peacebuilding and peace sustaining failures by localizing problem-solving and dialogue.

At the same time, challenges and barriers to transforming local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings are daunting, as the local level is where the unmet needs of populations and the institutional weakness of the state interact in the most explosive manner. Ineffective and rent-driven local governance based on elite pacts are common in such settings and often exacerbate fragility and conflict. Local governments usually lack the understanding, political and technical capacities and financial means to deliver basic services and rebuild social cohesion. Localizing a sustaining peace approach cannot be limited to localizing national peace agreements. It requires understanding and acknowledging local conflict and governance realities, including the fact that public authority may not lie in such settings with formal actors; it requires adopting an integrated approach bringing together the security, social and economic needs of communities and effecting change in different dimensions. On the other hand, concentrating on the local level is not and should not be seen as a panacea to the challenges confronting peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts of the international community.

**In this session,** participants will be given the opportunity to unpack the assumption that the transformation of local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings can contribute to building sustainable peace and explore the different challenges facing it. This assumption basically states that transforming local governance (towards a more inclusive, accountable and responsive model) can help to (i) extend the presence, authority and protection of the state to all regions, cities, villages and quarters; (ii) build confidence in the political settlement by enabling a fair distribution of resources to the local level; (iii) direct efforts of the state toward responding to the needs of affected communities in a more inclusive manner; and (iv) address some drivers of conflict and violence by strengthening social cohesion and supporting the inherent resilience capacities of local communities.



Specific questions for analysis: When are local government structures the most appropriate vehicle for establishing a local process of peacebuilding – and when are they less preferable than other options? Is the capacity for peace inherently found in local societies and their traditional structures and how can it benefit to/from national peacebuilding dynamics? What does comparative experience tell us about the importance of phasing the transformation of local governance systems within a national peacebuilding trajectory?

**2. Local governance for service delivery:** as recalled in the introduction, fragility and conflict have highly negative effects on the capacity of states to deliver services and to do so closer to end-users. The three major dimensions of availability, accessibility (economic and physical) and quality of services are severely limited when infrastructure, capacities and resources for service delivery are lacking in large swathes of the country coupled with potential insecurity. For decades, crisis response policies of development partners have in effect led to by-passing state structures, including local governments, for service delivery because of the (extremely) weak state capacity and/or ruined infrastructure. Such an approach ignores local capacity, delays state-building and creates dependency. It reduces opportunities for post-conflict or transition governments to establish their legitimacy.

Restoring or building capacities – infrastructure as well as human, financial, managerial and technical – of local governance institutions for service delivery so that they can play a meaningful role in the provision of public goods and services that can help improve living conditions of conflict-affected societies, is an essential feature of the theory of change linking local governance and sustaining peace. In most cases, local governments, statutorily mandated and formally linked to the central government are best positioned to coordinate localized service delivery or even deliver services directly by themselves. This is why transferring service delivery responsibilities to local governments through decentralization is often seen as a means to address the root causes of conflict especially when it is linked to a broken social contract. Yet, local governments are only capable of playing this role if they are supported by a conducive administrative framework (e.g. clear and effective division of responsibilities between levels of government), if they are sufficiently equipped with human, technical and financial resources and, most important, if they have sufficient incentives to do so, whether these incentives are purely motivational (e.g. prospects of re-election) and/or coercive (e.g. performance-based grants).

At the same time, if the localization of state-led service delivery has a role to play in peacebuilding, it should not be seen merely as a technical issue and its potential adverse effects should also be reckoned with. Political elites at the local level engage in service delivery for different reasons, such as genuinely wanting to improve their citizens' lot or promoting social cohesion, but also to consolidate their power base or even building rent. Hence, a frequent element of the policy debate is the extent to which local governments in such contexts should be allowed to lead service delivery functions and how quickly, as capacity for inclusive, accountable and responsive service delivery cannot be built in a day. Beyond human and organizational capacity matters, suitable service delivery frameworks, which delineate the respective expected roles of national and local, state and non-state actors in service delivery, for different kinds of services, and establish realistic service standards, are needed to make decision-making more responsive and reduce resource wastage. Complex and incoherent localized service delivery frameworks and the use of parallel delivery systems by the central government to bypass the administrative “monster” it helped create, have entrenched the idea in many societies that local governments are incapable of meeting their needs.

**In this session,** participants will discuss the pros and cons of entrusting local governance actors, and first among them local governments, with service delivery functions in fragile and conflict-affected settings. They will reflect on how the localization of service delivery can contribute to building state legitimacy and how it can be done with a conflict-sensitive lens. The session will consider service delivery through a wide angle as being the state-organized provision of goods and services to the wider public in order to meet a range of human needs (security, justice, shelter, education, health, jobs, etc.).

Specific questions for analysis: is improving service delivery sufficient to restore trust in the state? How far does the involvement of local actors accelerate or challenge this process of legitimacy-building? Which services are most indicated for localization in fragile and conflict-affected contexts considering



the peacebuilding imperative? What are the relative merits of deconcentration vs. devolution in service delivery in such contexts? What can help accelerate capacity building for service delivery at the local level in resource-depleted contexts?

**3. Local governance for social cohesion:** Social cohesion is usually understood as referring to two intertwined features of society: (i) the inequality dimension, which relates to the goal of promoting equal opportunities and reducing disparities and divisions within a society, hence addressing social exclusion as well; (ii) the social capital dimension, which concerns the goal of strengthening social relations, interactions and ties between individuals, social groups and institutions.<sup>2</sup> Good social cohesion is a building block of a strong social contract, just as is effective institutional convergence, i.e. commonality of values and norms across state agencies and the coordination and coherence of their respective policies and actions. Fragile states are usually characterized by a high level of inequalities and entrenched patterns of exclusion of whole sections of the population, be it from enjoying basic human rights, accessing public goods and services, finding decent livelihoods and/or from participating in decision-making. Social, cultural and/or legal norms may highly constrain the development of positive relationships between different groups and their social institutions. All in all, deeply divided societies demonstrate in general the inability of their various constitutive groups to agree on how they can live together, including govern and be governed, and to solve their dissents peacefully. Breaches in social cohesion open the door to violence and conflict, which in turn exacerbate distance between social groups, create more inequalities and exclusion and shatter social capital. Poor social cohesion also reduces opportunities for the civil society to influence government policies and achieve social change. And these impacts of conflict on social cohesion are long-lasting: it is usually easier to rebuild functional service delivery systems than to restore social cohesion in deeply-divided societies traumatized by past conflict.

The general view is that local governance provides a golden opportunity to rebuild shattered social cohesion as it can address issues of horizontal inequalities and strengthen social relations. If conducted inclusively, that is with the participation of marginalized groups (including women, youth, for example) and with non-state actors, local governance has the potential to offer a formal non-violent space for participation in the political process and for rebuilding relationships between groups by fomenting issue-based vs. identity-based networks for the common good (these networks are often referred to as “infrastructures for peace”). Local governance actors, including the local branches of law enforcement agencies, can work together to improve the security of communities exposed routinely to violence by nurturing positive transactions and increased solidarity (e.g. community projects, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, sports and cultural activities), by reducing threats of physical and psychological violence (e.g. small arms control, SGBV programmes) and by allowing safe and peaceful coexistence in public space (e.g. community policing, arms-free zones, urban renovations). Safer human settlements mean incentives and capacity for public and private investors to re-engage with territories that had fallen out of the state, rebuild infrastructure, extend services and create jobs, thus reducing territorial inequalities that also often fuel conflict.

Yet, some arguments, supported by evidence, also underline the potential exacerbating effect of local governance, including decentralization, on poor social cohesion in fragile and conflict-affected settings. For example, local elections after a conflict can lead also to local leaders being elected along ethnic lines with a strong identity-based discourse, defeating the purpose of reducing political marginalization of minority groups. Elite capture and rent-building is common at the local level, even more in conflict-affected settings, and can entrench an inequitable allocation of resources and provision of public services, hence accentuating horizontal inequalities. Also, post-conflict states can view the task of transforming local governance as meaning the imposition of a single liberal order based on state-sanctioned norms and institutions (local governments), excluding respected traditional social institutions even though they are for many communities the bedrock of social cohesion. Finally, ineffective local governments, handicapped by limited administration and fiscal devolution, can dampen the formation of social capital as collective action on the part of society is met by institutional apathy.

<sup>2</sup> Jenson, J. (2010), “Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion”, Commonwealth Secretariat and UNRISD.



**In this session**, participants will discuss the opportunities and risks to rebuild social cohesion in fragile and conflict-affected societies through greater empowerment of local governance systems. Different contexts will be considered, such as violent urban quarters, ethnically diverse post-conflict rural areas and refugee host communities. Participants will reflect on the value of different approaches to rebuilding social cohesion through local processes, such as infrastructures for peace (e.g. Local Peace Committees), inclusive local political processes, citizen security programmes, community-based reconciliation and transitional justice, sports, cultural and religious activities. They will identify key information needs for assessing the strength of social cohesion, key capacity needs of local actors to rebuild social cohesion and will make recommendations on how to better support social cohesion through development programmes.

Specific questions for analysis: How does social cohesion impact on peace and development in local contexts? What tools and approaches can local governments use to achieve social cohesion and what are examples of relevant programmes? Are local governments necessarily well placed to reduce inequalities and social exclusion, and why? How far can social cohesion at community level become resilient against higher-level shocks (e.g. major political crises, ethnic strife, disasters, migration, etc.)?



## Biographies of Presenters

### Guest Speakers



**Joshua Rogers** is a researcher with focus on the effect of conflict on local governance and the dynamics of state formation under conditions of conflict and external intervention more broadly. His regional expertise is on the modern Middle East and North Africa, with a particular focus on 20th and 21st century Yemen. He has taught on conflict analysis, the political economy of violence, conflict and development, post-war reconstruction, conflict sensitivity and the politics of the Middle East; and has published on the mechanisms linking conflict and state-formation, Egypt's statebuilding in Yemen, youth demands in Yemen's change squares, and on a range of other topics. Joshua holds a BA from Oxford University, an MA from the Free University in Berlin and a PhD from SOAS, University of London. He currently manages the Berghof Foundation's work on local governance in Yemen and is an active member of its local governance research and learning cluster.



**Aoife McCullough** specializes in contested politics, state legitimacy, and radicalisation. She has led or contributed to conflict and governance analyses in Niger, Mali, South Sudan and Pakistan for donors and NGOs. As part of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, she is currently leading a multi-country study to investigate whether there is a relationship between service delivery and state legitimacy. More broadly, Aoife has researched and written on the challenges of operating in fragile states, including on the current agenda of Countering Violent Extremism. She holds an MSc in Anthropology and Development from the London School of Economics and a BA in Psychology from Trinity College Dublin.



**Dion Van Den Berg** (1960) studied Dutch literature and linguistics. He started working for IKV (the Interchurch Peace Council, the Netherlands; now PAX for Peace) in 1980. He is now head of the Europe team at PAX for Peace. From the early eighties onwards, he was involved in the promotion of municipal peace policy in variety of countries, including Turkey, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia (Vojvodina and Sandzak), Kosovo, Macedonia, DRC (Congo), South Sudan, Ukraine, Syria and Iraq. In the eighties, he was involved in the 'detente from below' campaign, that aimed at overcoming the Cold War divide in Europe by means of support for dissidents and independent groups in Warsaw Pact countries. Ever since 1995, he supports the Campaign for Truth and Justice of the survivors of the genocide of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Currently, he is involved, in a number of post-conflict states, in processes in the domains of transitional justice and interlinking state building with peace building.



**Dr. Seth Kaplan (PhD)** is a Professorial Lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Adviser for the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), and consultant to organizations such as the World Bank, USAID, State Department, and OECD. Dr. Kaplan is the co-author of the United Nations – World Bank flagship report *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (2018) and USAID's *Fragility Assessment Framework* (2017). He was the lead author, coordinator, and managing editor of both an eight-country comparative study for the United States Institute of Peace on social contract formation in fragile states and a 100-page flagship publication for IFIT articulating a new approach to regime transitions in post-conflict and post-authoritarian countries. Dr. Kaplan is the author of three books: *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development* (Praeger Security International, 2008); *Betrayed: Promoting Inclusive Development in Fragile States* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and *Human Rights in Thick and Thin Societies: Universality Without Uniformity* (Cambridge, 2018). He runs the website <http://www.fragilestates.org/>.



### Case Study Presenters



**Ifrah Barre** works for the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance in Somalia. She supports the overall strategic direction and management of the program throughout Somalia/Somaliland. She has extensive experience in managing effective projects related to democracy and governance, capacity building, engaging civil society in good governance and civic education in Somalia. She has experience within both international and Somaliland CSOs with strong background in program and operations management, interagency coordination, institutional capacity building, support for partner institutions, strengthening capacity for parliament, political parties, local government and CSOs in response to governance and democracy, capacity building.



**Abdirahman Adan Mohamoud** has 16 years of professional experience, ranging from a local youth organization, tertiary education, private sector, humanitarian work, development and local governance. For the past 13 years, he has been working with UN-Habitat under different capacities. He now supports the municipal finance activities of the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance in Somalia, building capacities of district authorities in generating greater revenue to enhance service delivery.



**Anjali Pradhan** works with UNICEF Somalia as Local Governance Specialist and supports the UN Joint Programme for Local Governance in Somalia. Before that, she worked for 25 years with UNICEF Nepal as the Chief of the “Child Friendly Local Governance Unit“, where she supported the Government in implementing Child Friendly Local Governance (CFLG) in Nepal for the first time, including through legal reforms.



**Abdirahman Mohamed Idle** works with UNICEF Somalia and supports the Joint Program of Local Governance (JPLG) for the last four years. He is responsible for the planning and implementation of the programme in Somaliland. He has been working for 11 years in different capacity for both program and operations and almost 8 years within UNICEF in different capacities. In addition, he has a relevant Academic Knowledge in the governance sector.



**Maik Matthes** started working for GIZ in 2010 after finishing my studies in political science, history and law. From 2010 – 2015, he worked as an adviser in a project that dealt with the Palestinian Civil Police. Apart from the construction of community police stations the focus of the project was to develop and implement the concept of community policing in Palestine. In 2015, he started working as project manager for the TDA project in Ukraine. Apart from setting the scope of activities, he was involved in building up the project team. One year later, Maik took over the responsibility for one component. Since then, his team and himself are trying to improve municipal services in hosting communities in Eastern Ukraine. The spectrum covers administrative, medical and social services as well as education and integration.





### **Facilitators**



**Nicolas Garrigue** is the Thematic Course Coordinator for the JLE 2019, as he was for the JLE 2018. He works as a Senior Consultant on Local Governance in Crisis-Affected Settings with UNDP and other international organizations. Nicolas has spent nearly 25 years working in field postings and in headquarters of different international organizations, including UNDP, UNOPS and UN missions, in the areas of local governance, local development, democratization and electoral assistance. He has dedicated most of his career to working on fragile and crisis-affected countries (e.g. Iraq, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, East Timor, Haiti, Myanmar, Palestine). Currently, Nicolas's works focuses on Myanmar, Tunisia and Yemen. Nicolas has authored UNDP's Guide on Local Governance in Fragile & Conflict-Affected Settings (2016) as well as UNDP's Signature Product on Restoring Local Governance Functions after a Disaster (2015). He holds an M.Sc. in Rural Development Studies from Montpellier University, France.



**Noel Matthews.** As an Irish citizen working in Asia, Africa, Arab states and Europe, Noel has designed and directed a wide range of international development programmes over the last 25 years, and generally provides senior management oversight and/or technical and programmatic leadership on capacity institutional development in democratic transitions. He works on local governance, public administration reform, civil society development, women's political participation and gender equality as well as sectoral reform work in livelihoods, health and rural development, usually in fragile and/or transition contexts. In addition to program and organisational leadership, he brings a variety of specialisms to these practice areas including, political economy and conflict analysis, policy and strategy development, design and management of multi-stakeholder dialogue processes, capacity development and developing and mentoring advisory practices in the field of democratic governance. Noel has served as both regional and country director of international organisations and NGOs and as team leader/manager of various initiatives/programmes for a range of development partners [Including DFAT, EU, Sida, UNDP, WB] focused on supporting democratic governance transitions. He is currently Team Leader for the EU on governance programme formulation in Malaysia and supporting EU & Member State dialogue and effectiveness in Myanmar.



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# **PART 2:**

# **WORKBOOK**

By the end of the course, participants should have acquired the ability described in each **Learning Outcome** and have internalized the content of each **Key Understanding**.

### The Nexus between Local Governance and Sustaining Peace

#### *Learning Outcomes*

- Explain the social-contract based theory of change that links local governance to sustaining peace.
- Identify the limitations and risks of the ‘local turn’ to sustaining peace.
- Sequence potential interventions in a local governance programme against the long-term objective of sustaining peace.
- Select the most important aspects of a local governance context to be studied and analyzed prior to developing a programme for a fragile setting.

#### *Key Understandings*

1. Fragile states are not just born from fragile institutions, they are also born from fragile societies and fragile environments; hence, governance interventions for sustaining peace should seek to address at the same time state, societal and environmental weaknesses and risks.
2. Local governance programmes must help secure the social contract underpinning legitimate political power by providing capacities and incentives for making the state more responsive, for making inclusive local politics more opportune as a means of political contestation than violence, and for mending divisions and strengthening bonds between local groups.
3. The main challenge is to not just ‘strengthen’ local governance systems in fragile and conflict-affected settings, as many are not working for greater peace and resilience as they are, but rather to help them transform from within towards more equal and accountable distribution of power and resources.
4. Local governance programmes must be context-specific, especially in fragile settings where informal power structures are stronger in general than centrally-defined formal institutions and norms, but the challenge is also for such programmes to help rebuild a common vision and destiny between groups and communities or else they will miss their long-term goal of sustaining peace.
5. An integrated, area-based, risk-informed, phased and multi-level approach to local governance geared towards building the collective capacity of a range of local stakeholders to deliver progress on peace, security, environmental resilience and development, increases the potential of successfully sustaining peace from below.

### Local Governance for Service Delivery in Fragile / Conflict Settings

#### *Learning Outcomes*

- Explain the concept of ‘localized’ service delivery vs. local government-led service delivery.
- Weigh the pros and cons of localizing service delivery for building state legitimacy.
- Differentiate between various categories of public services and delivery systems when analysing the suitability of localized service delivery.
- Analyse the level of conflict sensitivity of an intervention in support of localizing service delivery.
- Develop indicators for measuring the impact of localizing service delivery onto building sustainable peace.

#### *Key Understandings*

1. Local governance for service delivery makes it easier to demonstrate inclusiveness and accountability in the state’s functioning and hence increases the potential of service delivery for rebuilding state legitimacy – as, in that relationship, how services are delivered counts more than how much is delivered.
2. Devolution to local governments in fragile settings needs to surmount greater challenges than elsewhere and it bears the risks of weakening state legitimacy and inducing conflict if it happens

## PR 1.1 Learning Outcomes and Key Understandings

too fast, too comprehensively and is driven by short-term political interests rather than long-term sustainable development objectives.

3. Rather than considering the devolution of services to local governments bodies as the ultimate recipe for sustaining peace, the localization of service delivery should be prioritized: it means empowering local decision-making while distributing management responsibilities and risks between levels of government.
4. In assessing the conflict sensitivity of programmes tackling service delivery, one should analyze how far new vulnerabilities, grievances or tensions may be generated by changing the local political economy of service delivery and what needs to be done to mitigate such risks.
5. Effective monitoring and evaluation of the peacebuilding effect of service delivery interventions start with a clear theory of change based on a serious context and conflict analysis.

### **Local Governance for Social Cohesion in Fragile / Conflict Settings**

#### *Learning Outcomes*

- Identify factors that influence positively the impact of greater social cohesion onto sustaining peace.
- Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of various actions that local institutions can take to strengthen social cohesion
- Analyse the level of conflict sensitivity of a local governance intervention for social cohesion.
- Mobilize various tools for measuring the impact of social cohesion programming onto fragility and conflict.

#### *Key Understandings*

1. Social cohesion and institutional convergence are essential building blocks of a strong social contract as a lack of social cohesion means the inability of various groups to agree on how they can live together, which has negative impacts on their ability to govern and be governed.
2. To be effective, social cohesion programming needs to tackle both dimensions, social inclusion and social capital, and not focus solely on the latter, especially at the local level, on the social capital dimension, as it is often seen as politically easier in divided contexts.
3. Given how critical to social cohesion is the interaction between society and the state, local governance bears great importance for rebuilding social cohesion and local institutions need in particular to be encouraged and supported to adopt a strong social cohesion lens in their delivery of public goods and services.
4. Working with informal actors holding public authority legitimated by their customary or spiritual role for rebuilding social cohesion in deeply divided societies is not a matter of ‘whether’ but of ‘how’; in this process, trade-offs are inevitable, but they need to be apprehended through a dynamic, and not static, vision of the role of such authorities in their communities.
5. There is no perfect and universal tool to measure social cohesion in any given context, but there are a few constants: absence of a single proxy indicator, necessity to envisage different dimensions and requirement of allocating sufficient resources to what remains a complex exercise.

### **Local Governance for Social Cohesion in Fragile / Conflict Settings**

#### *Learning Outcomes*

- Explain how the quality of social cohesion can influence the pathway to sustainable peace in fragile and conflict-affected settings.
- Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of various actions that local institutions can take to strengthen social cohesion
- Express a more nuanced view on the suitability for development partners of working with traditional and religious structures in conflict-affected settings for rebuilding social cohesion.
- Mobilize various existing tools for measuring the impact of social cohesion programming onto fragility and conflict.

### *Key Understandings*

1. Social cohesion and institutionalization of governance are essential building blocks of a strong social contract and a pathway to sustainable peace.
2. Social cohesion policies and programmes need to tackle both existing issues and risks affecting social inclusion and social capital, and not just the latter which is often seen, especially at the local level, as programmatically and politically easier.
3. Given how critical to social cohesion is the interaction between society and the state, local governance bears great importance for rebuilding social cohesion and local institutions should apply a strong social cohesion lens in the delivery of their various functions.
4. Working with informal actors that are broadly considered legitimate to hold public authority in their community should not be skipped; in doing so, trade-offs between democratic principles and the reality of local paradigms are inevitable but they need to be apprehended dynamically: evidence shows that engaging with local social norms and structures is more beneficial in the end for peace and stability than ignoring them.
5. There is no perfect nor universal tool to measure social cohesion, but there are a few constants: it cannot be captured through a single indicator, it requires evaluating different dimensions with different tools, it needs substantial resources and time – it remains in all settings a complex exercise fraught with potential misunderstandings.



### A/ Governance, fragility and conflict:

- The current global context is one in which the international community faces an era of unprecedented multiplicity and complexity of crises. These include natural disasters, climate change, rapid environmental degradation, pandemics, armed conflict and intensification of violence, forced displacement, irregular migration, trafficking in persons, radicalization, and terrorism.
- Fragility is a much-discussed concept, because it puts into one basket countries with very different trajectories, is not a static condition and is based on contested theoretical grounds. There are different approaches to defining fragility:
  - UNDP considers that a fragile country is where public authorities no longer have the monopoly on legitimate violence, the ability to deliver services or the capacity to collect public revenues.<sup>3</sup>
  - OECD speaks of a situation of dynamic vulnerability to the slowing or reversal of development gains in the face of risks affecting five dimensions: (i) political; (ii) economic; (iii) societal; (iv) environmental; (v) security.<sup>4</sup> In short, fragile countries face both an accumulation and combination of risk and insufficient capacity to manage it.
  - The WB considers that a country is fragile based on a complex composite measurement process (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Rating).
- In general, there is consensus in recognizing that fragile countries or settings (as fragility can be restricted to a portion of a country only), display the following characteristics:
  - deeply fractured societies along political-identity or ideological lines such that the population is unable to cooperate effectively in pursuit of public goods (fragile states also have fragile societies!);<sup>5</sup>
  - lack of effective institutions (formal and informal) and political processes that can balance conflicting interests in society and bring state capacities and social expectations into equilibrium.
  - as a result of the above, a weak and fragile social contract.
- Not all fragile countries are in conflict nor are all conflicts violent nor is all violence linked to socio-political conflict. Most conflicts are non-violent in fact and one must remember that conflict and contentious politics are inherent to social transformation. Conflict can bring more inclusive distributions of wealth and power.<sup>6</sup>
- The relationship between violence and fragility is complex. Violence is an outcome of fragility and can become a driver of chronic fragility. Violence is often a component of how governance works in fragile and conflict-affected states, rather than a sign of breakdown or collapse, but it can also become that when a society's capacities and incentives for managing conflict peacefully are giving in. Violence is shaped by forms of authority, control and competition between different social groups and political actors. Violence both shapes and is shaped to how institutions of governance emerge and are sustained. It may result in constructive forms of social change just as it can lead to vicious cycles of more violence, weak governance and poverty. These trade-offs are ever present.<sup>7</sup>
- Exclusionary politics is an important driver of conflicts. Being excluded from access to power, opportunity, and security creates fertile ground for mobilization to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or contexts of human rights abuses.<sup>8</sup> Under certain conditions, outcomes associated with both global, national and sub-national development processes create grievances and a sense of injustice that can be mobilized into organized violence, especially when it coincides with other social determinants (ethnic, religious, regional, ideological, etc.). The concept of horizontal inequalities is often used to describe situations of structural inequalities with a high-risk factor for violent conflict. Sub-national inequalities can translate into many different areas, such

<sup>3</sup> UNDP (2012).

<sup>4</sup> OECD (2016).

<sup>5</sup> Kaplan (2017).

<sup>6</sup> UN & WB (2016).

<sup>7</sup> Justino (2017), PRIO (2016).

<sup>8</sup> UN & WB (2016).

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as poverty, access to services, access to voice, access to land and natural resources, levels of corruption and poor governance, and are all important dimensions of violent conflict.<sup>9</sup>

- Until recently, the global policy discourse on conflict tended to classify fragile countries into categories such as failed states, protracted crisis, escalating crisis, post-crisis (even if drivers of crisis are not fully resolved). Yet, most fragile countries remain at risk of violent conflict for long periods of time because the organisations, relations and power arrangements that underpin their governance structures allow – or are not able to resist – the appropriation of institutions and resources by some political actors. Fragility and conflict operate as a trap and concerned countries face enormous challenges coming out of them. While the momentum for fragile countries and the international community to focus on “preventing the outbreak, escalation, recurrent or continuation of conflict” (UN General Assembly, 2016) has accelerated, spending and efforts on prevention still represent only a fraction of the amount spent on crisis response and reconstruction.<sup>10</sup>
- For Justino (2017), fragile countries that have been affected by conflict tend to follow one of the three patterns listed below in their ‘post-conflict’ time:
  - a. Open access / inclusive societies: strong, accountable and legitimate institutions (e.g. Western Europe after WWII).
  - b. Limited order societies: fairly strong governance structures that often result in extractive, predatory or authoritarian forms of governance but may be effective in avoiding open armed conflict and promoting economic development, but show limited resilience to severe internal or external political shocks (e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, SL, Rwanda, Zimbabwe).
  - c. Transitional societies: vulnerable systems of weak governance structures experiencing protracted forms of violent conflict. State-level authority is largely absent and often stable governance (with the attributes to security and public goods provision) is only found at the sub-national level in situations (e.g. Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, CAR, DRC).
- While the institutional capacities of the state to prevent conflict are often invoked, there are critical political economy factors that ultimately shape the capacity of governance systems to prevent violent conflict:<sup>11</sup>

(i) *the preferences and interests of national, sub-regional and local elites*: the nature and composition of national and local elites that govern are context and time specific. Elites have the capacity and information to prevent or pre-empt potentially violent tensions and, over time, to devise durable inclusive institutional arrangements incentivizing cooperation and collaboration over conflict and delivering equitable development outcomes.

(ii) *the way social groups and political elites relate, compete or cooperate*: elites are influenced by a myriad of actors with a variety of interests that operate at different geographical levels through formal and informal structures and networks. Among these actors, the most important are: non-state armed groups, ordinary citizens (they are not just victims in an FCS!) and traditional leaders.

(iii) *the relevance of informality in how societies, economies and politics are organized*. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, public authority is often weak and fragmented, and institutions are shaped by the way political power is distributed between de jure and de facto sources of legitimacy.

### **B/ Theory of Change**

- First of all, it is important to realize that fragile countries are not by definition anarchic and ungoverned. Fragility is not the end of governance and not all fragile countries are just ‘ripe’ for better forms of governance.<sup>12</sup>
- Overall, a society’s ability to manage conflict constructively is tested continuously by risks that “push” toward violence, and opportunities to “pull” a society on a pathway toward peace. Risks

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> UN, WB (2018).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Justino, 2017.

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and opportunities exist at various levels and can reinforce one another. The majority of violent conflicts today originate from instability within states, either as a result of tensions across groups, or between groups and the state. However, geopolitical dynamics and global factors have a strong influence, particularly on major violent conflicts, and violence and instability locally can impact international or regional stability.<sup>13</sup>

- Another important consideration is that while growth and poverty alleviation are crucial pull factors, alone they will not suffice. Preventing violence requires departing from traditional economic and social policies when risks are building up, or are high, and seeking inclusive solutions through dialogue, adapted macroeconomic policies, institutional reform in core state functions, and redistributive policies.<sup>14</sup> In short, it is not only about demonstrating to conflict-affected societies what peace can deliver but also how it can deliver it in a way that sustainably reduce risks of falling back into conflict.

### *The social contract*

- It is now accepted that **securing the social contract between state and society** is at the heart of reducing push factors towards violence and maximizing pull factors towards sustainable peace. The ‘social contract’ is diversely defined but in general it refers (in its shortest form) to a “dynamic and implicit agreement between state and society on their mutual roles and responsibilities”.<sup>15</sup> It is based on the concept that people are the ultimate arbitrators of the state’s political power and governments must serve the people (e.g. by providing public goods) while people accept the state’s authority and surrender some of their freedom to it (e.g. by not taking own justice in their own hands or by paying taxes).
- ‘Securing’ the social contract in certain contexts, such as post-conflict societies with very weak state institutions, will mean virtually rebuilding it from scratch, while in other contexts, such as middle-income countries confronted with regional tensions (e.g. massive migration flows), it will mean increasing its capacity to absorb and overcome crises. A resilient social contract has capacity to cope with variations in legitimacy, capacity or effectiveness of state institutions and yields state stability.
- A (simplified) theory of change states that a stronger and more resilient social contract helps finding a pathway for sustainable peace because...
  - a) it gives legitimacy to the state to take decisions in people’s names hence reduces the risks of violent contestation over these decisions.
  - b) it reduces the use of violence outside of the state’s authority (and within collectively-defined boundaries) as it recognizes the preponderance of the rule of law applying to all over individual grievance-settling strategies.
  - c) it helps build institutions necessary for peaceful dialogue and policy-making around contested matters.
- However, securing the social contract is not enough in itself, what matters is building an *inclusive* social contract. Indeed, the more systematically fault lines and horizontal inequalities that divide societal groups and debilitate institutions, the more likely the threats of renewed violence, social fragmentation and repression will be significantly diminished.<sup>16</sup> The best way to prevent societies from descending into crisis is to ensure they are resilient through investment in inclusive political settlements and sustainable development. For all countries, addressing inequalities and exclusion, making institutions more inclusive, and ensuring that development strategies are risk-informed are central to preventing the fraying of the social contract that could erupt into crisis.
- While there are different models relating to how an inclusive social contract can be secured, they adhere broadly to the necessity of making progress at three levels: state capacity, state-society relations and society-society relations. The latter is sometimes forgotten as fragility is – wrongly so

<sup>13</sup> UN & WB, 2017.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> UNDP, 2012.

<sup>16</sup> IFIT (2017), p.15

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- often equated with failures on the part of the state only, and overlooks the fact that it is also linked to weak societies, e.g. deeply divided societies with low social cohesion.
- For this course, we propose the following conceptual model for securing inclusive social contracts in fragile and conflict-affected states. It requires making progress through governance interventions towards achieving:
  - Responsive and equitable institutions: that have the capacity to deliver public goods and services and implement policies effectively across all groups, that can keep powerful actors in check and work the same no matter the political group in leadership and that can uphold the rule of law equitably and effectively through the justice and law enforcement apparatuses.
  - Inclusive politics delivering inclusive policies: that are based on mechanisms that allow for the legitimate and peaceful expression of a plurality of opinions and interests in a way that does not reverse development gains for particular groups. It implies acceptance, among elite and wider population, of equal rights to voice and equal treatment by the state for services, justice and security.
  - Cohesive and resilient society: that is bound by an overarching ‘social covenant’ identity that supersedes identity based on relation, tribe, ethnicity, race, language, etc., that displays positive social capital and that plays a role in monitoring, assessing, mediating, and responding to social conflict and political crises.
- In many cases, especially in context of high-risks or conflict escalation, harnessing these three ‘entry points’ for making tangible progress in the arenas of access to power, security, services and resources is the greatest guarantee of securing the social contract. This requires being able to analyse and engage with the structural factors, institutions, and actors in society that define these arenas and are unique to each context. The state needs not be active and present in all the arenas. In many cases, community structures, traditional leadership, civil society, and the private sector are better placed than the state to mediate and address risks in these arenas and achieve progress.

### *The role of local governance in building and sustaining peace*

- The local level is critical to explain conflict dynamics. Variations in subnational political, social and economic institutions are responsible for large variations in the way conflict or peace take root in particular communities and regions (because there are always pockets of peace and stability even amidst the worst forms of armed conflict). This local perspective is important because policies and forms of governance that work in one region to prevent conflict and secure the social contract may not work in another region.
- Local governance is inherently where the state intersects with society and the point at which national policies meet local aspirations; it can be more easily participatory and inclusive than national governance. The ‘local’ is seen as a crucial entry point to strengthen collective action as a factor of social cohesion, (re)build state capacities, strengthen inclusive state-society relations and eventually reshape the social contract and restore state legitimacy.
- The contribution of local governance to securing the social contract is modelled as follows:
  - Local governance can help legitimize the state by rebuilding its functional presence closer to citizens, a presence that should be capable of organizing the delivery of public goods and services (including by non-state actors). In this sense, strengthening local governance actors, institutions (formal and informal) and systems can change incentives for the state from a top-down accountability chain towards the alignment to local needs and priorities.<sup>17</sup> It also builds confidence in the political settlement underpinning the state by enabling an equitable distribution of resources to the local level hence lowering political tensions and assuaging local claims for secession.
  - Local governance can bring decision-making and political processes (elections, representative democracy) to the local arena as well as provide an inclusive space for dialogue and collective action. It is assumed that inclusive local governance help shift the incentive structure for local leadership and organizations towards cooperation in problem-solving and delivery of inclusive

<sup>17</sup> UNICEF, (2017), *Peacebuilding through Decentralization & Local Governance*, Draft Technical Note.

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local policies that signal a change of paradigm to groups holding grievances, including those victims of horizontal inequalities.

- Local governance can create safe spaces for (re)building relationships between social groups and offer opportunities in building issue-based vs. identity-based coalitions to reinforce the common good, in particular for local security and conflict matters. It can help establish networks within civil society, intersecting and surpassing traditional sectorial or class divisions and thus establishing certain key conditions for lasting peace.
- Because of the high relevance of local governance for the three dimensions of the social contract as modelled above, it is a privileged entry point to mediate disputes and negotiate inclusive solutions in the arenas of access to justice and security, access to power, access to land and natural resources and access to basic services.

### *The evidence at hand*

- There has been few solid research conducted on validating how far local governance contributes holistically to rebuilding the social contract and sustaining peace. Studies have tended so far to focus on a particular aspect of the equation. But the available evidence gives a mixed picture in terms of the extent to which local governance interventions in fragile and conflict-affected settings have brought lasting positive conflict prevention and peacebuilding impact. This is highly context-dependent though and points in general more to design problems in the programmes researched than an intrinsic fault in the theory of change.
- Also, there is still a lack of research and understanding how far and how positive outcomes on the social contract at local level through local governance interventions translate into lesser vulnerability of a country as a whole to conflict risks. For example, in many protracted conflict settings, it has been shown that people's trust in local institutions is much higher than in national institutions and that both can evolve independently from each other.

### **C/ Gender dimension**<sup>18</sup>

- Gender inequality, conflict and fragility are key challenges to sustainable development. They are inextricably linked: unequal gender relations can drive conflict and violence, while women's active participation contributes to peace and resilience. At the same time, conflict and fragility place enormous burdens on women and girls, while peacebuilding and statebuilding can provide unique opportunities to advance recognition of their rights. Strengthening gender equality in fragile situations is therefore critical for achieving global commitments to women's empowerment, sustainable peace, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
- Women face systematic abuse of their rights as a direct outcome of systematic fragility, including due to rising identity politics, clientelism and corruption, or unstable political settlements. While rarely directly at its origin, women see their lives deeply disturbed by conflict due to displacement, sexual and gender-based violence,<sup>19</sup> trafficking and the rapid decline of their socio-economic status. Women's free-willed exercise of voice is also highly curtailed in such settings due to greater vulnerability to security threats, lesser access to educational opportunities and conservative cultural norms. The effect of conflict on women's marginalization is felt long after conflict recedes, as post-conflict settings often see a rise in criminality, domestic violence and post-conflict political settlements tend to lock out women's participation.
- Donor programmes tend to focus on relieving the impacts of conflict or violence on women, but largely neglected the effects of wider fragility issues. They could do more to support women as active agents in peacebuilding and statebuilding, rather than only as victims of conflict and violence and passive beneficiaries.

<sup>18</sup> OECD, 2017.

<sup>19</sup> In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an estimated 400,000 women are raped yearly under an ongoing civil conflict (World Development Report, 2011). In El Salvador, femicides increased in the 2000s faster than male homicides as gang violence skyrocketed. In 2007, El Salvador was the most dangerous place on earth for women (12.94 deaths per 100,000 women).

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- If local governance is where inclusivity in the exercise of power and citizenship can best experienced and rebuilt, this is particularly true for women. The local governance sphere remains a privileged entry point, in many contexts, for women to exercise these rights compared to opportunities offer by national-level politics and institutions. Evidence shows that enhancing the meaningful participation of women in decision making at the local level, as well as long-term policies to address the economic, social, and political aspirations of women are fundamental to sustaining peace in a fast-changing world.

### **D/ Challenges and Risks**

- First of all, the main challenge is understanding that local governance on its own cannot undo complex situations of conflict. A steady pathway to peace also needs, among others, a government that can fulfil its core functions, including maintaining security for all and managing a public administration, a diversified national economy, a democratic culture in society and geopolitical consensus around its success.
- There are examples where local self-governance, including decentralization, has exacerbated conflict or heightened conflict risks, especially where central government is weak and politics fractured. The UN Peacebuilding Commission has identified key recurring challenges for implementing local governance efforts towards greater decentralization in conflict-affected settings:<sup>20</sup>
  - The potential that the infusion of new resources to the local level will generate conflict or renew and exacerbate existing tensions.
  - The potential that the reallocation of power and authority between levels will generate, reignite or intensify preexisting or budding power struggles.
  - The difficulty to ensure that externally-initiated programs of decentralization are carefully designed and take into account historical and cultural issues as well as public perceptions.
  - The difficulty to ensure that the concerns of the poor, especially women and children, are taken into account at the local level, given often the lesser acceptance of local elites of such priorities.
- Evidence shows that ambitious local governance goals in regard to peacebuilding such as strengthening social cohesion may be in competition with more immediate service delivery outputs and outcomes.
- Participation and inclusiveness are no silver bullets and do not seem to deliver *alone* on installing peace in local communities, because violence is often part of the local system of governance. Processes of authority, control and competition during or in the aftermath of violent conflicts are rarely challenged simply through opening channels of participation – which is often where development programmes remain.
- As underlined by the Peacebuilding Commission, transforming local governance systems in conflict-prone or conflict-affected settings implies establishing differential relations with different actors and changing the way institutions function (*the rule of the game*), and this may generate social and political conflict as it affects the balance of power, redistributes resources and creates winners and losers that may be at odds with each other. The risks that this process goes astray are enormous, as shown below.
  - There may be no settlement reached between central and local power-holders: the central state may fail to engineer a comprehensive enough bargain on the sharing of powers and resources and/or may exclude certain groups (and create thereof spoilers) or fail to translate political commitments into concrete measures. Certain local actors may refuse settling central-local relations as they benefit more from the status quo or never abide by any agreement as their goal is secession.
  - Local governments and local bargains reached among local actors may remain marginalized in the peacebuilding process if the central government chooses the path of re-centralization as a means to pacify the country and guarantee the delivery of public goods. It may choose de-concentration only in lieu of devolving real powers and means to elected local governments, depriving these of the

<sup>20</sup> UNICEF, 2017.

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means to influence the well-being of local populations and hence of legitimizing their existence – and by extension, that of the state. This also dampens the formation of social capital as collective action on the part of society is then met by apathy in state institutions closest to them.

- Local political and governance processes may bring more division and corruption: for example, when local elections after a conflict, if certain safeguards are not adopted in the electoral system, lead to local leaders being elected along identity-based lines, defeating the purpose of reducing political marginalization of minority groups. Capture by predatory elites is common at the local level in FCS and can entrench corruption, an inequitable allocation of resources and provision of services, hence accentuating inequalities which work against strong rebuilding social cohesion and trust-based state-society relations.
- Central governments may view the task of transforming local governance as meaning the imposition of a single liberal order based on state-sanctioned norms and institutions (local governments), excluding social institutions such as traditional or religious structures, even though they are for many communities the bedrock of social cohesion.

### E/ Development approaches

- For a long time, governments and international agencies alike treated the dual goals of ‘good governance’ and ‘conflict resolution’ separately. Things are changing, because conflict (or the risk of conflict) is unlikely to be solved or prevented without states having the capacity to govern without resorting to violence. Also, the global discourse has moved from a focus on peacebuilding to a focus on sustaining peace, which emphasizes preventing conflict risks from emerging and then escalating – or resurging in post-conflict situations. In order to achieve more effective prevention, new mechanisms need to be established that allow the various tools and instruments of prevention, in particular diplomacy and mediation, security, and development, to work in much greater synergy, and much earlier on.<sup>21</sup>
- This global trend towards a multi-dimensional approach is of course relevant to local governance programming and is also coupled with a multi-scalar approach, which emphasizes that peace cannot only come from above. The liberal peacebuilding model that viewed the imposition of a peace settlement from above and understood support to local governance merely as vehicle to extend the state’s authority to all confines of a country, has also been largely challenged now. Emphasizing the sub-national and local levels is particularly necessary for preventing conflict and addressing territories that are marginalized or ungoverned as a consequence of a deficient political settlement is critical.<sup>22</sup>
- While there is good progress in reckoning the importance of the local level for sustaining peace, programming approaches on the ground are still slow to change and tend to align with the below options.
  - Focus primarily on building a strong core of government and national political institutions, while managing local needs and aspirations for local self-governance through community-driven development models until such time as state stability. In-depth research has now proven the limited success in actually effecting lasting change in terms of peace, social cohesion and state legitimacy through such approach.
  - Jumpstart decentralization reforms, partly to appease claims of autonomy and threats of local unrest, or to bridge the gaps of a weak central state incapable of assuming its core functions. Usually, the massive input of resources and capacity development that is needed to make decentralization succeed in such contexts is not sufficient and/or too short-timed (while a decentralization reform needs a minimum of 10 years to deliver stable results). The outcomes of such an approach in the fragile countries where it has been followed is not convincing.
  - Address local governance primarily through ad hoc short-term efforts to build capacities of local governments for specific tasks (e.g. service delivery, LED, social cohesion, security) and involve more local populations in their decision, but on the basis of existing political arrangements, without acknowledging the political economy that created the crisis situation in the first place or precludes any real changes in terms of inclusivity and accountability. Such approach ignores the risks of

<sup>21</sup> UN & WB, 2017.

<sup>22</sup> UN & WB, 2016.

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exacerbating drivers of fragility and conflict by strengthening, rather than transforming, prevailing local governance arrangements.

- In fact, the international response is crossed by five main tensions:
  - Building an elite-based political settlement (which will often then remain at the national level) that can provide stability in the short term, and pushing for an inclusive settlement, with good representation from sub-national elites and power holders, which takes longer but also delivers better development outcomes, in particular for the economy.
  - Between the vision of a more responsive decentralized state and the reality of extremely weak local formal institutions.
  - Between (re)-building a functional local government structure (costly and risky) and delivering faster peace and development outcomes at lower costs and with lesser risks through parallel channels.
  - Between a state based on a strong input (rules-based) legitimacy and a state capable of managing violence by accepting hybrid public authority at the local level (e.g. a role for informal institutions).
  - Between the relative simplicity of delivering participation and inclusion in exogenous interventions, and the more complex and longer process to durably change the way in which endogenous decisions are made.
- Approaches that attempt to connect peacebuilding and statebuilding at the local level work better. It implies for example supporting strong national state capacity to provide basic services inclusively together with sufficient regional and local autonomy to provide a sense of legitimacy (deconcentration with decentralization).
- To support a wider impact of local governance interventions on a country's pathway for peace, it is crucial to adopt a multi-scalar and long-term approach, involving different levels of government, not just the lowest ones as this is not the most powerful level to shape the state governance structures.

### **F/ Context specificities and analysis**

- Analysing prevailing national and local contexts before adapting the proposed theory of change into development programme is primordial as the choice of implementation strategy, interventions, speed of action and phasing should be guided first and foremost by local opportunities and risks. On the other hand, DPs should avoid the danger of excessive 'localism' by tailoring their programme entirely to the situation of the narrowly-defined locale(s) selected. Effecting change on fragility and conflict trajectories from a localized approach requires at-scale legal and institutional, if not societal, changes that reach far beyond the mere boundaries of the local. No territory nowadays functions in isolation from surrounding territories or the central governance level.
- A very important dimension guiding the choice of strategy (and even the decision to intervene) lies with the political economy of central-local relations and of relations between local governance actors. A broader "power lens" that recognises social norms, attitudes and behaviours as part of the field of power in which formal actors operate and exercise or contest power, and not just on the visible formal manifestations of power, is necessary.<sup>23</sup> Such analysis helps gauge the political feasibility of intervening given interests and incentives, the role of formal institutions and the impact of values and ideas in state-society interactions. It also helps anticipate the possible redistributive effect on power of a local governance intervention.
- Different levels of variables are important to consider when researching a particular context before deciding on an intervention: (i) Primary variables (directly affecting local governance arrangements and usually targets for programming); and (ii) Secondary variables (indirectly affecting local governance and also hard to influence through a local governance programme):
  - **Primary variables:** the state's overall institutional capacity, democratic nature, and capacity to operate equitably across identity groups and at different levels; the nature of the state (unitary or federal); the scope (political, fiscal, administrative) and nature (devolution, delegation, deconcentration) of decentralization between existing levels of government; the nature, strength and legitimacy of non-state local actors, in particular armed groups and traditional leaders; the channels available for the exercise of voice at the local level (elected representation, bureaucratic

<sup>23</sup> Justino, 2017.



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- action, lobbying, social action, consultation); the capacity of civil society at the local level to bring people together across cleavages; the conflict drivers specific to the area(s) considered; the shape and intensity of violence stemming from local issues; the strength, policies and level of coordination of donor support towards local governance in the country.
- **Secondary variables:** the force of the political settlement / agreement; the ethnic, religious and cultural make-up and the rigidity of these boundaries and corresponding political cleavages; the form of nationalism (liberal, ethnic, ideological, religious, etc.); the neutrality of security forces; the country's income level, extent of economic hardships and their differentiated impact on the population; the national and local economic diversification and how far it rests on natural resources; the national-level conflict drivers and the shape and intensity of violence between national-level political actors; the regional and global geopolitics interfering with the country's sovereignty and political destiny; the vulnerability to global threats (e.g. price shocks, terrorism, transnational organized crime, disasters and climate change).
  - Also, the difference between rural and urban settings needs to be reckoned with and properly integrated the same recipes to support local governance cannot be applied indiscriminately to rural villages, mid-size towns and large metropolises.

### *Political Economy Analysis*


- Political economy analysis (PEA) is a powerful approach for improving the effectiveness of aid. It focuses on how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts, and the implications for development outcomes. It gets beneath the formal structures to reveal the underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or frustrate change. Such insights are important to advance challenging agendas around governance, economic growth and service delivery, especially in FCS.<sup>24</sup>
- PEA is concerned with understanding:
  - The interests and incentives facing different groups in society (and particularly political elites), and how these generate particular policy outcomes that may encourage or hinder development.
  - The role that formal institutions (e.g. rule of law, elections) and informal social, political and cultural norms play in shaping human interaction and political and economic competition.
  - The impact of values and ideas, including political ideologies, religion and cultural beliefs, on political behaviour and public policy
- Typically, a PEA can be applied: (i) to a country; (ii) to a sector; (iii) to a problem. PEA does not replace other types of context assessment (including capacity assessments, gender analysis, environmental impact assessments, value chain assessments, etc.); it rather comes in addition to more traditional forms of assessment, to shed light on the political and economic feasibility of proposed solutions & reforms. In general, a PEA is concerned with studying the following aspects:
  - Stakeholder identification and engagement analysis (including inter-relations)
  - Incentives and constraints mapping
  - Rents and rent distribution
  - Historical legacies & prior experiences with reforms
  - Social trends & forces (e.g. ethnic tensions, value debates) and how they shape stakeholder positions and actions.
- There are many methodologies and tools used in FCS that are infused with a PEA approach. Among the most known are:
  - UNDG Conflict-Related Development Analysis
  - UNDP Institutional and Context Analysis
  - DfID Political Economy Analysis Note
  - UN/WB/EU Recovery & Peacebuilding Assessment
  - UN/WB Diagnostic Tool on Core Government Functions in the aftermath of conflict
- The issue with political economy analysis tools is that they are seldom properly used by DPs, because this would be time-consuming, complex and may focus too much focus on informal actors and informal power networks while DPs have limited leeway to engage with these.

<sup>24</sup> DfID, 2009.



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- Context analysis for programming in local governance should be done bearing in mind that it needs to produce actionable directions and indicators for monitoring and evaluation as well. More generally, context analysis in FCS should provide country-wide, localised and sector-specific indicators of fragility and recovery. As this is a massive effort, it should be done collectively by the international community (e.g. fragility assessments of the PSGs, localization of SDG indicators).



Source: UNDP (2016)

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

The tools presented below focus more particularly on assessing the political economy applicable to a country's governance institutions and processes, as well as broader conflict drivers and dynamics in some cases (UNDG Tool). The three tools are:

- 1) DfID Political Economy Analysis
- 1) UNDG Conflict and Development Analysis
- 2) UNDP Institutional and Context Analysis

All tools have been formatted in a summary version (extracts). Links are provided to the original tool.

### **1. DfID Political Economy Analysis**

<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/3797.pdf>

#### **What is the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) method and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?**

Political economy analysis is a powerful tool for improving the effectiveness of aid. Bridging the traditional concerns of politics and economics, it focuses on how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts, and the implications for development outcomes. It gets beneath the formal structures to reveal the underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or frustrate change. Such insights are important if we are to advance challenging agendas around governance, economic growth and service delivery, which experience has shown do not lend themselves to technical solutions alone.

Specifically, PEA is concerned with understanding

1. The **interests** and **incentives** facing different groups in society (and particularly political elites), and how these generate particular policy outcomes that may encourage or hinder development.
2. The **role** that **formal institutions** (e.g. rule of law, elections) and **informal social, political and cultural norms** play in shaping human interaction and political and economic competition.
3. The **impact of values and ideas**, including political ideologies, religion and cultural beliefs, on political behaviour and public policy.

#### **What can the PEA tool help development practitioners do?**

Political economy analysis is not a magic bullet for the resolution of intractable development problems. However, it can help development partners in the following ways.

- Contribute to a shared understanding of the political context and how it affects our overall aid strategy.
- Inform better policy and programming, through the identification of feasible, realistic solutions to development challenges.
- Support risk management and scenario planning, by helping to identify the critical factors that are likely to drive or impede significant change in the future.
- Broaden the scope for dialogue with donors and country partners around key political challenges and opportunities at the country and sector level.
- Promote coherence across HMG around a common analysis of the underlying political and economic processes shaping development.

The use of PEA is particularly relevant in fragile and conflict-affected environments where the challenge of building peaceful states and societies is fundamentally political.

#### **How is a PEA process organized?**

Three major uses of political economy analysis can be distinguished:


→ **Macro-level country analysis:** to enhance general sensitivity to country context and understanding of the broad political-economy environment. This can be useful to inform country planning processes and the overall strategic direction of a DP's country programmes. It seeks to answer broad impact-level

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

questions, such as: how policy and institutional reforms that benefit poor people emerge and endure, or why in many cases they are blocked; how peace settlements develop into sustainable peace processes or why, in many cases, they fail to establish sustainable peace.

A macro-level analysis considers the dynamic interaction between three sets of factors, which vary over different timescales:

- **Structures**, defined as the long-term contextual factors. Generally, these are not readily influenced by a programme, either because of the time scale needed, or because they are determined outside the country. Examples include economic and social structures, geo-strategic position, natural resource endowment, demographic shifts, climate change and technological progress.
- **Institutions**, which can be *formal* in the sense of constitutional rules and codified laws, or *informal* in the sense of political, social and cultural norms. In settings where formal institutions (e.g. the rule of law, elections, separation of powers) are weakly embedded and enforced, informal norms often explain how things really get done. In many developing countries, there are tensions between formal rules and informal power relations, sometimes making politics unpredictable and prone to conflict.
- **Agents**, including internal actors such as political leaders, civil servants, political parties, business associations, trade unions, CSOs etc., and external actors such as foreign governments, regional organisations, donors and multinational corporations.



Whatever the actual data collection method use, a country-level PEA should help DPs think systematically about how political decisions are made, taking into account four elements of a political decision-making process:


- a) the wider historical, socio-economic and cultural environment, including the legitimacy of a given political process;
- b) the immediate pressures coming from groups and interests who influence, but do not make political decisions;
- c) the processes, both formal and informal, through which decisions are actually made;
- d) the continuing politics of implementation that determine the implications, if any, of political decisions.

→ **Sector-level analysis**, to identify specific barriers and opportunities within particular sector or domain where a DP is working e.g. health, education, roads, local governance, and to explain why reforms in these areas may have stalled / failed to deliver the expected outcomes. It helps outline what incentives and constraints influence politicians, civil servants and other reformers in these sectors and how donors might engage to facilitate effective policy change.

A sector-level analysis usually consists in two steps:

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

### a) Stakeholder Mapping:



b) Stakeholder Analysis: identify who are the most influential actors, what are their interests and incentives, and how do these shape overall dynamics of the sector, including the feasibility of proposed policy reforms. It usually covers the following set of questions:

- Roles and responsibilities: Who are the key stakeholders in the sector? What are the formal/informal roles and mandates of different players? What is the balance between central/local authorities in provision of services?
- Ownership Structure and Financing: What is the balance between public and private ownership? How is the sector financed (e.g. public/private partnerships, user fees, taxes, donor support)?
- Power Relations: To what extent is power vested in the hands of specific individuals/groups? How do different interest groups outside government (e.g. private sector, NGOs, consumer groups, the media) seek to influence policy?
- Historical legacies: What is the past history of the sector, including previous reform initiatives? How does this influence current stakeholder perceptions?
- Corruption and rent-seeking: Is there significant corruption and rent-seeking in the sector? Where is this most prevalent (e.g. at point of delivery; procurement; allocation of jobs)? Who benefits most from this? How is patronage being used?
- Service Delivery: Who are the primary beneficiaries of service-delivery? Are particular social, regional or ethnic groups included/excluded? Are subsidies provided, and which groups benefit most from these?
- Ideologies and Values: What are the dominant ideologies and values which shape views around the sector? To what extent may these serve to constrain change?
- Decision-Making: How are decisions made within the sector? Who is party to these decision-making processes?
- Implementation Issues: Once made, are decisions implemented? Where are the key bottlenecks in the system? Is failure to implement due to lack of capacity or other political-economy reasons?
- Potential for Reform: Who are likely to be the “winners” and “losers” from particular reforms? Are there any key reform champions within the sector? Who is likely to resist reforms and why? Are there “second best” reforms which might overcome this opposition?

→ **Problem-driven analysis**, geared to understanding and resolving a particular problem at the project level, or in relation to specific policy issue e.g. growth or public financial management reform.

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

“Problem-driven” does not mean focusing exclusively on areas of difficulty, but also identifying opportunities and learning from where success has been achieved.

A problem-driven PEA involves three main steps:

- (i) Identifying the problem, issue or vulnerability to be addressed.
- (ii) Mapping out the institutional and governance weaknesses which underpin the problem.
- (iii) Drilling down to the political economy drivers which constrain or support progressive change.

	<b>What vulnerabilities/challenges?</b>	Evidence of poor outcomes to which GPE weaknesses appear to contribute.	Eg: repeated failure to adopt sector reform and poor sector outcomes. Continuous food insecurity. Corruption continues to undermine the business climate even after anti-corruption law.
	Institutional & governance arrangements & capacities	What are the associated institutional set-up and governance arrangements?	Mapping of relevant branches of gov't, ministries, agencies & their interaction. Existing laws & regulations. Policy processes (formal rules & de facto).
	Political economy drivers	Why are things this way? Why are policies or institutional arrangements not being improved?	Analysis of stakeholders, incentives, rents/rent-distribution, historical legacies & prior experiences with reforms, social trends & forces (eg ethnic tensions) and how they shape current stakeholder positions and actions.

(Source: World Bank, Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy)

### 2. UNDP Institutional and Context Analysis:

[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OGC/UNDP\\_Institutional%20and%20Context%20Analysis.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OGC/UNDP_Institutional%20and%20Context%20Analysis.pdf)

#### What is the Institutional and Context Analysis (ICA) method and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?

‘Institutional and Context Analysis’ refers to an analysis that focuses on political and institutional factors, as well as processes concerning the use of national and external resources in a given setting and how these have an impact on the implementation of development programmes and policy advice. The ICA is method developed by the UNDP in 2012 for use by its Country Offices at the time of programming. It came as a recognition that, among development practitioners, technical solutions, however ably formulated, are not enough to achieve the intended result. Political processes, informal institutions, and power relations all play vital roles in the success or failure of development interventions. Knowing and understanding the interests of national and other actors can be the difference between a programme’s success or failure.

#### What can the ICA help development practitioners do?

- ICA can help Development Partners (DPs) become more strategic in their engagement with different actors and sectors in a given country. It does this by providing a framework for understanding the incentives and constraints that frequently pit social actors against one another, and against development interventions. Rather than undertaking situation analyses that rely on vague notions of political will, ICA instead focuses on how some actors stand to lose if a development programme is successful.
- ICA can add value to many areas, far beyond governance issues. Development projects in diverse sectors – be it environment, women’s economic empowerment, or post-conflict reconstruction – all work with social actors who have varying incentives to engage in pro-development behaviour. ICA offers a way of understanding those incentives, and is a form of risk mitigation for DPs. ICA can help DPs assess the likelihood that certain partners will collaborate or will resist change, for example in the level of support to mainstreaming gender concerns.

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

An ICA can help equally a Country Programme formulation or a programme / project formulation.

### How is an ICA process organized?

The ICA approach is inspired from political economy analysis, which usually examine the interaction of politics and resources. Yet, ICA is not restricted to an analysis of economic issues, nor are the relevant actors always political. ICA intends to provide a general approach to development matters, which may not be purely economic in nature; it goes beyond political and economic factors to facilitate a more holistic understanding of a diverse context.

In its most basic form, ICA is based on a set of 5 assumptions of how development works. From those assumptions is derived a set of key questions that should be answered before undertaking a development programme. The core of ICA is a focus on how a society's actors, who face varying incentives and constraints, shape the likelihood of programme success. The assumptions and related questions are shown below. They provide an analytical framework rather than a data collection template. The latter can be developed in a second stage, and will depend on whether the object of the ICA is a country or a particular development issue which is at the center of a new project.

1. Development requires a change in power relations and/or incentive systems.
  - a. What past conditions have led to historic pro-development or pro-poor policies in the country, such as laws relating to universal primary schooling, the enfranchisement of women, or the loosening of restrictions on the media?
  - b. Did these advances occur following major social movements or a post-conflict settlement, as a result of major electoral changes, or for some other reason?
2. The powerful reward their supporters before anyone else.
  - a. On whom do the powerful depend to keep them in power? How are supporters rewarded?
  - b. What is the ability of those out of power, and those they represent, to protect their rights and have their voices heard? What other fault lines exist among those out of power?
3. All actors in society have interests and incentives.
  - a. Do not think in terms of political will. The term is vague and unhelpful. Ask instead, 'what are the political incentives?'
  - b. What incentives could make actors put public interest before private interest? Can these private interests be leveraged for public gain?
4. Resources shape incentives.
  - a. On what sources of revenue do power holders depend and how does that dependence shape their incentives in responding to claim makers?
  - b. How does the DP's presence affect the relationship between power holders and claim makers?
5. But all stakeholders in society have constraints.
  - a. Are major actors constrained by formal rules, or do informal rules seem to matter more? For example, do traditional or religious authorities enjoy significant influence in state institutions? How do gender relations influence the choices that individuals and institutions make?
  - b. If a group or organization has an interest in an issue, is there evidence of their ability to act collectively? Do they have a history of effective activism?

Examining gender relations is an integral part of ICA, but it is important to assess how gender interplays with factors such as age, caste, location and marital status in order to draw conclusions about which groups of women and/or men enjoy particular benefits and face particular constraints.

→ **Country-Level ICA:** usually, data collection will follow the template below.

#### State control and distribution of resources

1. Does the state exercise control over its territory?
2. Is the country landlocked? Does it depend economically on neighbouring countries?
3. Are there cross-border groups that have an impact on state stability?



## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

4. Are there any geographical features that might impede central state control over the territory, present physical barriers to communication, or lead to the isolation or marginalization of particular groups or regions?
5. Is competition for scarce resources or particular patterns of exploitation of natural resources a potential source of conflict?
6. What financial and other resources are available to non-state actors, including opposition groups?
7. Are there particular power differentials that cause certain groups to be excluded from economic opportunities (e.g., women, ethnic minorities, migrants)?
8. How has the country responded in the past to external financial crises with regard to social protection mechanisms?
9. How significant is the public sector in providing employment opportunities? Is entry into the civil service open and transparent? Are promotions within it based on merit?
10. Is there a large informal economy that makes taxation problematic?
11. Have processes of land and agrarian reform taken place, and if so, what are their effect on social and economic structures?

### Outside forces at work

1. Are there natural resources that may interest external actors?
2. What is the role and function of the extractive industry in the country?
3. What is the percentage of aid in the overall budget? How much influence do external actors, including donors, have on development policy?
4. What are the key export/import products and who are the key export/import partners?
5. Are export generated resources reinvested transparently? If so, how?
6. How much foreign direct investment does the country attract? Are resources generated reinvested in the country transparently? If so, how?
7. Is there an obvious dependence on neighbouring countries and the region, and what impact does that have?
8. What is the size of remittances coming into the economy?
9. What role do multinationals and other states play in the country?
10. Do transnational criminal networks have a significant presence or influence in the country?

### Legal system

1. What is the constitutional structure of the state (type of government, electoral system, and the organization of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary)?
2. Are the constitution and the legal framework an outcome of a state-society negotiation and is it broadly seen to be legitimate?
3. How often has the constitution been changed, and how easily?
4. To which United Nations and regional treaties is the country party, and how is international law absorbed in national law? Are treaties ratified and implemented?
5. Which judicial, administrative or other authorities have jurisdiction over the promotion and protection of human rights, and what remedies are available to an individual who claims his/her rights have been violated?
6. Which specialized and independent oversight entities exist in the country and how do they function (for example, electoral commission, public service commission, anti-corruption commission, human rights commission and ombudsman office)?
7. To what extent is the political executive constrained by law?
8. Are there major defects in the formal systems (for example, in the electoral system or in the definition of the security sector's role and its relationship to civilian authorities)? Are gender inequalities perpetuated through law and, if so, in which pieces of legislation?

### Social structure

1. Are there ethnic, tribal, cultural, religious, linguistic or other divisions in the country?
2. What are the structures of traditional authority, and how important are they?
3. In which areas are there significant gender inequalities, and which groups of women or men are particularly disadvantaged?
4. Are certain ethnic, religious or other groups particularly disadvantaged?

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5. Is there a history of violent conflict in the country? Is there a history of coups and other violent or unconstitutional changes of power?
6. How equitable is economic and social development in the country? Are there specific groups or regions that seem to be left out?
7. Who is civil society in the country? To what extent and how do they interact with formal and/or political structures?
8. Are there business associations with capacity to organize demands for public goods, or are interests more fragmented, with individuals seeking private deals through personal networks?

### Political structure

1. How has the state's history shaped the access to political and economic power of different groups, relationships between them and perceptions of state legitimacy?
2. Are particular groups legally, or in practice, excluded from the political process?
3. What electoral system(s) is/are used at the national and sub-national levels (plurality – majority, proportional, mixed, direct or indirect) and who administers elections?
4. What do voters expect their government/elected representatives to deliver – individual patronage benefits, community-specific benefits or broader public goods?
5. How far do political parties organize around programmes rather than individuals?
6. How representative are the branches of government and do they enjoy legitimacy? What is the level of confidence of people in state institutions and where does support for the government come from?

→ **ICA at Project Level:** At the project level, an ICA should be tailored to the specific area the project seeks to address, such as decentralization, private sector development, disaster risk reduction or a combination of these. Whenever possible, the analysis should draw on the findings of a country-level ICA, which identifies the historical trajectory of the country and what has led it to where it is in broader terms. It considers, for example, whether the country has a strong democratic tradition or is in transition, in crisis or just recovering from conflict. The ICA process for a project programming exercise consists in different steps with proposed guiding questions for each, as detailed below.

### Stakeholder Analysis

This part of the process is meant to map and analyse the formal and informal rules and institutions that influence the issue at stake. It can be done through desk reviews, focus group interviews, stakeholder analyses, and validation workshops. It covers to main areas:


#### a) *Formal & Informal Institutions:*

1. What is the current existing legal framework on the issue at hand?
2. How did the legal framework come about? How was it introduced, by whom, and why? How did it evolve over the years?
3. Are relevant laws being implemented? What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing regulations? What are the gaps?
4. What are the informal rules preventing implementation of relevant legislation and regulatory frameworks? These can include cultural, traditional or other norms that may not be codified in legislation, but which determine how groups interact in the public and private spheres, from the national to the local and domestic levels.
5. Are there important informal institutions (for example, cultural traditions) that are relevant to the project and can be used to improve the likelihood of success?
6. Is the project likely to challenge certain informal institutions directly or indirectly? If so, expect actors to defend the benefits they accrue from the status quo.
7. Which groups challenge the legal framework (e.g., women's organizations)? Have reforms in this particular area been attempted before? If so, by whom, why and with what results? If not, why were they resisted and why are they being attempted now?
8. What has been/is the source of financing for these reforms? Are they donor-funded, or financed by public resources?
9. How are responsibilities distributed between the national and sub-national levels?

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### b) Stakeholder and engagement analysis:

1. Stakeholder mapping: Who are the relevant stakeholders that have a bearing on the issue at hand? Who are the main actors in the policymaking process in the area? Which actors play an informal role in this area? What are their time horizons? Are they in office short-term or long-term? How and in which arenas do they communicate and interact and what are the characteristics of those arenas? What is the nature of the exchanges and transactions they undertake?
2. Stakeholders' incentives and constraints: What are the main interests of the actors? Are they homogeneous groups or are there divisions within the groups (e.g., between women and men, based on ethnicity, caste, age and/or the ruralurban divide)? Who gains from the status quo? Who stands to gain what from the project? Who loses with a change in the state of affairs? What do they stand to lose? For example, what incentives does an incumbent government have to introduce merit-based hiring in the civil service if they rely on non-merit based hiring to reward supporters? For those with the most to gain or lose from the project, what is their capacity to act on their incentives? How do informal and formal relationships among actors, or their ethnicity, party, or religious affiliation affect policy implementation of the project? If reforms in this area have failed in the past, what makes actors support it now? How and why have their interests changed?
3. Identifying the best way to engage with different types of stakeholders and foster coalitions for change: this is done by drawing a diagram to help visualize the types of stakeholders that may affect the project and the best way for the DP to engage with them. It scales two variables: X) How much formal or informal power does each stakeholder have (i.e., to what extent can they influence the outcome of the project concerned); Y) How much interest does each stakeholder have in the success of the project? From there, four different engagement approaches can be defined with the identified stakeholders.



### c) Identifying entry points and risks:

1. Based on the information collected so far, what are the most feasible entry points for interventions
2. If resources are limited, what are the pros and cons of each possible entry point? What entry points have the potential to lead to change in the short-, medium-, and long-terms?
3. How sensitive are these entry points to changes caused by the external environment (for example, the economy, disasters or changes in government due to elections)?
4. Where appropriate, how will the Country Office ensure that women and men among the stakeholders will benefit equally from the proposed interventions?
5. What are the risks involved in the choice of entry points? How can these be mitigated?
6. Based on the above, what are recommended ways forward?

### d) Potential for change and actions to be prioritized:

1. Is change possible? How likely is it?
2. How can incentives be transformed by broader political and socioeconomic factors? What can DPs do to respond in a way that will help facilitate the change process?
3. Is the nature of formal or informal institutions and of relationships likely to be affected by collective action or broader political and socio-economic factors?
4. What stakeholders would bring most traction to a positive change process? How can they be supported?
5. What kind of collective action by stakeholders or a coalition of stakeholders could enhance their influence and lead to or block change?
6. Given the information available, what are the likely scenarios that emerge from the stakeholder analysis and the possible sources of change? What can external actors contribute to facilitate development outcomes?
7. Is there a potential for actions to be harmful? If so, how? What can be done to avoid this?

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

### 3. UNDG Conflict and Development Analysis

[https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/UNDP\\_CDA-Report\\_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf](https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/UNDP_CDA-Report_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf)

#### **What is the Conflict and Development Analysis (CDA) and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?**

A Conflict and Development Analysis (CDA) - or simply conflict analysis – is a tool that assists with analysing a specific context and developing strategies for reducing or eliminating the impact and consequences of violent conflict. It provides a deeper understanding of the issues that can drive conflict and the dynamics that have the potential to promote peace in a wide variety of countries where the United Nations (UN) operates.


Furthermore, the assessment can help identify the nature of the populations’ inherent resilience, and elaborate ways to support and strengthen that resilience. It can often appear convenient to focus analysis and interventions on the symptoms of conflict i.e. the manifestations of the situation. However, eliminating the symptoms of conflict will not solve the problem; furthermore, covering up the symptoms can actually encourage their replication and escalate the conflict. Applying a conflict analysis lens prevents national and international actors from concentrating resources and efforts only on the symptoms of conflict; conflict analysis supports national counterparts and governments to engage in effective political processes through an analysis of causality, linkages, entry-points and opportunities for action.

#### **What can the CDA help development practitioners do?**

- Establish a better understanding of the context in which you are working;
- Develop consensus among stakeholders around the challenges or issues that they face;
- Review and ensure that suggested reforms and subsequent programming is conflict-sensitive and doing ‘no harm’;
- Engage national counterparts and/or the international community in deeper discussions of key issues identified in the analysis;
- Advocate for more sustainable outcomes through an increased focus on the root causes of conflict rather than on the symptoms;
- Find entry-points for programming that would address the substantial issues of fragility or potentially violent conflict, while also strengthening peace engines within a conflict-affected context;
- Promote collaborative approaches within UNCTs and between UNCTs and UN Missions concerning the prevention of conflict and human rights violations; and,
- Develop scenarios and undertake contingency planning and risk management in unstable environments.

#### **How the CDA process organized?**

**Stage 1 (Conflict Analysis)** is the main stage of data collection on the context at stake and analysis. It follows 8 steps as shown below.



## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

The central goal of a conflict analysis is to identify:

- **Conflict drivers:** Which processes appear to be driving or fueling the conflict, and who is involved?
- **Peace engines:** What are the initial opportunities for building peace, and who is involved?

The main content and process aspects of each step of the analysis are summarized below:

Information validation: it consists in acquiring feedback for the findings that


have been obtained through primary and secondary research, before embarking on the detailed situation analysis. It is usually done through single-stakeholder and/or multi-stakeholder workshops, as well as interviews. Whatever the method chosen, it is essential to accommodate different perspectives. No single narrative will be able to encapsulate all the historical, multi-faceted aspects of the conflict.

Situation Analysis: it seeks to produce an introductory ‘snapshot’ of the current and emerging historical, political, economic, security, socio-cultural and environmental context in a conflict-affected area at a specific point in time. It is the entry point to understanding the conflict, including a cursory understanding of both conflict drivers and peace engines, focusing for the time being on the ‘big picture’ and identifying areas that will need further deeper research.

Key questions that go into a situation analysis are shown below. Further customization of the questions will be needed depending on the initial context review, and in particular at which level of fragility and conflict process the analysis takes place.

- How does the conflict manifest itself? Does it appear to be a national, sub-regional or local conflict?
- Is the conflict contained within one country or are there cross-border issues and ramifications that need to be taken into consideration?
- What are the major effects of the conflict? What will be the major consequences of the conflict in the short-, medium-, and long-term?
- How long has the conflict been underway? Does it appear to be cyclical? Does it appear to be getting worse?
- Are there key events or trends which impact upon the intensity of the conflict e.g. such as elections, weather patterns, unemployment, food prices, etc.?
- Who appear to be the main actors in the conflict? Who are the key groups and individuals? Who is most affected by the conflict? What roles do men and women play?
- What appear to be the main drivers of conflict? Is it fuelled by: inequality, marginalisation, identity issues, or access to natural resources, for example?
- If human rights violations are being committed, are they part of a pattern or do they constitute isolated events? Are these issues being addressed by the relevant authorities? Is the national policy and legal framework for human rights protection adequate?
- Are there any peace processes or peacebuilding endeavours underway? If so, where? To what extent have these efforts been successful?
- Who have been the main and/or most influential actors that have been pursuing peaceful means to resolve conflict? Which actors have the capacity and/or the interest to strengthen peace? What role do women play in pursuing peace?
- Which structures or institutions most prominently offer peaceful means by which to resolve or prevent conflict? Which structures or institutions have the potential to offer peaceful means by which to resolve or prevent conflict?

A situation analysis can be focused on a subnational area, but there will always be elements of the analysis looking at the national context as local conflicts are never insulated from country-level and



- |                            |                       |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) Information Validation | (5) Conflict Dynamics |
| (2) Situation Analysis     | ▣ Conflict Drivers    |
| (3) Factor Assessment      | ▣ Peace Engines       |
| (4) Stakeholder Analysis   | (6) Scenario-building |
|                            | (7) Reporting         |

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

rarely from regional dynamics as well. When researching a ‘local conflict’, it will always encompass a range of scale, from community, to municipality to region.

The situation analysis needs to be gendered, in the sense that gender relations and how these relations shape the extent to which women engage in, are affected by, and seek to prevent and resolve conflict, should be included in the analysis.

*Factor Assessment:* to identify ‘conflict factors’ and ‘peace factors’ i.e. deeply rooted issues that underlie the dynamics of conflict and peace as well as latent conflict or manifestations of conflict, frequently in the form of violence. The factor assessment will identify the factors that fuel and exacerbate conflict (as a component of conflict drivers), and the factors that mitigate conflict and build peace (as a component of peace engines). The factor assessment is sometimes also referred to as ‘causal analysis’.

A Factor Assessment involves determining for each of the political, security, economic, social, cultural and environmental dimensions, the following factors:

- Structural/ Root Factors: long-term, deep-rooted factors underlying violent conflict.
- Intermediate/Proxy Factors: accelerators of the conflict/visible manifestations.
- Triggers: actions that contribute to further escalation of the conflict.

*Stakeholder Analysis:* it seeks to identify and analyse the key actors in a given context. A stakeholder analysis will identify local, national, regional and international actors that influence or are influenced by the conflict, and how they interrelate and reinforce opportunities for peace or instigate conflict. Within this framework, the term ‘actors’ refers to individuals, groups and institutions engaged in, as well as being affected by, conflict.

For each stakeholder identified, the following should be analyzed:

- Characteristics: Features that describe the actor (individual, group or organization), e.g.
- Size of the group or organization, location and membership.
- Positions: What are the relationships among the various stakeholders? What are their positions on fundamental issues? What are the ‘drivers’ behind their actions?
- Interests and Needs: How do these interests and needs of stakeholders influence the conflict? How can the interests of the stakeholders be described? Are their interests political, economic, religious, environmental, or educational?
- Capacities: What resources do they have to influence conflict either positively or negatively? (i.e. Large active membership, external financial support, products, information, etc.).
- Gender dimension: What roles do women play?

Typical questions involved in a stakeholder analysis include:



- Who are the main stakeholders?
- Do they participate in current decision-making bodies?
- What are their main interests, goals and positions?
- What are their capacities and resources?
- Are there lines of connection/support between armed and civilian stakeholders? Is there capacity to mobilise civilians at short notice?
- What are the relationships between and among all stakeholders and how are they connected?
- What are their interests? Do their interests converge?
- What and where are the capacities for peace? How are they connected to the other stakeholders?
- What stakeholders can be identified as spoilers and why?
- What horizontal inequalities exist and what are their impacts on relationships amongst stakeholders, including among groups by identity, religion, ethnicity, region, etc.?
- What role does gender play in the conflict and is it a positive transformative role (i.e. is it mobilizing social movements for peace? Enabling social and political leadership)? If so, how can this be encouraged to contribute to long-term conflict prevention? If not, how can negative influences be mitigated?

## PR 2.7 PEA Tools

In general, the output of a stakeholder analysis is a Stakeholder Map, as the one shown beside.


Conflict dynamics and drivers of change analysis: it consists in combining the situation, factor and stakeholder analyses to understand how they affect and interact with each other. The conflict dynamics analysis helps to identify the relationship between factors that may drive conflict or support peace engines and stakeholder involvement, and aims to provide a multi-dimensional understanding of conflict. The focus, therefore, is on the dynamics of the situation i.e. the forces that are creating certain processes, or leading to certain events and activities.

Issue, problem or opportunity –  
Boundary of Network



→ **Conflict drivers:** dynamic processes that contribute to the ignition or exacerbation of destructive conflict. Conflict drivers emerge when structural and/or proximate conflict factors are affected by or affect various stakeholders, triggering some form of response, usually either a manifestation of violent conflict or contributing to the emergence of violent conflict.

Frequently, conflict drivers comprise more than one structural and/or proximate factor, given the complex nature of conflicts and the associated undercurrents. Conflicts, however, are rarely caused by one driver alone; most conflicts are the result of several, complex and inter-locking conflict drivers.



→ **Peace Engines:** Like conflict drivers, a peace engine describes the dynamic process that mitigates conflict or strengthens peace emerging as a result of the dynamic relationship among key factors (structural, proximate, and trigger) and key stakeholders. Peace engines operate at state, regional and local levels and can take many different forms – both formal and informal (institutions, groups, individuals, specific processes, specific places, symbols or social constructions).

Scenario-Building: Usually the final stage of a conflict analysis involves engaging in scenario-building exercises in order to

better anticipate possible conflict trends. The elaboration of potential scenarios begins with looking at the triggers identified during the factor assessment step. The triggers are combined with the analysis of dynamics and drivers to develop worse-case, best-case, and most likely scenarios. Understanding these dynamics and developing predictive scenarios can help develop programmatic interventions that can either arrest an escalating situation or strengthen a peace dynamic, thereby creating a foundation from which to address the structural dynamics of the conflict.

**Key peace factors** are those structural, proximate or trigger factors that create central conditions to mitigate tensions or violent conflict, build peace, and strengthen social relations.

**Key stakeholders** are those that either have a significant or catalytic role in mitigating conflict or building peace, or those that are most significantly affected, thereby having the greatest potential/capacity to reduce violent conflict.

**The dynamic** is the interaction between the key peace factors and the key stakeholders. It is this dynamic process that mitigates conflict and strengthens peace.

## PR 2.9 UN/WB Core Governance Functions Tools

### Diagnostic on Local Governance in the aftermath of conflict:

<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/core-government-functions/-re-building-core-government-functions-in-fragile-and-conflict-a.html>

#### What is the Diagnostic on Core Government Functions (DCGF) and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?

The UN/WB Diagnostic method is not an “off the shelf” toolkit or manual, and nor should it be. Rather, it aims to identify priorities on six core government functions - those functions required to make and implement policy - and to provide guidance on their execution. The six core government functions covered are: (i) executive decision-making and coordination at the centre of government; (ii) public revenue and expenditure management; (iii) government employment and public administration; (iv) the security sector; (v) local governance; and (vi) aid management.

#### What can the UN/WB Diagnostic help development practitioners do?

The Diagnostic provides a selective synthesis of priority measures likely to be applicable in most countries emerging from violent conflict. It focuses on the first three years after the end of major internal violence when external actors have the mandate or authorization to engage, often through a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

The Diagnostic helps arrive at a more nuanced and granular understanding of a specific relationship between politics and administration, which is necessary for the effective rebuilding core government functions, including local governance. Policies to strengthen local governance should be designed in part to help stabilize the political situation and support an inclusive political settlement. Political settlements are the formal and informal arrangements among elite groups that regulate competition over power and resources.

The Diagnostic is to be used in situations where a political settlement sufficiently inclusive of the factions that have the capacity to mobilize organized violence has been established. This is the main prerequisite for ending violent conflict and restoring security and order in durable way. These are pre-conditions to bring political opponents and potential spoilers “into the tent;” give disaffected groups a stake in the new political and economic order; reward supporters and allies; and meet the population’s expectations of a peace dividend.

With regards to local governance, the UN/WB Diagnostic helps DPs make informed decisions in situations of conflict aftermath, on how to:

- address immediate stabilization and functionality priorities of local governance systems;
- enhance the potential and role of local governance for peacebuilding;
- localize recovery and service delivery processes; and
- build core capacities of local governments and improve local finances.

#### How is a CGF Diagnostic on Local Governance process organized?

The Diagnostic for local governance in the aftermath of conflict is based on the **core assumption** that “the immediate objective to pursue is to extend the legitimacy of the state through outreach and engagement of central government through sub-national administration; build confidence in the public administration by enabling resource distribution at the local level; signal efforts by the state to respond to pressing service delivery needs, in particular through engagement of communities in local recovery processes; and address drivers of insecurity or conflict by expanding engagement of the population in processes for decision making and the distribution of public goods.”

The diagnostic process makes use of the following checklist of questions – which is not a rigid template, but rather an assessment guide.

#### Mapping the pre-conflict and conflict environment:

- What was the nature of intergovernmental or centre-periphery relations prior to the conflict? What was the role of subnational institutions, both de jure and de facto?



## PR 2.9 UN/WB Core Governance Functions Tools

- What were the sources of state capacity, authority and legitimacy at the regional and local level? How do these maps onto traditional structures for the exercise of power and authority? Have the social foundations of local government been destabilized by the displacement of populations or the infiltration of armed actors?
- Are there lagging regions in the country? Are there areas where certain groups are excluded from local governance and what was the impact?
- Did local coalitions prevent/reduce the collapse of subnational structures during conflict or take over local governments' functions in the course of conflict?

### The post-conflict enabling environment

- Are federalism, sub-national governance arrangements and/or decentralization part of the peace agreement or a central part of the political transition? And if so, what role (if any) will decentralization play in the emerging political settlement?
- What is the legislative framework for sub-national governance? How clear are formal legal provisions on the roles and responsibilities allocated to each tier of government?
- Is there an on-going policy process or constitutional debate directly relevant to the functioning of subnational institutions, including local elections?
- Are there pockets of significant support or resistance to the idea of reforming the intergovernmental system? Among political elites, in particular parts of the country, from within civil society, or among a popular constituency?
- Is there a likelihood of renewed conflict if there is no rapid signaling by the central government of a willingness to change intergovernmental arrangements?
- Are there any issues with border delimitation for subnational units and how they are handled?
- What is the importance of local elections in the peace agreement? How likely are these to serve as a source of legitimacy or accountability on the one hand or a source of conflict?
- Has peace been slow to reach the ground in some regions? Which regions are still impacted by day-to-day violence even after the formal cessation of the conflict? What are the drivers of this violence (i.e. unaddressed grievances from conflict, crime, disputes between groups?)

### Mapping the presence of subnational institutions

- Where are local governments operational, at which levels and to what extent?
- What is the general state of repair of subnational government infrastructure and assets (buildings, mobility, communications, and technical equipment). If not all subnational government have re-established a presence, what are the main constraints?
- What are the de jure responsibilities and functions of local governments? What functions are local governments actually capable of carrying out?
- Are subnational governments fully, partially or barely staffed? Are target staffing levels known?
- Is the subnational governments' payroll handled by the central government partially or totally?
- What are local governments' capacities for handling basic PFM functions?

### Mapping the relationship between central government and regional governments

- How well connected are the local and national networks? This includes physical infrastructure (i.e. roads, flights between regions, etc.) and ICT connections (mobile network, internet connections).
- What, if any, are the de jure links between provincial and local (municipal) government structures? What are the de facto links are how functional are they?
- What are the most common forms of communications between local and central governments? Do subnational government leaders have to take their issue directly to central level or is there an established protocol through intermediary levels?
- Is there a central government ministry, department or agency responsible for coordinating local governance? If so, what are its mandate and responsibilities? What is its de facto ability to carry these out?
- Is guidance provided to subnational governments by the central regulatory authority? Is the central authority capable of verifying the legality of local governments' actions, to what degree and how?
- Which measures did the central government take to tackle logistical issues of subnational governments, such rebuilding/repair of facilities, transfer or procurement of equipment, etc.?

## PR 2.9 UN/WB Core Governance Functions Tools

- Does the central government have the capacity to provide direct technical support to subnational governments in the delivery of their functions through its deconcentrated services and/or provincial governments and/or sub-contractors?
- Which are the main non-state actors having a marked influence on local governance processes (peacebuilding/conflict management/reconciliation, local security, service delivery, representation / voice)? What is their legal status? Which resources (human, financial, technical) do non-state actors rely on to perform their roles, and in particular importance of donor support and community support?
- How are relations between subnational governments and informal governance institutions organized? Are there overlaps between the role of subnational government and informal institutions with regard to leadership and legitimacy, service delivery and taxation? Are traditional structures (where relevant) officially recognized by the state and what support from the state does this entail?

### Review of service delivery by local governments

- What is the division of responsibilities between the central government, subnational governments, and non-state actors as laid out in legal provisions and as carried out in practice? How clearly has the allocation of responsibilities been established? What are the overlaps and other issues?
- Are immediate needs of populations for these services hardly/partially/fully met (qualitative assessment using benchmarking)? Are all sectors/regions of the population reached equitably - if not, which have less access? Are all geographical areas covered?

### Capacity and resource gaps for subnational governments

- Do local executives (mayors, village heads, governors, etc.) have leadership experience before the conflict? And how were they selected? Have local tiers of government continued to function during the conflict?
- Are local councils considered to be legitimate by the population? And how were they selected? Level of previous experience with local legislative function? Are local councils able to play an active role in conflict resolution, policy formulation and oversight of local executive branches? What kind of technical support do they receive to assume their functions?
- Did the majority of subnational governments produce annual plans and budgets in the last fiscal year? What was the process for developing these plans?
- Is local and sectorial planning integrated? Is infrastructure planning in cities linked to longer-term urban planning process?
- What was the share of current expenditure as compared to investment expenditures? What was the breakdown between capital, operational and salary expenditures? How does this compare with pre-conflict data?
- What is the percentage of the overall national budget allocated and expended through subnational governments' pre-conflict and post-conflict period?
- What are the amounts of intergovernmental fiscal transfers (i.e. from the centre to subnational levels)? What are the formulas used to calculate allocations? How much funding is actually reaching subnational units? Compare these questions pre and post-conflict?
- With regard to intergovernmental fiscal transfers, do these function with predictability, flow of resources between levels of government, and transparency? Are any measures envisioned or under way to reform these processes?
- Is there a block granting systems and local development funds? Does it function?
- What is the share of donor assistance directly expended at local level and breakdown between allocations to subnational governments and to NGOs/CSOs?
- With regard to local revenue generations, what are the de jure sources of subnational governments' revenue? How much has been collected (as a percentage of local government budgets) during the pre and post-conflict period? What has been the breakdown between different sources (taxation, fees, investments, others)? Does the central government collect taxes and other revenues on behalf of subnational governments?
- What is the rate of execution in the last fiscal year? Are subnational governments directly responsible for financial execution of their budget? Which procurement practices are followed and their legality? What accounting systems are used? What constrains internal financial controls?

## PR 2.9 UN/WB Core Governance Functions Tools

- Are subnational governments financial reports debated before new budgets voted by local councils? Does the central authority require financial reports on the past year before funding new budgets? Are subnational government accounts regularly audited by the central government auditing body?
- Are civil service positions common in the subnational governments' workforce? Is it common for subnational government staff to work without contracts and if so, are measures taken to phase out practice? Do recruitments involve a selection process and if so, is the central government involved in any way in it? Do subnational governments use organograms and job descriptions?

### Inclusion and participation

- What is the overall status of mechanisms for participation and accountable decision-making at the subnational level? If they exist, how effective are participatory governance practices at including the needs of marginalized groups, in particular those that did not have access to local governance before conflict?
- What is the overall status of mechanisms to promote participation (information-sharing, participatory planning, permanent local development committees, social accountability, etc.)? Where they exist, are any of these structures parallel to subnational government decision-making rather than connected to it?
- Have local elections taken place? Were they competitive? What was the quality of these elections in terms of providing a mechanism for holding government officials accountable?
- If local elections have taken place, what is the data on women's turnout rate and women's presence in local councils and among elected mayors/governors? Are there significant differences in representation between local and national governing structures? Reasons?
- What is women's enrollment among subnational government staff? What are the main hurdles? Is the issue of women's representation in local councils and administrations present in CG discourse on local governance? Which measures are taken and what hurdles to implementation remain? Are some municipalities (especially in larger cities) making efforts of their own to increase this representation?
- Are women's CSOs actively involved in local committees and participatory structures? In service delivery? Is funding made available to women civil society organizations (CSOs) by subnational governments (in cities)?

## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

### The impact of fragility and conflict on access to services:

- People in fragile and conflict-affected countries are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before age five, and more than twice as likely to lack clean water.<sup>25</sup>
- Among civilians, women, youth and children in particular disproportionately bear both direct and indirect consequences of violence. UNICEF estimates that children in conflict-affected contexts are more than three times as likely to be unable to go to school, twice as likely to die before the age of five and more than twice as likely to lack clean water. A child living in a conflict-affected or fragile country therefore misses out on essential services and is more likely to be exposed to violence.<sup>26</sup>
- Conflict also deeply undermines the capacity, impartiality and incentives of rule of law institutions to provide access to justice services and maintain security – when they are not actively part of the problem.
- Fragility and conflict affect service delivery in different ways:
  - Availability: when infrastructure is damaged, service providers go missing, finances are lacking to operate services and create new outlets.
  - Access: when insecurity precludes movements to service provision facilities, when users lack income to pay for services due to conflict-induced livelihood crisis, when particular groups are discriminated against in accessing services by public policies and/or local power holders, when fiscal crises forces to reduce the opening hours of service facilities.
  - Quality: when personnel is disincentivized to perform due to payroll ruptures and hardship working environments, when continuous professional training becomes unavailable, when service delivery standards are lowered due to fiscal pressure, when internal accountability systems break down and fail to apply scrutiny onto service providers.
  - Governance: when decisions made around service delivery priorities and standards are made without consulting users, because of operational constraints or simply lack of political will for participation, when there is no mechanisms for users to access information on service delivery or express grievances, due to lack of means, capacities and political will, or when the monitoring of services by users is discouraged due to widespread corruption, clientelism and also insecurity.

### Theory of change

- Inequity in access to services is a major source of grievance, especially when inequity overlaps with group identity factors – and even when these perceptions do not align with objective inequalities. This is particular true for the following kinds of services: security/justice, basic (including social services) and social protection (including livelihood enhancing). Addressing gaps in access to services towards a more equitable availability, access and more uniform quality, is therefore an important priority in FCS.
- Service delivery is also among the state’s core functions. In FCS, the assumption is that improving the effectiveness of service delivery contributes to strengthening the social contract and hence preventing conflict and resolving conflict situations. This theory of change takes the following path:
  - it (e.g. state-led service delivery) restores trust that the state works for the public good, i.e. it operationalizes the social contract, and hence the state is legitimated to exert its authority;
  - it brings people closer to the state as the more services operating in more locations, the more people come in contact with state institutions and experience the formal rules-based paradigm on which the modern state is based;
  - it creates higher opportunity costs for certain sections of society to return to violent conflict as they would lose access to welfare services and payments;
  - it introduces incentives for citizens to fulfill their responsibilities under a stable social contract (e.g. paying taxes, respecting public properties, following administrative rules established by the state for operating services, etc.);

<sup>25</sup> World Bank, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> UNICEF, 2017.



## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- it shows that the state is intent on serving people as per their needs rather than as per their social identity, hence limiting reasons for violent contestation nurtured by enduring horizontal inequalities;
  - it provides a straightforward incentive for citizens to demand greater accountability from the state in responding to their needs, either through their policy-makers or through service providers.
  - it strengthens social cohesion as certain kinds of services, especially education, recreation, urban management, irrigation, etc. provide opportunities to bring divided communities together and build inclusive coalitions of non-state actors representing various interest groups.
  - it strengthens civic engagement (can cover the last 2 items on this list as well).
- The New Deal of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011) defines 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) and one of them deals with service delivery [PSG 5: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery].
  - Strengthening service delivery is also a self-perpetuating process: the more services can improve social outcomes and contribute to a more positive outlook for the future, the more likely it is that strong service-delivery institutions – responsive to the needs of people – will develop.<sup>27</sup>
  - There are two major conditions to the above virtuous process realizing itself fully: inclusivity and accountability in service delivery. These are usually the most difficult to establish in FCS.
  - Giving a greater role to local governments in service delivery in FCS for achieving the above TOC on the link between service delivery and sustaining peace, is usually justified by the following arguments.
    - local governments are often statutorily mandated to partake in service delivery;
    - local governments can more easily identify and reach out to deprived areas and marginalized groups than central administrations;
    - public services are mostly provided under a division of responsibility between the public administration and local governments, restoring service delivery encourages dialogue and cooperation among political actors and administrative entities at various levels that may be at odds following or during a situation of conflict;
    - local governments can rally other local actors, including informal leaders holding as well public authority, behind service delivery objectives and co-construct strategies and delivery mechanisms, hence contributing to the redistribution of power that is central to the concept of *transformative* local governance;
    - local governments can more easily fulfill than the central administration an enabling and oversight function over community-driven initiatives for services, hence contributing to their success and facilitating the uptake of the innovative solutions they often produce.
    - local governments are best positioned to coordinate various actors at the local level involved in service delivery;
    - service delivery through local governments provides great opportunities for citizens to hold the state accountable as it both brings policy-making for service delivery closer to citizens and facilitates the social accountability of service providers; as a result, the trust in the state can be restored.
  - There is growing evidence from a number of terrains that government-led public goods provision programmes may have an important role to play in reducing or mitigating violent conflict. It is also demonstrated by the fact that service delivery mechanisms using parallel systems in FCS, as often favored by DPs under the justification of weak state capacity and associated risks, have not had convincing results on security and stability outcomes.
  - Programming for service delivery, state capacity and governance needs to be integrated. For example, an integrated approach to education would link schooling to security, public finance, health, sanitation and the economic basis of livelihoods.

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<sup>27</sup> Baird, 2010.

## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

### Counter arguments and risks

#### *The role of the state*

- The question of what the role of the state should be in service delivery in FCS – at least in certain types of contexts – is not clear cut. Donor support to state-led service delivery in FCS implies that “existing state structures have a degree of legitimacy and be seen by sectoral ministries and government agencies as reward in spite of their poor performance.<sup>28</sup> More generally, service delivery may buy peace but the cost may be corruption and harmful forms of clientelism, which may generate conflict and violence in the face of external shocks and budgetary constraints when expenditures are not associated to political reforms. (e.g. Syria, Arab Spring). Service delivery is a very political function<sup>29</sup> for the state and in contexts prone to polarization and manipulation, support state-led services may increase fragility and conflict.
- There are also clear examples of outsourcing service delivery responsibilities from the state to non-state actors, including international ones (e.g. health in Afghanistan in 2002, education in DRC or Haiti), or to communities (education in Nepal from 2001), which have met success in terms of social outcomes. Hence, the role of the state is not necessarily to be a front-line provider and impact of service delivery on conflict drivers can also be achieved through non-state channels, especially when involving the state would bear more risks of accountability and exclusion. A key dimension in the argument for a more measured approach to state-led service delivery in FCS is the country’s context and its situation on the pathway between peace and conflict.

#### *The implication of local governments*

- Local governments are only able to take charge of service delivery in an accountable and inclusive manner if their prerogatives are supported by a conducive regulatory framework (e.g. effective division of responsibilities between state agencies) and if they are sufficiently equipped with facilities, qualified male and female staff, financial resources and managerial and technical capacities. These are conditions rarely applicable in FCS, especially in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
- There are specific arguments against involving (too far) local governments in the delivery of basic and social services in FCS because of the following risks:
  - Danger of elite capture and use of service delivery responsibility to build rent and patronage, exclude other groups / take revenge.
  - Service delivery plans devised by local actors may be too delinked from national policies that aim to improve quality and social justice.
  - Priorities may match very local interests while ignoring wider regional concerns, opportunities and dynamics.
  - Local actors might be enticed to lower delivery standards.
  - Building capacity for local service delivery takes too long and remains unsure as local governments
  - Some services have to remain coordinated at the regional or national level as the risks in case of failure are too big for the populations at stake (e.g. immunization).
  - Too much devolution of responsibilities to local governments without adequate capacity and accountability may actually weaken the state’s own legitimacy in the long run.

### Delivery Modalities and Modes of Support

- Various modalities for service delivery have been practiced in FCS and supported by donors: state provision, contracting, co-production, INGO provision, private provision (PPP), social funds (or parallel systems), community action. Experience shows that there is no one model of service delivery that works in all sectors and in all situations.

<sup>28</sup> Baird, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Some authors (Van de Walle and Scott, 2009, cited by Baird, 2010) argue that service delivery has been used by states for penetration (territorial consolidation), standardization (homogenization of the population) and accommodation (buying loyalty and power-broking).



## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- Choosing to support local governments in service delivery is a strategic commitment to state-building and it needs long-term support. Short-term measures without gradually establishing a functional legal and fiscal framework will not work.
- Supporting local governance for service delivery in FCS follows a number of requirements:
  - service delivery frameworks, i.e. the division of missions, means and costs induced between different layers or government and state/non-state actors, need to be clarified.
  - the state presence and administrative systems need to be extended – local governments need proximity with state services to succeed in delivering services.
  - public finance management systems, including taxation, need to be restored and improved, so that they can sustain local efforts in the long-term.
  - corruption in local governments need to be combatted actively.
  - core institutional capacities of local governments have to be built, as well as of private providers, if applicable.
  - grievance handling and social accountability mechanisms need to be established, under the helm of civil society, to signal a different paradigm in state-society relations and to play a balancing role in a situation of increased responsibilities of local state institutions in providing services. It can contribute to restoring people's trust (yet, SA only works if administrations' capacities to deliver services are built at the same time!).
- As highlighted above, modalities used to entrust service delivery functions to local actors, and in particular local governments, are highly dependent on the type of services considered.
  - Broadly, there are 8 types of services eligible in most FCS to some level of decentralization: security & justice, social services, infrastructure, utilities, urban planning & management, livelihoods and economic development, environmental management. Other types of classification also exist.<sup>30</sup>
  - In general, in FCS, social services (e.g. health, education) are better remaining more centralized given the high negative impact on the development pathway of affected societies in case of local government failure. Services less demanding in technical and managerial skills (e.g. solid waste management) and services at the juncture of formal and informal institutions (e.g. land management), requiring a good understanding of local norms, are often more indicated for greater local autonomy.
  - A more thorough risk/benefit analysis of intervention options in each sector needs to be incorporated into policies and practices. Sectors have unique features, with implications for programming risks and opportunities. Justice/security and education appear to be the most transformative kinds of services in a fragile setting, but they are also the most prone to polarisation and manipulation. Healthcare and water/sanitation, the most politically neutral sectors, seem to offer the best opportunities for cooperation across communal lines, as well as for civic-governmental partnership. (OECD).
- Strengthening locally-led service delivery is often linked in the global policy discourse to **decentralization** – and often in its most elaborate form, i.e. devolution to local governments of full authority over a set of service responsibilities. Decentralization in that sense is seen as a means to address conflict drivers related to a broken social contract, by assigning service delivery responsibilities and revenues to sub-national governments in order to build up state legitimacy.<sup>31</sup> However, there are many aspects and issues to consider when discussing the role of decentralization for service delivery in FCS.
  - Positive: decentralization in FCS, particularly in post-conflict, is an important signal of recognition to local structures that usually play a more important role already in service delivery than war-exhausted central states. Decentralization can also help reduce regional imbalances and give greater voice to marginalized groups. Negative: full-blown decentralization reforms in many FCS have aggravated state fragility (loss of authority and legitimacy for central government) and reinforced informal public authority. It has also pushed corruption down to

<sup>30</sup> Baird (2010) speaks of basic services as comprising: social services (health, education, water, sanitation); social protection services (safety nets, livelihood services); and (iii) security/justice services.

<sup>31</sup> UNICEF, 2017.



## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

local institutions, especially in resource-rich countries. Sometimes, central politicians accelerate political decentralization to buy local support but without transferring real administrative and fiscal power, hence creating more resentment and frustration in the population at the end of the day.

- Challenges: (i) territorial fragmentation in FCS make it difficult to apply the same decentralization reform to all; (ii) political power in the aftermath of conflict is not easily shared by national leaders; (iii) FCS face extreme scarcity of qualified human resources for local governments; (iv) lack of own-source revenues for local governments; (v) difficult to muster sufficient inter-ministerial coordination to implement such reform.
- Decentralization covers many different options and should not be seen only in its most “extreme” form (devolution of all powers). It can in fact concern different scopes (political, administrative, fiscal) and different types (devolution, delegation, deconcentration), this makes at least 9 possible options.
- Increasingly, the concept of ‘**localized service delivery**’ is invoked instead of decentralization for FCS. It puts the emphasis on increasing the role of the ‘local public sector’<sup>32</sup> in service delivery rather than strictly ‘local governments’. Research shows a positive correlation between localized spending and service outcomes in mainstream countries.<sup>33</sup> In FCS, when the central government still retains some capacity and authority, localization also can work when it marries deconcentration and devolution of service delivery responsibilities at the same time, so that the public administration can retain sensitive functions (administrative, fiscal) while political functions (representation, policy-setting) are exercised by elected local governments and provide opportunities for shorter accountability loops. This can be seen as first step towards fuller devolution of powers until capacity has been built and the political settlement has reached sufficient stability.
- The concept of ‘**localism**’ is also invoked sometimes to describe a service delivery framework that sees the decentralization of power away from the central government. It is wider than localizing public services as it involves an array of local actors (not just local governments) such as service facility managers, local communities, traditional leaders, non-state administrations, etc. It is useful where public authority is shared with informal power holders who also need to find their place in a decentralized governance model.
- Some advice to implement successfully localized service deliver in FCS:
  - Balance the short-run pressure to deliver outcomes, in order to build trust, and longer-term aims to build institutional capacity, in order to transform local governance.
  - Test different options first in different part of the countries and for different services and monitor security, social, political and economic outcomes.
  - Address separately the three scopes of localization (political, fiscal, admin)
  - Address early on issues of delineating functional assignments and intergovernmental coordination arrangements
  - Consider asymmetric approaches for urban vs. rural areas, or areas that are restive politically (e.g. Kurdistan Region in Iraq).
  - Emphasize the role of planning and budgeting at the regional and local level, which provides space for a wide range of views to be heard and for spending decisions on service delivery to be made within a well-defined budget envelope.
  - Adopting as early as possible an integrated service delivery approach; this requires building capacities of local governments to develop integrated local development plans. The SDG framework is useful in helping with priority setting and building integrated goals in this regard.
- Possible programme activities / tools / mechanisms to strengthen the role of local governance for service delivery in FCS:
  - Strengthen local coordination platforms for service delivery (multi-stakeholders)

<sup>32</sup> Defined as the part of the public sector that regularly interacts with residents, civil society, and the private sector within a localized setting. It can include local governments, local branches of the central administration and central programmes directly run through local windows (e.g. social funds).

<sup>33</sup> DeLoG, 2015.





## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- Participatory service delivery audits to involve users in reforming service delivery systems.
  - Cost-benefit analysis of different delivery models (in particular for access by marginalized groups)
  - Facilitating negotiations around transitional service delivery frameworks between central and local stakeholders (also called Sector Wide Action Plans SWAPs in their most elaborate form).
  - Testing PPP options
  - Introducing appropriate technologies (e.g. ICT) to facilitate user access and transparency.
  - Introduce grievance-handling and user feedback mechanisms facilitating the social accountability of service providers.
- And also some more generic interventions (not concerning SD only)
- Restoring local government operational capacities (after a conflict)
  - Building core capacities of local governments (basic, leadership, administrative, project development, crisis resilience and gender mainstreaming skills)
  - Improving local finances, including local taxation and other own-source revenues.
  - Fighting corruption in local administrations.
- In FCS, successful localization strategies for service delivery imply (re)building core government functions as well which form the backbone of the government's capacity to support service delivery in general. These are: policy-making at the center of government, public finance management, civil service management and aid coordination.
  - Local Revenue Generation (LRG):
    - Situation:
      - Although local governments in developed as well as developing countries rely to some degree on own-source (autonomous) revenues to fund expenditures within their realm of responsibility, local revenue generation is the most serious challenge raised in a majority of countries globally. Formal taxation only represents 14% of GDP in FCS (2013, ICTD) but UN considers that it should reach 20% at least to make progress on the SDGs.
      - Local revenues are even lower in proportion of local government budgets in general in FCS, and these depend heavily on state transfers (vertical imbalance is 70% in average in FCS against a world average of 52%).<sup>34</sup>
      - Local level is where the highest occurrence of informal / unauthorized revenue collection, by local governments and by other public authority figures (e.g. traditional chiefs, warlords, militias, gangs, etc.) are found.
      - Most local governments in FCS barely tap into the existing revenue potential – even considering the high poverty levels often found (i.e. local elites have a pact with local political leadership not to be taxed or evasion is not sanctioned).
      - Potential for growth in local revenues in FCS is very high. In general, highest level of own-revenues happens in large cities, which are also the less dependent on state subsidies in these countries.<sup>35</sup>
      - Domestic revenue mobilization remains in general an area neglected by donors, as only 0.07% of ODA to fragile states actually spent on supporting their tax systems<sup>36</sup> (and only a portion of this goes to local revenues), despite the fact that such support pays dividends.
    - What does it mean?
      - Revenues commonly assigned to the local level: taxes (e.g. property tax); user fees (e.g. utility fees, fees for garbage collection or market fees); licensing and permit fees; rent on local government property; fines and contraventions.
      - In absolute, complete autonomy for LRG means that LGs are free to raise local fees and charges, assess and set the tax base, set the tax rate and administer or collect the revenue.

<sup>34</sup> UNDP (2016), p. 15. Vertical imbalance refers to the ratio state transfers / subnational expenditures.

<sup>35</sup> Lagos earns 75% of its income from local revenues, while Nigeria as a country only earns 20% of its national budget through taxation. Source: Kaplan (2013). Port-au-Prince metropolitan area in Haiti concentrates 81% of all the municipal income generated in the country (though it 'only' concentrates 50% of its population). Source: UNDP (2016).

<sup>36</sup> OECD (2014), p. 12.



## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- In practice, local governments always have to deal with some level of limitations and oversight exerted by central government, whether legally (e.g. limits set on tax rates) or administratively (e.g. collection controlled by Ministry of Finance). Also, LGts remain accountable to central government for the proper use of their own revenues, as part of their obligations to financial auditing by central gov.
- Good local taxes are those that: (i) achieve a “correspondence” with the benefits of the services that are financed with this tax; (ii) are relatively easy to administer; (iii) do not have “perverse effects” such as – in a context of widespread poverty – benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor or impeding local economic activity and entrepreneurship.
- **Benefits of increased LRG:**
  - It incentivizes local governments to be more transparent about their management and citizens to ask more accountability from their LGts.
  - It reduces excessive demand by local governments for transfers from the centre, hence limits possible political conflicts in intergovernmental relations.
  - It allows to better finetune tax policies (tax levels and structure) with local conditions, and in particular economic potential, social patterns and political feasibility.
  - It allows building subnational administrative capacity when tax administration is also decentralised.
  - It creates a direct embodiment of the idea of the social contract (taxation against services) when LRG happens at the same time that decentralized service delivery is improved.
  - It reduces dependence on aid and can help finance human development and recovery actions which donors usually neglect.
  - It can fortify intra-society relations and benefit social cohesion when wealthier citizens in a locale contribute more local taxes that are immediately – and visibly – reinvested in developing services for the benefit of all residents (redistribution).

### **In short, strengthening LRG helps building effective governance and strengthening ties between state and citizens.**

- **Challenges:**
  - Lack of autonomy: central government often strongly controls local government tax rates and the tax base, and political interference in the mobilisation of local government revenues is rife.
  - Local elite pacts, whereby political patronage systems are premised on low taxation to the wealthier and/or unenforced tax codes.
  - Limited rule of law: local governments do not have the means / are not supported by the judicial system, to impose tax policies and combat tax evasion.
  - High levels of poverty, which makes it politically very sensitive to impose taxes / fines / fees and can also have negative socioeconomic consequences on the poorest.
  - Weak administrative capacities in local administrations for tax collection & administration, in particular for doing it in an accountable way.
  - Lack of trust / legitimacy in state institutions, which means that tax compliance remains low (vicious circle).
  - Poor quality of services does not incentivize tax payers.
  - Lack of transparency / efficient short-loop accountability systems to directly link taxation and services. This is even more serious in countries with limited media / civil society freedoms and limited capacities for citizen-led actions.
  - High level of corruption in state administrations, central and local.
- **What to do?**
  - Assess fiscal opportunities, taking into account legal provisions, possible improvements of the system and social feasibility. Such an assessment should include an analysis of the systems and capacities in place, identifying important bottlenecks and areas for improvement that will increase local fees and taxes for the local government. Also, evaluate political economy of local taxation (including illegal / unauthorized taxes) and risks.
  - Support better coordination in the transfer system, fees and revenue collection. Take into account basic local government (LG) incentives to collect taxes, link support with other initiatives, especially transfer systems.



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- Support local CSOs and media to design and lead social accountability initiatives around tax collection, revenue use and service delivery.
- Public outreach campaigns on local government functioning, finances, services delivery, citizen roles, etc. among population and advocate / incentivize tax compliance, insisting as well on social justice and redistribution. Boost citizen tax morale by establishing clear links between tax revenue and local benefits.
- Legal reform to increase autonomy of local governments to revenue generation but also social justice in tax base and tax rate.
- Provide long-term capacity building to LG tax administration to make systems more efficient, fair, legitimate, equitable and accountable. Support the development of systems with more stable, predictable and high yielding LG taxes is needed. Some taxes are so expensive to collect that the administrative costs surpass the tax yield.
- Support local governments to secure fairer deals with multinational enterprises, especially extractive industries, by limiting tax exemptions, paying local taxes and being sanctioned with fines if applicable (in particular in relation to environmental / labour standards).
- Participatory budgeting: has the potential to increase local revenue collection, but only convincingly so in already-mature politically and administratively decentralised local governments – thus not recommended in FCS where decentralization framework still unestablished and LG capacities still basic (return on cost of implementing PB not worth it).<sup>37</sup>

### **Conflict-sensitivity**

*Generic section applicable to all sessions*

- There is a difference between working *around* conflict – as in humanitarian action hence avoiding in principle any intervention that shifts power structures and providing similar support to all civilian parties in a conflict as per needs – and working *on* conflict, i.e. making deliberate attempts to design programmes that seek to exploit opportunities to positively affect conflict dynamics and address their structural causes. DPs designing and implementing a programme on local governance for sustaining peace are definitely working *on* conflict.
- A conflict sensitive approach involves gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between activities and context and acting to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts of intervention on conflict, within an organisation’s given priorities/objectives.
- Working *on* conflict does not mean that adopting a “do-no-harm” approach is not necessary. DNH means minimizing the potential negative of a programme on conflict dynamics. A DNH approach is meant to identify, avoid and ease unintended conflict-exacerbating consequences of project work including on gender inequality. Six basic factors should be considered:
  1. Project context: what are the potential dividers and connectors between local governance actors involved in service delivery provision?
  2. Interaction with project: what impact will the project have on dividers & connectors and vice-versa?
  3. Impact on connectors: does the project reinforce positive connectors for peace? How?
  4. Impact on dividers: does the project reinforce potential dividers that can lead to conflict? How?
  5. Project adjustment: how can the project be re-adjusted to avoid exacerbating dividers?
  6. Impact on gender equality: what are the potential tensions or risks associated with gender-blind activities? With external actors supporting women’s empowerment in politically charged and volatile fragile situations? How will they be minimized?

*Conflict sensitivity when support service delivery through local state systems*

- In assessing conflict sensitivity in service delivery, it is important to look at the extent to which the intervention aggravates or mitigates grievances, vulnerabilities or tensions.
- The following dimensions are important to consider when supporting localized service delivery models:

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<sup>37</sup> Beuermann, Amelina (2014).



## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- **Political economy:** service delivery frameworks in FCS, more than anywhere else, are underpinned by specific political economy systems. It is important to understand these so as to avoid taking too drastic steps towards reshuffling powers and rents (both in terms of legitimacy and financial) at once. Donor interventions should support the involvement of all actors, especially potential spoilers (non-state armed groups), in the definition of service delivery frameworks and build channels for constructive engagement and grievance-handling contiously. A specific role might have to be recognized to powerful informal actors (including religious organizations) to minimize risks of disruption. This might mean also issues related to integrating into the civil service, staff that may have been under management of non-state actors until then (under different modalities).
- **Inclusion:** if service delivery audits are conducted, extra care should be given to acknowledging cases of unequal access to services, whether due to active discrimination or operational issues (physical access, cost, literacy, etc.). Representatives of marginalized groups should take part in audits and future social accountability mechanisms. The Project can support greater enrolment of such categories (including women and youth) as staff and manages of front-line provision entities.
- **Conflict management:** capacities to analyse service delivery issues through a conflict-sensitive lens and maintaining a conflict-sensitive approach throughout service provision need to be developed and institutionalized among local state institutions – and not be skills that remain mostly with aid agencies. Skills development on conflict sensitivity and conflict management should be prioritized early on. This will also help service providers deal with grievances, possibly violent, and perceptions (possibly biased), related to the level and quality of services in a conflict-diffusing manner and avoid escalation.
- **Accountability:** because service delivery is usually where the largest aid amounts are invested in an FCS (considering infrastructure needs as well), extra attention needs to be given to strengthen internal and social accountability systems around the use of financial resources devoted to local institutions for service delivery. Without transparency in project design, staff recruitment, procurement, operating costs, etc. linked to service provision, opportunities for fraud and corruption cannot be sufficiently curtailed and donor support can then be seen by the population (and spoilers) as benefiting only service providers and not users, and damage profoundly their opinion of the state.

### **Measurement**

- This section deals with monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at outcome and impact level of programme interventions meant to address conflict and fragility drivers through improved service delivery. It does not discuss project-level activity monitoring.

### *Problem*

- More needs to be done by donors to produce reliable and impartial evidence-based findings on the impact of their work as it is crucial to determine what interventions can be effective in meeting specific challenges, such as delivering services while enhancing longer-term accountability, strengthening capacity for governance and service provision and building peace and social cohesion.
- M&E in FCS is usually problematic because:<sup>38</sup>
  - It is done less systematically than in mainstream situations, and often there is little to no evaluation activity in settings of violent conflict, leading to very little credible information about the effectiveness and results of DPs' endeavours in these contexts.
  - Evaluation in these settings tend to be weak in terms of data, methods and validity of findings. Fewer rigorous methods are used and questions of causality are often inadequately addressed.
  - Many evaluations in this focus on process and mapping the context, rarely on measuring change in political, social, cultural and economic determinants of fragility and conflict.
  - Internal and external validity tend to be quite low: it is hard to draw broader lessons that can be applied to other contexts.

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<sup>38</sup> OECD/DAC, (2012).



## PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- At the same time, DPs face many challenges in maintaining credible M&E of their operations in FCS, especially for activities undertaken at the subnational level:
  - High risk of violence for both the evaluators and the evaluated
  - Complex and unpredictable contexts: combining multifaceted, multi-directional change with high levels of unpredictability, a general lack of information, and potential strategic misinformation. Programme implementation may differ widely from original plans, to adapt to an evolving conflict.
  - Multiplicity of actors: which encompass not only state institutions but also military actors, informal power-holders, civil society and international NGOs.
  - Weak theoretical foundations and evidence base: theories of change underpinning programme design to sustain peace can be weak if present at all.
  - Challenges to data collection: scarcity of data, lack of monitoring, high DP personnel turnover, and erratic access to field data in certain regions at certain points in time, compounded by weak state statistical capacities and a multiplicity of international actors with incoherent data systems.
  - Attribution: fluidity and complexity of conflicts settings and from frequently non-linear nature of change processes. Other activities (beyond the scope of the evaluation), such as military interventions, may actually be responsible for changes that are attributed to conflict prevention or peacebuilding activities. It is also very difficult to find / create a counterfactual or control group, especially when looking at country or regional conflicts.
  - Politicisation of international involvement and political sensitivities in national contexts, make it difficult for evaluators to maintain a safe, credible “evaluation space”.

### *Principles of good evaluation*

- The OECD defines the following key generic questions for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and policies:
  - **Relevance:** does the intervention relate in a meaningful way to current, key driving factors of the (potential) conflict? Is the theory of change on which the activity is based logical or sensible in this context at this time? Are outputs consistent with the objectives of reducing or preventing conflict?
  - **Efficiency:** Are activities cost efficient? Is this the most efficient way to contribute to peace?
  - **Impact:** What happened as a result of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity? Why? What were the positive and negatives changes produced, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended? In this field, the focus may be on impacts on the conflict: how did the intervention impact key conflict actors or affect on-going conflict-creating or peace-promoting factors?
  - **Effectiveness:** To what extent were the objectives achieved? What factors contributed to achievements?
  - **Sustainability:** Will benefits be maintained after donor support has ended? Has the intervention addressed the role of “spoilers” (those who benefit from on-going conflict) or attempted to engage the “hard-to-reach” (combatants, extremists, men, etc.)? Do locals have ownership of the activity or programme, where possible? Have durable, long-term processes, structures and institutions for peacebuilding been created?
  - **Coherence:** How does the activity relate to other policy instruments (trade, migration, diplomacy, military)? Are different efforts undermining each other? What are the costs vs. impacts of coordination?

### *What to measure?*

- Three kinds of targets should be measured when assessing the outcome of a programme supporting the localization of service delivery (as in other types of programs):
  - “Function” targets to record the results of institutional development for a relevant environmental attribute or policy outcome, for instance, reducing the amount of water lost during distribution, or the number of days with severe air pollution;
  - “Action” targets to record that an agency did something, though the intended results of the activity are not measured, for example, regularly conducting an analysis or regularly monitoring an environmental attribute.



### PR 3.0 Main Facts on Local Governance for Service Delivery

- “Form targets” to record that an institution, law, policy, or regulation exists or is organized in some way. There is no measure of activities or the policy impacts of the institutional form, for example, the establishment of a governmental unit or the passage of a law.
- Indicator frameworks should monitor both short-term results (i.e. increase in output delivery) and long-term changes desirable for sustainability (i.e. systems, capacities).
- The cost-effectiveness for public finances (or donor funding) is an important measure of the sustainability and relevance of a particular model of localized service delivery, but it should be applied gradually and not consider only purely economic aspects. Social and peacebuilding effects should also be involved in qualifying the ‘effectiveness’ of a particular approach in such contexts.

## PR 3.1 Somalia Case Study

**Programme Title:** Joint UN Programme on Local Governance in Somalia

**Programme Period:** 2018 to 2023.

**Implementing Partners:** UNDP, UN Habitat, UNICEF, ILO UNCDF

**Source:** JPLG Coordination Office and UNDP Guide on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings (2016)

### A/ CONTEXT

Although progress has been made in peace-building and stabilization, Somalia, remains a fragile and conflict-prone country due to the presence of armed groups, competition for scarce resources and power, state fragility, environmental degradation, lack of a common national vision and social cohesion, and the proliferation of small arms. This complex conflict picture is also reflected in Somalia's poor ranking on the Fragile States Index and Transparency International perception survey.<sup>39</sup> Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an estimated 63% of its 8 m people living in extreme poverty (UNDP, 2014). Access to basic services is severely limited: less than 30 percent of Somalis had access to clean water in 2010 and less than one third of Somalia children were enrolled in primary education.

Since 2012, the country seems to be pathway, albeit rickety, towards greater stability. There has been relative peace and stability in Somaliland and Puntland State of Somalia for over a decade. While Al Shabab (AS) still controls large areas in Southern parts of Somalia, the government's efforts to push them out of major town centers has, with the support of the African Union and the international community, yielded results. A federal structure exists in Somalia since 2012 and the New Deal Framework has allowed the emergence of new Federal Member States (FMS).<sup>40</sup> Although the state building exercise is far from over, the establishment of Federal and state levels of government is largely completed.

In Somaliland and Puntland, local governments have now been operating for many years, while in the new FMSs the process of establishing local governments is just commencing and is closely tied to other stabilization, conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts. In Somaliland, the self-declared entity, local councils come to power through the ballot box and sub-national structures are increasingly engaging with local communities to provide basic urban services. However, there is still a long way to go towards accountable local governance. The structures of governance are in favour of men, while women remain underrepresented in political leadership and executive positions. Women are severely underrepresented in local governments both in the local councils (legislative) and in local administrations (executive). Furthermore, local governments often do not recognize, nor do they adequately respond to the needs and priorities of women and girls. After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and in the absence of a unified national government, the country split into three main zones (Somaliland, Puntland and South and Central Somalia), each with its own ambitions for the future. Trust in government was low after a long conflict and governance arrangements were deeply contested. Long consultative processes with traditional and religious leaders, as well as with Somali stakeholders from around the world, resulted in a transitional constitutional arrangement and the basis for state-building was formed.

Regional states were established under the auspices of federal governance. However, key issues such as fiscal federalism, power-sharing and authority of different levels of governance still need to be clarified. Somalia's provisional constitution (2012) frames decentralization by articulating that services should be provided at the lowest level of government where there is the capacity to do so. clan dynamics are still a strong force in Somalia and the selection process for the national parliament is based on a formula, known as the '4.5 system', which divides power among the four main clans and the minority clans. This same formula is applied for the district formation process and is described in the national framework for stabilization and local governance, the Wadajir framework.

The constitution further recognizes that there is a continued need to clarify functions and revenue assignments among the federal, state and local (districts/municipalities) levels of government. This

<sup>39</sup> Somalia is the 2nd most fragile country in the world and the most corrupt (FSI, 2016; Transparency International CPI, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> Jubbaland, South West State, Galmudug, Hirshabele, Puntland. The status of Mogadishu Municipality/Benadir Regional Administration is yet to be determined. Somaliland is seen as a "special arrangement", due to its self-declared independence.

## PR 3.1 Somalia Case Study

process is taking place both through the ongoing constitutional review process as well as in sector specific working groups, including on public financial management. At the FMS level there are some laws, policies and practices which designate service delivery responsibilities between the state and the local government levels, however the legal framework has many contradictions and does not provide a comprehensive legal framework for the whole country.

### B/ THE PROGRAMME

The UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG) was introduced in 2008 and has entered its third phase in 2018. Implemented by five UN agencies (UNDP, UN Habitat, UNICEF, ILO and UNCDF), the programme initially focused on the more stable and accessible Somaliland and Puntland states, at a time when there was neither policy guidance on service delivery at the local government level nor systematic financing arrangements for service provision. At that time, districts' investment in service delivery was minimal and sporadic, and state ministries continued to deliver services in parallel to local government. A series of negotiations held among central government and local government authorities on the sharing of responsibilities for service delivery resulted in the formal passing of a policy on decentralization and an accompanying roadmap in Somaliland and Puntland in 2013 and 2014, respectively. The policy articulates the agreed devolution of functions, such as education, health and water services, as well as existing service functions such as the rehabilitation of roads, business licensing and birth registration.

#### *Theory of Change and Programme Content*

Over two decades of externally supported reconstruction efforts in Somalia have shown the limits of an exclusively top-down, centrally directed approach to state-building. JPLG's focus, which is centred around consultative, bottom-up approaches aimed at building and consolidating local and state governance structures within a broader framework of promoting inter-clan reconciliation, is understood to be better aligned with Somali society and culture and therefore a potentially more successful strategy for state-building in Somalia today. Accordingly, the JPLG programme's focus has been on targeted support to local government structures and capacities across the range of basic functions and services they are expected to fulfil, as a means of addressing the differing but related challenges faced across Somalia. In the South, emphasis on building nascent, accountable and representative local governance structures in the aftermath of military success offers a reasonable chance that stability – and security – can be established and consolidated thereafter.<sup>41</sup> Somaliland is successfully navigating the twin demands of establishing statehood and doing so on the basis of a consensual, nominally democratic dispensation.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, Puntland has made very significant strides in consolidating its own governance structures and capacities, including a degree of democratization and presidential selection processes involving a peaceful transition of power. In both places, the challenge is one of consolidating stability gains by entrenching local governance capacity, building revenue bases and improving the reach and depth of basic service delivery - and security provision - to ordinary citizens.

The JPLG change model has evolved from a technical focus in earlier phases - on rendering local governments credible and professional service providers, increasing public investment in basic services and strengthening civic participation in local decision-making - towards a more politically grounded theory of change in the latest iteration of the programme. The phase III programme document recognizes the fragile nature of the federal model, the ongoing political and security tensions, low levels of trust in government, as well as the culture of social exclusion that has characterized the governance space in Somalia. The new theory of change emphasizes the importance of consensus-building, inclusion, accountability and legitimacy as a means of tackling these concerns. It more clearly states how the promotion of more effective, efficient and equitable public service delivery by local government can strengthen the social contract, thereby increasing government legitimacy, improving social cohesion, consolidating peace gains, stabilization and security in general.

The most defining interventions laid out by the JPLG are:

<sup>41</sup> The May 2017 London Conference placed emphasis on strengthening sub-national levels of administration and increasing the accountability of public officials as a key component of building effective national institutions.

<sup>42</sup> Somaliland has a bicameral legislature with a clan-based Guurti (Upper House) and a publicly elected Lower House composed of MPs from the political parties.



## PR 3.1 Somalia Case Study

- **Policy and legislative reforms through dialogue:** support to dialogue and coordination among sector ministries at state level, and between state and local levels stakeholders, to develop local government policies with alignment of the national laws, and to develop broad support for decentralized service delivery, and technical support for the development of decentralization-related policies. Champion offices provide the much-needed coordination and guiding framework necessary for passing policies and requisite regulatory framework;
- **Seed funding to encourage use of local government systems (sub-national PFM) and build capacity for local service delivery:** JPLG contributes through the Local Development Fund (LDF, for capital costs) and sector grants (for recurrent costs) to service delivery by local governments, such as for building roads, clinics and markets, providing street lighting, supporting teacher retention, paying water and electricity bills, and ensuring maintenance and security in primary schools and health facilities. Such support started even prior to the legislative translation of local governments' functions for service delivery, with the objective of demonstrating their capacities to do so and building support for localized service delivery by providing "proof of concept".
- **Development of tools and systems for accountable and transparent local governance, management and administration:** Tools and systems are tested by JPLG at District level and the support is provided to state government for translation into policies or laws. This includes automated accounting systems at sub-national structures, investments in public expenditure management, human resource management, office management, land management, community consultation and participatory planning, and social accountability, among others.
- **Support to own source local revenue generation:** JPLG requires state and district/municipality authorities to make financial contributions to complement grants provided through the LDF and supports these local authorities for own revenue generation through enhanced collection of high mobilization, planning and administration. Thanks to the program's interventions, local authorities are now in a better financial situation, hence continually increasing their budgetary allocations to the delivery of equitable social services. In Somaliland, local government ownership and investment in service delivery has resulted in significant increases in contributions to services from local revenues. Significant progress has been made in stimulating district ownership of and investment in local service delivery.
- **Capacity-building for improved service delivery and sustainability:** Capacity-building on core functions, systems and procedures that local governments need to master, which has transitioned from a UN-driven training exercise to a government led approach. JPLG embeds local experts in federal, state and local government institutions and supported the establishment of Local Government Institutes (LGIs) in Somaliland and Somalia to bring together a range of training components under a common curriculum for local governments.
- **Inclusive Politics:** aims at Improve gender equality and social inclusion in local governance by strengthening the representation, inclusion, retention and voice of women, youth, IDPs and minority groups in local government councils and administration, and in public decision-making processes (planning, budgeting, oversight, accountability, etc.).

### *Programme Impact*

A number of independent evaluations carried out on the JPLG revealed a positive impact, in the 21 targeted Districts across Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia, of the actions undertaken on a number of areas essential to building a more stable and peaceful environment:

## PR 3.1 Somalia Case Study

- **Access and quality of local services have increased significantly:**<sup>43</sup> more functions have been devolved to local governments,<sup>44</sup> which in turn demonstrated more ownership and invested more of their own resources<sup>45</sup>.
- **Local government authorities have progressively established legitimacy** and some level of public trust by demonstrating use of the limited local revenues collected and contributed to the provision of local services. This has created further incentives for revenue mobilization as citizens have been able to relate their payments to improvements in service delivery.<sup>46</sup> Whereas the collection rates remain relatively low, the foundation for own-source local revenue mobilization has been established and is being further enhanced.
- **Enhanced state-society relations** as local governments have stronger capacity to provide services that better respond to needs thanks to participatory planning processes and increased public engagement in decision-making and monitoring of local service delivery.<sup>47</sup>
- **Piloted local government model has provided a basis for scaling up a uniform system across Somalia:** the model, initially developed in 15 Districts in Puntland and Somaliland (80% of the population in these areas), is being adapted by the new FMSs to establish functioning local governance systems after more than 20 years of informal local governance. The Federal Government is supported to provide oversight and harmonization and facilitate dialogue.
- **Stronger local – central political settlement and reduced intergovernmental conflict opportunities:** dialogue and coordination fora, including the Inter-Ministerial Committee and the Technical Working Group Forum for decentralization, have brought together state and local governments to clarify functions and strengthen collaboration. These achievements, together with improvements in the coherence and harmonization of state and local government legal and policy frameworks, have contributed to reducing conflicts and improving service delivery.

### C/ CHALLENGES

- **Oversight and accountability:** the capacity for internal audit functions at state and district levels remains very weak and poses a risk to sustainable revenue collection growth as it is not clear how much revenue is lost to collection leakages or malpractice. Economic activity remains low, particularly for rural local governments and consequently constrains levels revenue mobilization.
- **Sustaining capacity and maintaining relationship:** as trained staff take up other employment and government reshuffles are frequent. It affects the institutional memory and requires ongoing reinvestment in capacity and relationship-building. This is further compounded by poor access and communications challenges.
- **Resource mobilization:** delays in attracting additional funding for service delivery at the local government level has exerted pressure onto the LDF and sector grants which were only designed to serve as catalytic funds and intended to be replaced by larger budgets from bilateral donors. Due to a nascent national public financial management environment, the mood for budget support is still very low.
- **Regulatory gaps:** whereas there has been adoption of administrative and fiscal decentralization policy frameworks, relevant functional and revenue assignments are yet to be finalized and formalized. There is still lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities in some aspects of local

<sup>43</sup> For example, schools supported by 3 districts in Somaliland have seen enrolment increase by 19% (2013-2016), in part due to improvements in the learning environment: improved sanitation and dedicated gender-specific and protected latrines, more space for students following the rehabilitation and equipment of classrooms and more motivated teachers in rural primary schools.

<sup>44</sup> In the education sector, only a few functions were devolved in 2014: rehabilitation, extension and maintenance of primary schools, as well as participation in education sector planning, coordination and monitoring processes. By 2016, these had been expanded to include the payment of top-up incentives for primary teachers and awareness raising on student enrollment. JPLG has supported the development of an education sector decentralization plan (2017-2021) that outlines the devolution of additional functions over the next five years, including the supervision and management of teachers, the oversight of school administration, the provision of school materials, and training of subordinate staff.

<sup>45</sup> In Somaliland alone, districts supported by JPLG increased their own-source contributions to education, health and water services by 480% between 2014 and 2017.

<sup>46</sup> The increase in revenues from property taxation in Somaliland and Puntland since 2008 has been 485% and 196%, respectively.

<sup>47</sup> In Hargeisa and Berbera for instance, local government is under pressure from neighborhood committees who mobilized resources for a certain cause like construction of a road and demands local government's top up or contribution.

## PR 3.1 Somalia Case Study

governance. For approved policies and regulatory frameworks, enforcement is still a major challenge.

- **High operating costs** continue to pose a challenge for local governance programming in Somalia, particularly in a context where strong engagement is needed with and among three levels of government.

### D/ KEY LESSONS LEARNT

- **A bottom-up approach to state-building is relevant**, even in the most adverse environments.
- **Decentralized service delivery requires coordinated engagement** from all relevant ministries and state and local levels of government, backed up by strong political will.<sup>48</sup>
- **Long-term predictable funding and financing arrangements are essential.** Sustaining decentralized service delivery depends on predictable funding and financing arrangements, Policy discussions on the transition towards domestic financing needs to be an integral part of programming.
- **Sustained advocacy to define and implement functional divisions** of responsibilities between state and district levels, as a means of creating a stronger enabling environment for decentralized service delivery, must be on-going.
- **Policy uptake by central government must be supported** with central government and buttressed by “expansion strategies” from pilot Districts to allow for a uniform local governance system to be implemented.
- **Engaging local government in service delivery contributes to improved state resilience, trust and legitimacy.** The role of local government should therefore feature more prominently in government, donor and implementing agencies’ development strategies.
- **Scaling up local governance systems requires concerted and coherent donor support** around a common approach and aligning their interventions with local governance priorities, so that stabilization interventions contribute to the legitimacy and sustainability of local governments.
- **Prolonged technical assistance to address systemic capacity gaps** and provide stability through a turbulent political climate is needed to sustain local governance reforms in FCS
- **Multi-stakeholder participation and prioritization helps focus limited resources** for capital investments on the most appropriate services to be delivered by local governments, even with minimum capacities. This is the main ingredient for public accountability, legitimacy and state-building.
- **Social accountability mechanisms on service delivery:** The system brought together local communities, service providers and local governments to monitor and report status of service provision and report challenges to generate mutually agreed solutions. It helped community committees to give constructive feedback to the service providers in Health, Education and Water authorities about the quality and other aspects of service delivery through community feedback. The information generated through the community committees is used for administrative and policy changes related to service delivery.
- **Gender and inclusion considerations need to be moved to the centre stage of programme design and implementation** to make sufficient advances. Local governments need to be supported to create more opportunities for women in district councils and encourage their retention and rise to senior levels. There is also needing to extend the engagement of youth and minority groups in local governance, particularly through civic education and social accountability efforts.

<sup>48</sup> The Vice Presidents of Puntland and Somaliland have served as champions for local governance and played a critical role in bringing key stakeholders together for policy change. A similar strategy will be adopted in the emerging FMS.

## PR 3.2 Service Delivery Debating Game Scenarios

In this activity, for each debate topic, two teams confront each other. They defend opposing positions on the question put forward to them. In addition to the two teams, the following characters play a role in each debate:

- the arbitrator (a participant): a high-ranking official / decision-maker that both teams try to convince to adopt their position.
- the time-keeper (facilitator): to make sure that each team limits itself to the time allotted for exposing its arguments.
- the scribe (assistant facilitator): writes on the board the arguments presented by each team.

### **Process:**

- **Step 1:** After being assigned a role in the debate, each team has 20 minutes to read their scenario and prepare their arguments to buttress the position that they are defending in front of the arbitrator. Each team should list a maximum of three arguments only.
- **Step 2:** Each team nominates three different speakers to present each of their argument and one more speaker for an opening statement. It is important for the quality of the role-play that not just one team member speaks the whole time in the name of the team. Other team members (not the 4 initially speaking) can also interject at any time to throw counter-arguments to the opposing team's own arguments.
- **Step 3:** The first team ('for) presents one argument. The opposing team then has the opportunity to present a counter-argument to the argument just made, and then to present their first 'against' argument. Each speaker only has ONE minute to speak. The scribe writes each argument and counter-argument on the whiteboard. The process continues to allow both teams to present all three of their arguments, plus three counter-arguments.
- **Step 4:** The adjudicator announces her/his decision as to which position won his support. S/he must give justification for her/his conclusions (e.g. persuasiveness of argument; logic; presentation).

### **SCENARIO 1**

**Context:** In the country of Big-Mess, a political and armed conflict has been on-going for the last 5 years. It followed a failed attempt to transition from an oppressive regime to democracy. The country has now *de facto* split into a number of more or less autonomously governed entities, under the dual control of non-state armed actors (militias) and municipal councils elected during the unsuccessful transition period. The conflict is increasingly entrenched, as well as societal divisions, insecurity and economic challenges. About 20% of the population has its basic humanitarian needs not covered and about 12% of the population is displaced. The public administration, which continues to be in charge for the provision of most basic services, including health, education and water, suffers from the vacuum of effective governance and leadership at the central level and of skyrocketing fiscal deficit. Therefore, public services, including utility provision, are regularly disrupted. In some localities, they have been completely shut down. Public infrastructure is often taken over by militias in their military campaigns, or squatted by displaced populations; this is particularly the case for schools. In the Education sector, about 10% of children need emergency schooling support. In the most affected localities, more than 50% of school buildings have been completely or severely damaged. In such context, local-level actors, and particularly municipalities, that are also the last legitimate democratically-elected institutions in the country, are trying to fill gaps left by the increasingly paralyzed public administration. Often, they seek to co-develop solutions with civil society, the private sector and community leaders, for responding to urgent needs of the local population. But their limited decision-making autonomy given by law, weak technical capacities and low financial resources, greatly limit their responsiveness to fast-changing conditions. A process of decentralization had been initiated prior to the conflict breakout, but it has been put on hold since then and what remains since then of the central government, is showing signs of wanting to re-centralize power.

**Scene:** A delegation of Mayors is visiting the Ministry of Education in the capital city, to meet with the Directorate General of Primary Education (DPE). The Minister of Education is also attending the meeting and will take the final decision. This Minister has been newly-appointed and has vowed to bring all children to school within 6 months – he also has strong political weight in the new UN-backed

## PR 3.2 Service Delivery Debating Game Scenarios

transition government. The DG for Primary Education and her/his staff take pride in the fact that, in Big-Mess, before the failed revolution, the Ministry of Education was able to achieve nearly 100% child enrolment in education, both for boys and girls, and education was totally free. S/He argues against increasing municipalities' prerogatives and budget for running primary schools, as Mayors are asking for, and in particular for recruiting and managing teachers (something which the central administration is already facing problems to perform in a situation of acute fragmentation of the country).

The Minister has decided to call on both parties to meet to try and reach a common solution, as the issue is becoming increasingly political and threatens his promise to bring all children back to school, hence potentially damaging the fledgling legitimacy of the transition government.

### Roles:

**Team A:** Mayors' Delegation

**Team B:** Director-General of Primary Education and his staff.

### **SCENARIO 2**

Context: Atlantis, a major donor country especially for fragile and conflict-affected settings, has initiated a process of revisiting its aid strategy. As part of this review, an evaluation of the country's support to peacebuilding has just been conducted, and it brings very mixed results. In general, programmes funded by Atlantis (mostly conditional cash transfer programmes) have had more impact at the level of sustaining livelihoods for impacted populations, than at getting these societies / countries out of the fragility. conflict trap. At the same time, this seems to be the case for most of peacebuilding interventions by the international community, as has recently underlined the UN-led peacebuilding review. Until now, Atlantis has been among the most ardent advocates of using parallel systems in post-conflict contexts for the delivery of social welfare assistance to the most vulnerable (conditional cash transfers) or for other types of community development. Atlantis almost exclusively delivers its cash transfer programmes through institutions such as Social Funds or international NGOs, i.e. non-governmental channels, because the government is very keen on limiting fiduciary risks in a context of budgetary constraints back home. Now, the government (who's been in power for the last 10 years) faces repeated attacks from the opposition on the ineffectiveness of the country's aid programme to conflict countries. In particular, the opposition is quick to point out that millions of \$\$ have been spent on distributing "handouts", as they say, to fund terrorism as many of the recent terrorist attacks in Atlantis were perpetrated by citizens from the countries where Atlantis has its biggest social welfare assistance. With all this in the balance, a confirmation of the country's new strategy towards stabilization and peacebuilding in conflict-affected settings is needed.

Scene: after a series of reviews and prospective studies, have been conducted for the past year, on Atlantis's strategy and social welfare programmes in conflict-affected countries, the final strategy-setting meeting is happening at Atlantaid, the country's aid agency. It gathers on one side the Strategic Policy Unit, who argues for a drastic change of approach towards using regional and local government systems to deliver social welfare payments, hence contributing to increasing the state legitimacy and to statebuilding. On the other side, the Emergency Response Unit, which implements all social welfare programmes, argues that parallel systems approach must be maintained but can be improved to make sure that payments only go to women and children, for example, and not adult men. They see that an institution-building approach is not appropriate for a post-conflict setting as usually government institutions are weak, corrupt and not politically stable. Also, they argue that instead of INGOs, they could work more through local NGOs, hence contributing to local capacity-building. The debate happens in the presence of the Atlantaid's CEO, who needs to send soon a final recommendation to the Foreign Minister re. the revamping of the country's aid strategy. \_\_

Team C: Strategic Policy Unit

Team D: Emergency Response Unit.


## PR 3.4 Programming Exercise

**Scenario:** you are deployed as Local Governance Programme Manager for an aid agency to a new country where a fragile peace has just been signed between the government and various rebel groups who holds large chunks of the territory, but mostly rural areas (cities are mostly under government control). Part of the agreement is that the central government will provide major support to improve access to services in the conflict-affected areas but no further details have been agreed between the government and rebels (i.e. priority services, modalities, sharing responsibilities, financing, etc.). During the decade-long conflict, the rebel groups were running basic services themselves in rural areas with support from INGOs and faith-based groups, while government run larger infrastructure / more complex services in regional cities. Government administrative services (i.e. civil registry, passports, licensing) were also only available in larger cities. Rebel groups have started running basic social services on their own, as INGOs are gradually leaving since the peace deal was signed, but face lots of capacity issues. Many types of services are not yet available in these areas, such as agriculture, LED, financial, waste management, etc. Also, rebel-held rural areas are not plugged in at all into the government's PFM system. The government only accepts that government funds transit through "official" local administrations for the time being, but rebel groups refuse to dismantle their own administrative system. Also, rebel groups insist that their own 'civil servants' be de facto integrated into the state's civil service. In the meantime, local populations are getting increasingly frustrated with the peace process (signed 2 years ago) as they see that not much has improved for them, and in addition to this, there is a large return movement of refugees from the neighboring country – they are being sent back forcibly as the neighbor country considers that peace has been signed and they have no more claims to remain on its soil. Those refugees mostly congregate to towns – the only place where sufficient services are really available – but contribute them to overcrowding and slum development in these cities, while the government and rebel groups would like to see them settle more evenly over the territory.

**Your task:** as the new Local Governance Programme Manager, you need to devise a 5-year road map to strengthen service delivery through a localized approach, to be presented to the State's Peacebuilding & Recovery Agency. It needs to be sequenced according to three phases (Stabilization, Recovery, System Development). What are the key programmatic interventions that you are proposing to the Government Agency for this road map?

You can use the diagram on next page to brainstorm; then draw the three phases and columns on a flipchart (use colors!) and write your proposed programmatic actions onto cue cards. Stick the cue cards on the sheet (or just draw rectangles with the action name written inside), where you think they fit the best (phase-wise). Of course, actions can overlap in time.

### PR 3.4 Programming Exercise



## PR 3.6 Conflict Sensitivity Interview Guide

**Guidelines:** Use the following template to interview members of the case study team in relation to the service delivery component of their Project. For questions 2 to 6, assign a score (decided as a group) based on your assessment of the level of sensitivity of the project for the criteria in question. At the end, sum up all the scores in the bottom row.

Criteria	Answer	Score (1 – 5)
<u>Project Context:</u> <sup>49</sup> What are the potential dividers and connectors linked to service delivery as identified by the Project? - Systems and institutions - Attitudes and actions - Values and Interests - Experiences - Symbols and Occasions	<u>Dividers:</u>  <u>Connectors:</u>	
<u>Impact on connectors:</u> how does the project reinforce positive connectors for peace through its support to service delivery? Did the project happen to weaken those connectors at some point?		
<u>Impact on dividers:</u> how does the project weaken potential dividers that can lead to conflict through its support to service delivery? Did the project happen to reinforce those dividers at some point?		
<u>Project adjustment:</u> has the project been re-adjusted during the course of implementation to avoid exacerbating dividers? How?		
<u>Impact on gender equality:</u> did the Project analyse the potential conflict risks associated with gender-blind activities? With supporting women's empowerment? How have both been minimized? How does the project reinforce the peacebuilding potential of women's empowerment?		
<u>Impact on environment:</u> did the project create tensions around access to or damage to environmental resources? How have they been minimized? How did the Project reinforce the peacebuilding potential of environmental conservation?		
<u>TOTAL</u>		

- **Dividers** are those things that: (i) increase tension, divisions or capacities for war between groups of people; (ii) increase suspicion, mistrust or inequality in a society.
- **Connectors** are those things that: (i) bring people together despite their differences; (ii) decrease suspicion, mistrust and inequality in a society.

<sup>49</sup> See next page for explanations.



## PR 3.6 Conflict Sensitivity Interview Guide

### Categories for Dividers and Connectors:

**Systems and Institutions:** Systems and Institutions can be either inclusive or exclusive, legitimate for all or only for some. When examining systems and institutions, it is important to look beyond formal mechanisms for governance. There are informal, religious, and traditional systems and institutions as well. Technological systems (communications, electrical grids, etc.) also fall into this category.

→ Sample questions: Which formal or informal governing policies, institutions or local, economic, technological, or cultural systems keep people apart or increase tensions between groups? Which institutions or systems help people overcome their differences or promote coexistence?

**Attitudes and Actions:** this category covers the things people say, and the things people do. People can promote connection or division through their actions (e.g. welcoming behaviors or aggressive behaviors) or their attitudes (e.g. sharing messages of peace or promoting stereotypes). These attitudes and actions can be small scale (how groups interact in a community) or large scale (what national-level politicians say).

→ Sample questions: What kinds of attitudes, stereotypes, threats or acts of violence exist in the context? How do people express tolerance, acceptance or appreciation for other groups?

**Values and Interests:** the things that are important to people, their concerns, their principles, and their standards. Shared values and common interests connect people and different values or competing interests divide them. Interests can be economic or political, and values are more likely to be ethical or cultural. Values and interests represent deeply held or incredibly strong beliefs and positions, and are very difficult to influence. They may represent the reasons behind attitudes and actions.

→ Sample questions: what are the specific values that may differ between groups and lead to tensions? What are the specific values that are shared among groups? Do groups share interests? Do they work together? Do groups have different interests in relation to shared resources?

**Experiences:** a strong factor of either connection or division. Shared or common experiences can unite people across lines of division. Different experiences of a singular event can shape people's perceptions and create positions of division in a society. Group experiences are the source of its narrative and history, so much so that generations after an event or experience, those historical events can still be the source of connection or division. How groups have interacted or been on the same or opposing sides in the past is a key feature of their present-day relationships.

→ Sample questions: have groups experienced a past or historical event differently? What experiences have groups shared in the past?

**Symbols and Occasions:** symbols are representative of something larger than themselves (e.g. a flag represents a country or a movement; a color represents a group; a street named after a war hero represents a piece of history). Occasions bring people together to celebrate, mourn, remember, or compete. These symbols and occasions can unite people across lines of division, or further divide them. A street named after a war hero looks different to people on the winning and losing sides of the war. A celebration of remembrance or independence may bring together all groups.

→ Are there symbols, events, holidays or occasions that celebrate one group over the other? From which certain groups are excluded? Are there universal symbols of togetherness or peace recognized and celebrated by all groups?



## PR 3.8 Kyrgyzstan Case Study

This case study (summary version) presents a project implemented by UNICEF in Kyrgyzstan between 2013-2017 as part of the UN's collective response to the Recovery & Peacebuilding Assessment conducted that same year. The case study was first used as part of the joint learning event led by UNDP, UNICEF, UNCDF and the DeLoG network, in 2018.

**Directions:** your group has been assigned an area of meaningful change by the Facilitator. Read individually the case study (prepared by UNICEF) and then identify collectively 3 indicators fitting the below terms of reference;

- each indicator should aim at capturing a change *within* that area only.
- one indicator should be on Functions, one on Form and one on Action.
- indicators should be pitched at outcome-level (there are 2 outcomes for this project, so your indicators can relate to one or the other or a mix – but only 3 indicators, not 6!).

Guidance on the 5 areas of change can apply to project results is given below:

1. **Political economy:** did/does the programme help redistribute political power around who makes what decisions on service delivery, including the division of responsibilities between central / local level, in a transformative way instead of a merely instrumental / superficial way? Did/does the programme in particular provides incentives for decision-makers in the service sectors supported by the programme to practice a more participatory form of governance?
2. **Accountability:** Did/Does the programme help strengthen upward *and* downward accountability of service providers? Did/does it contribute to better grievance-handling from users and front-line providers?
3. **Inclusiveness:** did/does the programme facilitate inclusive dialogue and collective problem-solving among all stakeholders effectively involved in delivering the service, including non-state actors when they play an active role? Did/Does the programme facilitate greater access to service(s) for social groups that were hitherto excluded from it? Did/Does it prevent new exclusions/marginalization to appear?
4. **State-society relations:** did/does the programme provide increased / easier opportunities for interaction between people and state institutions? Where these varied (involving different state actors) and serving different purposes (e.g. information-sharing, participation in decision-making, service, grievance-handling)? Did/does the programme help increase service-orientation among front-line providers? Is user satisfaction / trust higher as a result of the programme?
5. **Resilience:** did/does the programme help build capacities of the service delivery system to understand crisis risks, anticipate crisis and respond faster and more effectively? (here crisis could also relate to natural disaster-related events).

### Peacebuilding and Local Governance: Local Self-Governance in Kyrgyzstan

#### A/ Setting the Context:

The Kyrgyz Republic is a nation of nearly 6 million. With the gross national income for 2013 estimated at US\$ 1,200 per capita, the Kyrgyz Republic was only recently classified as lower middle-income country. Approximately 2.1 million children make up 37 per cent of the country's population.

Kyrgyzstan gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and shortly after implemented a parliamentary democracy, unique in Central Asia. In 2010, a liberal constitution was adopted which guarantees separation of powers, fundamental human rights and a system of governance based on the rule of law. Two increasingly open, fair and transparent parliamentary elections have been held since, albeit clearly under-representing women and ethnic minorities. Independence of Kyrgyzstan coincided with a shift in inter-ethnic demographics, mainly due to emigration of Russians: the proportion of the ethnic Kyrgyz population increased from 50 to 80 per cent. Ethnic Uzbeks based in the south, are with 14 per cent of the population currently the largest ethnic minority. Ethnic Russians, in the north, represent 6 per cent of the population. The change in demographics provided politicians with opportunity to gain votes through identity politics and populist messaging. In 2010, ethnic violence erupted in the south, resulting in 470 dead and the destruction of 2,800 homes. Feelings of social

## PR 3.8 Kyrgyzstan Case Study

injustice and of suspicion linger, slowing down recovery and inter-ethnic integration. In a context of unmarked and disputed borders, recurring community-level conflicts over governance and access of resources create a continual threat of further escalation.

The 2010 Constitution consolidated a system of **Local Self-Governance (LSG)**. The administrative system of Kyrgyzstan is characterized by three sub-national tiers of governance consisting of seven regions and two cities including the capital Bishkek; districts administered by government-appointed officials, and the LSG level, including municipalities in urban areas as well as rural areas (where they consist of up to twenty small settlements, headed by locally elected mayors and councils). LSG competences embrace water provision, garbage collection, sports, culture, local economic development and notably ‘the organization and implementation of measures for dealing with children and young people’.

The country’s marked by a lack of quality basic services, weak capacity of local public servants and the public perception of pervasive corruption according to polls, add to the complex fragility situation. A large percentage of the population has sought a better a life abroad, with 30 per cent of Kyrgyz GDP consisting of remittances, resulting in separated families and impacting parental care and supervision. Young people increasingly resort to religion to achieve spiritual comfort and guidance. A minority of them, over 500 according to some estimates, have travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State in a hope for a better future.

### **B/ UNICEF Engagement in Peace-Building through Local Governance:**

The United Nations Country Team Peacebuilding Needs Assessment (2013) highlighted the conflict potential related to the lack of trust between people and the state as well as among people, especially between ethnic groups. The assessment found that ‘weak state control and governance affect the trust of people in state institutions, as those institutions tend to provide an unequal or uneven access to quality public services, leaving room for discriminatory approaches and deprivation from social, economic, cultural, civil and political rights’. It also identified an overall sense of impunity and a tendency to resort to violence in resolving disputes, leaving women, children and youth as those most vulnerable. A lack of civic identity and the prevalence of ethno-nationalism further increase the conflict potential. The assessment pointed towards the need for ‘checks and balance mechanisms’ and strengthened participation of minorities, women, youth and other excluded groups in public affairs.

UNICEF prioritized two **outcomes** of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan:

- (1) Local self-government bodies, in partnership with related state institutions and civil society, have the capacity to bridge divisions and reduce local tensions.**
- (2) Policies, pilot initiatives and approaches are developed and implemented that enable the further development of a common civic identity, multilingual education and respect for diversity and minority rights.**

#### *First area of intervention: Social Protection and LSG*

LSG bodies are well placed to effectively promote social inclusion of vulnerable groups through the delivery of equitable and accessible public services. In 2013, the State Agency on Local Self-governance and Inter-Ethnic Relations was established, presenting a strong opportunity to support LSG bodies to bridge existing ethnic divisions and to reduce tensions. Thirteen LSGs and related state institutions joined efforts with UNICEF and UNDP to model mechanisms to identify the most vulnerable children and youth and their families as a precondition to providing access to basic services and appropriate case management. The programme analysed local legal and operational mechanisms for reaching the most vulnerable, identifying both opportunities and deterrents to equitable service delivery. Local service providers from conflict-affected communities were then trained and coached in identifying and responding to vulnerabilities in an inclusive manner. In 2015, the approach was endorsed through a government act which scaled up the approach nationwide, assigns clear roles and responsibilities to LSGs and central authorities and guarantees access to social benefits and social services.

## PR 3.8 Kyrgyzstan Case Study

### *Second area of intervention: Youth and LSG*

In this area, UNICEF Kyrgyzstan interventions have been guided by the following Theory of Change: *if adolescents and youth acquire non-cognitive skills that enable them to act as peace actors, and professional skills and competences, they will be better prepared to engage in socio-political and economic life, they will find opportunities for self-realization, and in the mid-long term contribute to improve living conditions at a local level. Narratives of extremism and radicalism will then be less attractive to them because they will focus their attention on realizing their potential while contributing to collective advancement.*

In Kyrgyzstan, youth topics are divided between the Ministry of Education and Science and the Agency for Youth, Sports, and Physical Culture, in which the former manages policy development while the latter is tasked with monitoring and implement of these policies. The National Strategy of Youth Policy Implementation is the primary strategy guiding the youth sector in Kyrgyzstan. **Youth affairs, in general, are formally a service provided by LSGs.** Enactment of youth related services is at the discretion of LSGs and contingent on both local government capacity and financial resources. As a result, LSG youth work has ranged from being virtually non-existent to one-off sport or folkloric events with limited sustainable impact. Linkages between the national level youth strategies and local youth initiatives have been weak.

In the aftermath of the 2010 conflict, UNICEF engaged in a partnership with national and local governments, international development organizations and civil society to create **a network of Youth Centers**. The Youth Centers provided a safe space for young people from different backgrounds to come together, learn technical and social skills, discuss issues and potential remedial and preventive actions. Since 2012 the programme took on a more systemic approach through the introduction of a common standards for professional youth work in conflict affected communities, including a focus on youth leadership, communication and citizenship skills; career planning; youth participation in local government development planning and budgeting and in monitoring the delivery of local services. At the same time, the programme introduced a youth policy course at a graduate school for LSG public servants.

Since the introduction of the course, 50 LSG youth workers have been trained, resulting in the introduction over 60 youth initiatives and more than 20 new LSG youth services. In 10 pilot communities, youth now participate in LSG budget hearings through which they can advocate for the allocation of LSG funds to issues of their concern. The programme also supported LSGs in contracting civil society organizations and private companies as a key mechanism through which LSGs can support local youth policy implementation.

### **C/ Challenges**

Political parties are articulated around territorial, lineage or clan, religious and national identity programme cleavages, thus making at times difficult to articulate debates and policies around issues, including youth issues. Local governments are primarily interested in local infrastructure development, which provides tangible outputs as a result of their action.

It is frequent and hence expected among the population that LSGs do not abide to their own policy decisions because:

- The fiscal system is centralized, and most LSGs depend on levelling grants from central government. This does not facilitate LSGs responsiveness to local citizens needs and demands, diluting institutional accountabilities between LSG and central government.
- High turnover of local public servants, mostly motivated by low salaries, lack of career development, and motivation.
- There is no institutionalized culture of evidence-based and participatory policy/decision-making.

**D/ Lessons learned:**

- On the job capacity development with LSGs will contribute clarifying roles and responsibilities among different political levels.
- Aligning social protection mechanisms to international standards will help providing better services to the most vulnerable (central and local authorities' aim primarily at reducing the number of beneficiaries while international criteria aim at reducing poverty headcount, severity and gap, or impact on consumption share).
- Supporting LSGs enforcing their own Strategic Plans and using them as tools to set the policy and funding framework, will help bringing consistency in priorities and interventions of aid agencies, central government and other stakeholders.
- LSGs frequently support and benefit from adolescents and youth engagement in decision-making. Efforts to institutionalize this approach within the existing legal framework and processes, particularly around LSG planning, budgeting and monitoring, will strengthen vertical social cohesion.
- The peacebuilding case of increasing LSGs capacities to manage and benefit from participatory processes must be coupled with the development of skills and competences of adolescents and youth so they can contribute in a constructive and effective manner to the local planning processes. This is particularly relevant for girls and minorities.
- Special attention has to be devoted to the role of elders in communities, grounded on custom and traditional values, so youth engagement is perceived as a positive contribution and not as threat or inappropriate. And as such it is encouraged and facilitated.

## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

### The nexus between social cohesion, fragility and conflict:

- Social cohesion is a concept that reflects overall the quality of relationships across groups in a society. It can be applied to a community, a city, a region or a country, where it is then often associated with the idea of national identity. Social cohesion can also be defined through a negative scale statement, saying that it is the nature and extent of social and economic divisions within society. As such, socially cohesive societies are not necessarily demographically homogenous, but rather ones that have fewer potential and/or actual leverage points for individuals, groups, or events to expose and exacerbate social fault lines, and ones that find ways to harness the potential residing in their societal diversity.<sup>50</sup>
- Social cohesion is a dynamic notion:
  - It is an ideal to be striven for, rather than a goal being fully achieved. It constantly needs to be nurtured, improved and adapted.
  - Its strength is also measured in the way that it has developed satisfactory ways of coping with strains (divisions, potential divisions) in an open and democratic manner.
- Social cohesion can be decomposed into two main interrelated dimensions:<sup>51</sup>
  - 1) *social inclusion*: it describes how a society (including the state) is able to minimize disparities and avoid marginalization (Council of Europe). It is not just a matter of combating poverty and exclusion, but also about creating solidarity in society such that exclusion will be minimized. From an action point of view, it refers therefore to any measures that ensure that every citizen (individual) can have in his/her community, the opportunity of access to:
    - The means to secure their basic needs
    - To progress
    - To protection and legal rights
    - To dignity and social confidence.
  - 2) *social capital*: refers to features or social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. There are three forms of social capital usually considered: bonding, bridging and linking. Social capital is not necessarily all positive, as it can also be traversed by power relations which then utilize social capital for non-inclusive outcomes. Indeed, social capital is often mobilized in societies (alongside physical capital and human capital) to provide access of individuals and groups to resources and supports. Communities with strong networks, high levels of trust and well-established habits of cooperation and association are generally much better off than those without these things.
- Social cohesion and conflict are intimately related. Indeed, social cohesion determines levels of trust and collaboration between groups, social institutions and, by extension, society and the states. Social cohesion is the product of the multiplicity of power relations within society, which lies at the heart of conflict dynamics and which need to be understood for development and peacebuilding programming.<sup>52</sup>
- A socially cohesive society faces lower violent conflict risks because:
  - it displays a ‘manageable’ level of structural inequalities among groups, i.e. to a point where the scale of inequalities does not seriously damage the public trust that social progress is still accessible to most and access to opportunities for better living conditions and livelihoods is not constrained by the accumulation of capital and power by better-off groups.
  - it has less horizontal inequalities based on identity factors or measures are being ostensibly taken by government to erase potential horizontal inequalities inherited from previous times.
  - diversity (ethnic, cultural, gender) is managed by social actors and leaders as a source of mutual enrichment rather than a threat to one of the groups (often, the dominant one).

<sup>50</sup> William Easterly, W., J. Ritzan and M. Woolcock, 2006.

<sup>51</sup> Jenson, 2010.

<sup>52</sup> UNICEF, 2017.



## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

- strains and stresses to the society's equilibrium, such as changes in the diversity make-up (e.g. migrants, emergence of new modes of living and communities of identity), are managed through dialogue and collective action.
- tensions and conflicts between groups (or starting at individual levels) are managed peacefully before they escalate, including by entrusting public authorities (formal & informal) deal with such threats with legitimate normative systems.
- civic engagement is fuelled and maintains pressure on institutions to reach higher standards of accountability and inclusivity, hence reducing elite's tendencies for exclusionary and patronage politics.
- it displays sufficient confidence and patience needed for the state to implement reforms: citizens trust the government that the short-term losses inevitably arising from reform will be more than offset by long-term gains.
- Conversely, a society crossed by deep fault lines and possibly featuring the exclusion of certain groups from rights, public goods and opportunities, can experience the following consequences:
  - efforts to improve governance are hampered, leading to greater discontent.
  - the tolerance to inequalities of those who suffer from them runs thin or nil and they lose trust in the state's and wider society's interest (and capacity) to address their situation; resentment against well-off groups strengthens and violence becomes the preferred strategy to reclaim one's rights.
  - horizontal inequalities develop without realization by better-off groups of the threats posed to the society as a whole; they may even be encouraged by the majority or elites.
  - diversity (ethnic, cultural) is seen as a threat to the well-being of the society by those who make up its main group and/or hold power, leading to greater horizontal inequalities against minority and marginalized groups.
  - strains and stresses to the society's equilibrium are responded to by violent reactions from rather than civic engagement and peaceful problem-solving.
  - tensions and conflicts arising in society, even outside of identity factors, can escalate fast into violent conflict involving groups and social & political institutions see themselves unable or unwilling to negotiate a peaceful exit.
  - strong divisions along class and ethnic lines place severe constraints on the attempts of even the boldest, civic-minded, and well-informed political elites seeking to bring about reforms for redistribution of powers and opportunities (including economic).
- Social cohesion makes with institutional coherence (or 'institutionalization') the two pillars of a strong social contract. They are mutually reinforcing. The more cohesive a society, the greater likelihood groups and institutions will work together and manage conflict constructively. Conversely, "social divisions hamper efforts at improving governance and fostering economic opportunity, which in turns creates discontent and a zero-sum competition for power and resources".<sup>53</sup> More social cohesion leads to better institutions, which in turn leads to stronger social contract and higher growth and reinforces social cohesion (for as long as growth and social progress benefits all groups).
- Social cohesion is vital in countries where formal institutions are weak and often susceptible to manipulation, corruption and bias. In such contexts, a relatively cohesive society will still manage to address its internal conflicts and differences through socially-legitimized rules and processes, while if left to formal institutions alone, they are mostly incapable of neutral mediation and enforcement of rules. But generally, it is very hard in poorly institutionalized contexts to improve formal institutions because elites and officials have strong incentives to undermine reform as harmful to their interests.<sup>54</sup> If a state is strong formally institutionalized, social fractures are less likely (or matters less) because the state is more likely to be a more equitable conflict manager. Hence, social cohesion and the level of institutionalization interact in determining the level of fragility of a society. Fragility can be understood as existing along two dimensions, with socially cohesive and highly institutionalized states on one extreme, and social fractious and poorly

<sup>53</sup> Kaplan, 2017.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.





## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

institutionalized states on the opposite one. Combinations exist between these extremes. Fragile states / societies are those combining divided societies and strong controlling states and those combining divided societies and low-capability governments.<sup>55</sup>  
(from Kaplan, 2017).

**Table 1. Four Types of Political Orders (with Examples)<sup>14</sup>**

	Low Political–Identity Fragmentation	High Political–Identity Fragmentation
High Institutionalisation (or at least high coercive capacity)	<i>I: Dynamic</i> Botswana Turkey Chile China	<i>III: Fragile but Controlled</i> Syria (before 2011) Soviet Union (before 1991) Iraq (before 2003) Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan
Low Institutionalisation	<i>II: Stable but Sluggish</i> Senegal Armenia Tanzania Bangladesh	<i>IV: Fragile and Unstable</i> Nigeria Congo (DRC) Somalia Libya (after 2011) Syria (after 2011)

### The theory of change around a local governance approach to building social cohesion

- Rebuilding social cohesion in conflict-affected settings is primarily a bottom-up process, although the importance of redefining a ‘social covenant’ in society, which supersedes community or regional boundaries, is also intrinsic to the process of securing the social contract and implies going beyond local-level social cohesion strengthening. A ‘social covenant’ is defined (Kaplan, 2017) as “an agreement (written or presumed) defining a framework for cooperation among the major groups of a society. Forged between groups, it is a society-society rather than a state-society pact. It builds a common identity that defines the origins and make-up of political society and a common sense of purpose for the state”.
- At the subnational level, social cohesion implies working on reducing social exclusion, inequalities and nurturing social capital. There are two main angles to be followed:
  - Society-society relations: to address divisions in society
  - State-society relations: social cohesion and institutionalization are self-reinforcing. A ‘healthy’ state-society relation is therefore an engine of greater social cohesion (and vice-versa).
- Institutions, whether social or formal, have an important role to play in actively strengthening social cohesion – while it is too often seen as a society-society issue only. The state has a main responsibility to actively create social cohesion by ensuring that public services (including security and justice) are provided fairly and efficiently (i.e. treating all citizens equally), by actively redressing overt forms of discrimination and other social barriers<sup>56</sup>, by protecting and promoting civic freedoms (e.g. civil society) and by reducing opportunities for the use of violence in settling inter-group disputes (e.g. arms control, effective policing, education).
- The local level is a natural arena to rebuilding bonds and links between groups in society, fight exclusion and rebuild state-society relations in fragile and conflict affected societies. A localized approach to strengthening social cohesion is particularly relevant because local governance:

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Jensen, 2010.



## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

- facilitates the mapping, analysis and resolution of possible horizontal inequalities (and some are very localized);
  - shows that certain levels of problems affecting people's daily lives and opportunities can be resolved rather straightforwardly through collective action;
  - strengthens the development of a common 'local' identity beyond possible ethnic/religious faults, including through proposing local development models that can demonstrate the value of shared interests over competitive strategies.
  - requires convening different groups to work together on public policies, through representative processes but also through new forms of democratic participation, hence nurturing tolerance and respect across social divides;
  - offers a platform for the development of infrastructures for peace (e.g. local peace committees) within and among communities and can support difficult reconciliation processes led within transitional justice processes;
  - facilitates welfare-to-work policies to integrate the unemployed and excluded in local economies.
  - embodies the bridging role of institutions, when these institutions are closer to society and sufficiently empowered.
- As was the case for the potential of localized service delivery for preventing and solving conflict, the accountability and inclusiveness of local governance processes are at the heart of realizing the theory of change presented above.
  - Privileging a women and youth focus in social cohesion programming in FCS is a common approach among donors. This is because it has been demonstrated that "higher social cohesion is positively correlated with a higher participation of women and young people to the political and working life of their countries, more intense social participation and confidence in new technologies".<sup>57</sup> The rationale is that:

### *Women*

- promoting gender equality reinforces the building of new social relations horizontally rather than reinforcing vertical command chains.
- as an oft marginalized group in FCS, increasing women's access to decision-making and rights is an essential objective to reduce social exclusion that feeds societal divisions.
- women are generally agents of peace as they are more prone to negotiations than the use of violence to settle disputes and display better skills than men at bridging across groups.
- women are strong influencers in their households and communities; in particular, as they are mostly in charge of child rearing, especially in the early ages, women can shape perceptions, including on the need to restore social cohesion and overcome divisions, and on the role and performance of state institutions.
- women are usually inclined to civic engagement in FCS because they face a harder time accessing political power through formal institutions, and women's civic activism can have a great influence on social attitudes.
- reducing SGBV and other security risks facing women in FCS means opening greater access for women to the public arena, hence nurturing a greater social, political and economic role.

### *Youth*

- the tension between young and old is one of the key features of inter-generational shifts pertaining to the control over power, resources and people. It is a root cause of conflict in many fragile settings. Reducing the dependency, exclusion, and social or political marginalization of youth can therefore reduce prominent sources of social and political contest, which can lead to violence.
- youth should be nurtured as agents of positive peace not just because it takes them away from being perpetrators of physical violence, but also because they can spearhead the transformation of violent, oppressive and hierarchical structures, as well as behaviour, relationships and

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<sup>57</sup> Acket, S. et al, 2011.



## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

attitudes into more participatory and inclusive ones.<sup>58</sup> Youth demonstrate openness to change, feedback and learning; tend to be more future-oriented, more idealistic and innovative; and more willing to take risks.<sup>59</sup>

- youth have a strong desire and sense of innovativeness and creativeness which can be harnessed through the arts, culture, tourism, sports and education to build bridges between divided communities and ensuring a viable process of reconciliation.
- youth are more susceptible of having the educational level needed to conduct civic awareness campaigns for peaceful social relations; they are less likely to be directly involved with some of the violent leadership structures that have fueled conflict in the first place and hence in a better position to act as trusted bridging elements and mediators between divided groups.
- youth also have a desire for independence and self-realization in society which usually makes them prime engines for community entrepreneurship and the broader social and solidarity economy approach, where social cohesion outcomes are put on the same level than economic outcomes.
- In situations that are acutely polarized, with significant levels of mistrust among groups, if young people are not given an opportunity to use their 'energy' but also vent their frustrations 'positively, they may also be easily mobilized by their peers or groups to engage in disruptive or violent action.

### **Challenges, Risks and Approaches**

- Research evidence and empirical observations show that local governance, and in particular devolution of powers to local actors, in FCS can either mitigate or exacerbate social divisions, depending on many factors relating to context, such as pre-conflict levels of social cohesion, strength of institutions (social and formal) or the complexity of the diversity situation.
- The arguments against a significant role of local governance for building social cohesion are that:<sup>60</sup>
  - it accentuates differences between localities and dilutes common cross-group identities;
  - it can lead to scenarios where local political leaders are elected along ethnic lines and mobilize ethnic identities to consolidate their power;
  - it encourages patronage politics at the local level, hence defeats the purpose of legitimizing the state by undoing situations of horizontal inequalities and greater efficiency in providing for the common good.
  - It may reinforce the feeling of under- or non-representation by marginalized / minority groups in political power – and the most directly accessible form to them – depending on the electoral system used for local elections and the credibility of local electoral processes.
  - it can aggravate historical grievances if, for example, following a devolution process, a local region chooses a particular local language as official language in that region at the expense of other minority languages.
  - decentralization breeds increased inequalities in some cases, leading to higher risks for conflict.
- In general, social cohesion dynamics do not respond necessarily to the incentives that are commonly proposed through development programmes (public goods, voice, jobs, knowledge, etc.). The main reasons are that:
  - social cohesion is a sensitive area in most societies and donors do not have a 'natural' legitimacy to intervene into what are considered as mostly endogenous processes as they would have, for example, in service delivery.
  - many interventions forget the political dimension and hence are not designed considering the political economy of inter-group relations and social exclusion. These interventions remain on the surface and are not able to tackle the structural determinants of divisions of society, for example, or horizontal inequalities, or lack of trust between groups.

<sup>58</sup> <https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/10/26/the-role-of-youth-in-peacebuilding-challenges-and-opportunities/>

<sup>59</sup> Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development, 2016.

<sup>60</sup> Scott, 2009.



## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

- social cohesion interventions may rely too strongly on a Western-style vision of community / local governance structures and forget to understand local cultural and spiritual determinants of how individual and group relations are built and managed.
- efforts are too short-term and fail to tackle the structural factors that have created divisions between groups, including prejudice and long-held historical grievances.
- For example, a number of common donor approaches to supporting social cohesion building through localized approaches in FCS have shown the following results:<sup>61</sup>
  - Community-driven development: mixed evidence of success, with certain successful outcomes and others neutral or, worse, increasing violence in certain contexts (especially when there is competition over project resources). Programme design, in the sense of how the programme is designed, seems to be even more important in determining outcomes than context and content.
  - Social protection schemes: such approach supports the assumption that greater equity in society is good for stability. Social protection is thought to address the distributional aspect of social cohesion: reduce poverty, enhance income security, improve access to services and establish legal entitlements for excluded groups. It fits the vision of the role of the state in redistributing benefits of the social contract. However, there is little evidence of the ways in which different social protection modalities (e.g. cash transfers, social insurance, conditional transfers, etc.) impact social cohesion.<sup>62</sup>
  - Educational / recreational programmes: education and recreation activities are important for social cohesion by exposing students to those from different groups, teaching them values of tolerance, forging a national identity, recognizing and giving space to different cultures and providing equal opportunities to all and thus reducing grievances around inequalities, and teaching young people the basic principles of good citizenship. Investing in recreational activities (sports, culture) is effective in the short-term to build bridges between communities as it brings interaction into a more 'neutral' field than political contests or judiciary processes (e.g. transitional justice, conflict resolution), it is not sufficient to overturn durably built-up prejudice and grievances. A holistic approach to educational / recreational programming for social cohesion is needed, which includes teacher recruitment & training, building of schools and school mapping, curriculum and textbooks development, etc. to nurture greater social cohesion. The decentralization of education management can help address the very specific nature of social cohesion problems in some settings, and in particular help deal with linguistic claims, but central control on educational policies, especially for what relates to curricula development and school distribution, remains necessary in order to preserve / develop a larger social covenant and avoid undermining social cohesion as has happened in many settings (Sri Lanka, Rwanda prior to 1992).<sup>63</sup>
  - Civil society development: CSOs can play a role in facilitating dialogue, combating impunity and fostering social stability. At the same time, civil society is not immune from social divisions issues that cross society: in deeply divided contexts, it is rare to find CSOs that can work across divisions and donor interventions may face serious challenge in bringing CSOs representing different groups together. These CSOs can also be highly politicized in post-conflict contexts. To work effectively in rebuilding social cohesion through civil society support, DPs will have to adopt a broad conception of civil society, beyond NGOs and formally constituted organizations. A rigorous analysis of the civil society fabric, rather than an idealized portrayal of it, should be the base for programming.
  - Community policing / small arms control: Since along with socio-economic status, deprivation and access to services and facilities, crimes also have significant impact on community cohesion and resilience, the concepts of community security and social cohesion are seen as mutually reinforcing. If communities feel physically secure, they are likely to act in more cohesive ways and vice versa.<sup>64</sup> To some extent the relationship between crime and collective (dis)organisation may be mediated by the role of police in community (cooperative or conflicting). It has been

<sup>61</sup> GSDRC, 2016.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> UNDP, 2009.



## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

shown that formal police control and other external institutions do not work effectively within poorly cohesive communities unless if it is supported by informal rules and sanctions — meaning that the police needs the support and assistance of private citizens to succeed. This is why purely repressive strategies to combat crime in violence-affected communities has not delivered (e.g. Iron Fist policies in Central America in the 1990s) positive social cohesion outcomes, while community policing programmes where a cooperative role of police in a community has been established, have yielded more convincing outcomes. Yet, after a quick expansion of community policing programmes in 2000's, many failures have also been observed. This is because these programmes have often not tried or been able to establish effective multi-agency arrangements and effective, open communication channels<sup>65</sup> (e.g. between municipal and state police, or between police and judicial system).

- Measures that can be taken at the programming level to mitigate the risks identified previously.
  - considering that social cohesion is as much a programming area in its own right (e.g. social / educational activities that bring groups together, building social cohesion / conflict resolution skills in civil society, supporting local infrastructures for peace), as it is also a cross-cutting priority to be applied to all programming areas of a local governance approach to sustaining peace. Through service delivery, job creation, environmental conservation, local political processes, social exclusion can be fought and social capital can be built.
  - recognizing local culture and beliefs as determinant to the social cohesion, the closer to the local level, the more endogenous a process it is, and involve elders and traditional / religious leaders where needed
  - avoiding focusing solely on marginalized / less powerful actors in society to reactivate social cohesion (e.g. women, youth); while women and youth can be effective agents of social cohesion, they are also often the least powerful to induce structural changes to the way communities are governance and relate to each other. To reach this goal in the longer-term, it is necessary to activate all the levers of power in a community / society.

### **Conflict sensitivity: engaging with non-state actors to rebuild social cohesion**

- The notion of ‘public authority’ is useful to delineate what local governance arrangements really are in fragile and conflict-affected societies, especially where state institutions are weak. Public authority in such environments typically comes from both formal and informal institutions that can undertake core public functions, such as maintaining security, managing relations between community groups and with central government, resolving conflicts and providing or facilitating the provision of a range of collective goods and services. Supporting a shared public authority, and therefore engagement with non-state actors who embody the informal side of public authority, is justified for rebuilding the social contract and preventing relapse into conflict because:
  - State institutions, including local governments, cannot muster the necessary legitimacy to be the main (or sole) source of public authority; they may be politically weaker than informal actors and fail to provide a similar level of support to communities that the latter does.
  - Difficulties encountered in ‘democratizing’ local politics may result in local elections being delayed, creating situations in which public authority must be embodied by a hybrid mix of institutions with different sources of legitimacy; and
  - The capacity of the state to negotiate with a large diversity of actors wielding some level of authority at local level and to influence and regulate them without a top-down imposition of its authority is critical to the resilience of the political settlement.
  - Non-state actors play a strong role in mediating between state and society, where the state is barely present and/or in a weak capacity, as well as between external actors (such as donors) and society. In an area (social cohesion) where the legitimacy of external actors can be challenged, working through NSAs is sometimes the only manner to build the initial trust needed for engagement with external programmes.
  - NSAs have strong legitimacy in organizing intra and inter-group relations through defining norms of social interactions, conducting customary justice and resolving local conflicts.

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<sup>65</sup> Sučić et al, 2010.

## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

- Working with NSAs, in particular to rebuild social cohesion, has often met donors' reticence because of the static notion of legitimacy that these hold and the strong focus on rights-based approach in their work. Yet, if some non-state actors in certain settings follow socio-political norms that maintain the oppression / exclusion of women or other groups, or are strongly militarized, or refuse statebuilding as they also pursue separatist goals, this should not be the tree that hides the forest: NSAs also include community-based organizations and peaceful traditional and religious leaders, who in many cases are open to participating in local governance based on democratic principles. In fact, most 'formal' political actors at the local level would also be members of non-state groups. Experience shows that refusing to engage with those who oppose in principle transformation of local governance, for instance by excluding them from running in local elections, is counterproductive to building stable socio-political order.<sup>66</sup>
- Among non-state actors, traditional structures are the most commonly involved in sharing public authority with state institutions. Their relative strength comes from the fact that they do not take their legitimacy from the state but nevertheless strongly influence peoples' lives in many respects, including providing services and defending their communities' interests to the 'outside' world. Traditional structures may have a long history in power, as well as socio-cosmic legitimacy, but they may also be structures inherited from a recent (colonial) past. The administration of justice remains a common prerogative of traditional structures with both positive examples of separation and collaboration with the formal system (e.g. Bolivia, Botswana) or on the contrary competition in terms of jurisdiction and norms (e.g. South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Regulating community and individual access to land and natural resources is also a common function of traditional structures.
- Traditional structures are often capable of evolving when faced with competition from other options available to community members to settle grievances and find answers to their needs. People can also challenge the powers of traditional structures through legal means when available. The more that traditional structures interact with pluralistic and inclusive formal institutions, the more likely that traditional structures can evolve and blend well with these institutions. A recent study by the OECD<sup>67</sup> on gender inequality and conflict recommended that donors strengthen their programming on gender equality by engaging more strategically with men and with "resistors". Failing to work with the diversity of stakeholders – including men, community norm setters, and potential resistors (e.g. traditional and religious authorities, local officials, central or local level political party leaders) – is counterproductive as their participation is required to affect change in gender power relations and avoid doing harm.
- When applying a DNH framework to programming in a context of prevalence of TRS (or other non-state actors that do not readily embrace the notion of modern state legitimacy and still control to a large extent social and community relations), it is important to adopt a pragmatic approach: it is probable that TRS control, or at least influence, many of the power levers at the local level, whether directly or indirectly (through CSO/CBOs, elected representatives, militias, businesses, etc.). It is not just dealing with a traditional / tribal leader, it is about dealing with a network / web of relations and allegiances that legitimizes and extends their power.
- Modern states in many post-colonial / post-conflict contexts have either tried to: (i) repress traditional structures; (ii) actively collaborate or use them (to prop up their legitimacy); or (iii) ignore them. Yet much of the time, the actual relationship between traditional structures and the modern state is determined informally at the local level – and with a strong bias towards continuity. The political settlement between national and local polities that underpins local governance arrangements, should reflect the actual strength and legitimacy of non-state actors and provide them with incentives to contribute to building peace and the state, rather than act as spoilers. Hence, a DNH and HRBA approach to engaging on social cohesion matters in FCS, which would lead to ignoring the role of TRS and refuse collaboration, could actually lead to increased polarization and threaten the process of finding a political settlement.

<sup>66</sup> IDS, 2010.

<sup>67</sup> OECD, 2017.

## PR 4.0 Main Facts on Local Governance and Social Cohesion

- Yet, the process of blending traditional structures into modern local governance systems is also fraught with risks if it is not accompanied by a deliberate effort from the state to reform these structures. Donor programming should be balanced and provide incentives for TRS to evolve as well, such as by supporting at the same time democratic processes (elections, civil society) that can also provide a healthy source of ‘competition’ over the role of ‘cement’ of social cohesion. Acknowledging the power, legitimacy and role of TRS and other NSAs in building social cohesion and, more broadly, in peacebuilding, should not alter the fact that the transformation of social relations is a central objective of building peace.

### Measuring social cohesion

- Measuring social cohesion is by definition a multi-dimensional exercise. There is not one single indicator that can capture astutely the complexity of such a concept.
- Indicators commonly found to measure social cohesion:
  - Ethnic diversity: ethnic heterogeneity, data on racism and discriminatory acts, racially violent crimes, complaints for discrimination, patterns of discrimination in government,
  - Equal opportunities for women / men, generations, social strata, disabled, citizenship groups, etc.
  - Income distribution: gini coefficient, share of the income of the middle 60% of population, inclusion in the labour market
  - Social benefits
  - Trust
  - Civic participation: memberships rates in organizations
- Going back to the core dimensions of social cohesion, several authors consider that a full measure of social cohesion requires:
  - Social inclusion indicators:
    - equal access to security (statistics and perceptions)
    - equal access to financial resources
    - equal access to economic activity
    - equal access to education and human capital
    - equal access to health
    - equal access to technology
    - cultural and ethnic homogeneity
  - Social capital indicators
    - trust
    - tolerance accros social divides
    - respectful relations amongst social groups
    - participation and solidarity
    - inclusive leadership working on behalf of all
    - little discrimination in public services
- Albeit a complex process, the measurement of social cohesion at the local level is also one that bears great potential for participatory processes and self-evaluation. The very fact of unpacking what social cohesion means at the level of a community or territory, with the various groups present, and agreeing on indicators to measure it, can also be part of the healing process and help pinpoint where the real issues are (for example, discrimination, inequalities). However, it is also a sensitive process and there will be situations where certain indicators, especially for social exclusion on racial/ethnic basis, are simply not implementable in certain contexts.

## PR 4.1 Ukraine Case Study

Programme Title: Strengthening Ukrainian communities hosting IDPs

Programme Period: 2015-2019.

Implemented by: GIZ

### A/ CONTEXT

Due to the armed conflict in the eastern Ukraine, the country faced a rapid and large-scale population displacement. In total around 2.5 million people were forced to flee the conflict territories. The first wave of internal displacement occurred in March 2014. In 2015, the official number of registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) had increased till around 1,5 million people. Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions (Oblast) became the most popular destination and transit places. In 2015 there were approximately 350,000 people officially registered as IDPs in the mentioned three regions. The large number of IDPs and their unregulated influx create major problems for host communities. Governmental and municipal institutions were unable to meet the increased demand for basic social and administrative services. Non-governmental organizations and initiatives of the civil society tried to cover that gap with limited success due to a lack of sufficient capacities.

On national level already in October 2014, the Law of Ukraine ‘On Ensuring Rights and Freedoms of IDPs’ was adopted. This law defined the regulatory framework for comprehensively addressing IDPs issues and it also provided the basis for the formation of the state policies. In December 2015, the State Programme for Support, Social Adaptation and Reintegration of Ukrainian Citizens became the first state comprehensive action plan that aimed at addressing the integration of IDPs. The programme was financed from the state and local budgets, including international donor funds. Since 2016, the newly established Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine (MinToT) has been responsible for IDPs adaptation of state policies, while the Ministry of Social Policy retains the responsibility for IDPs registration and providing social services via the subordinated structures. MinToT has developed a Strategy for the integration of IDPs for the period up to 2020. This provides a set of measures aimed at supporting the regions and communities hosting IDPs. But although the implementation of the Action Plan was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in November 2018, several amendments have still not yet been published. The MinToT, as ministry responsible for the Action Plan’s realisation, still lacks funds and staff. In the regions, apart from a few coordinators it is hardly present with own administrative structures. Thus, it has not acquired the necessary political support and political impact and outreach in order to substantially improve the situation of IDPs and hosting communities.

Ukraine is undergoing a decentralization reform, that, even though it is providing more flexibility for planning and allocating their resources and thus, theoretically increases their ability to deal with IDP related issues, actually draws away the attention from IDP specific issues. Furthermore, the reform is bearing the risk of increased conflicts within hosting communities. It has to be stated that, whereas in the early years of the conflict the majority of IDPs was hoping to quickly move back to their ancestral home, meanwhile the majority of IDPs try to settle at the places where the currently live. The fact that they are excluded from participating in local elections is automatically excluding them from having influence on the respective decentralization process in their communities which makes their integration even more difficult.

Although there has been some stabilization of the situation in the East of Ukraine it remains impossible to predict the resolution of the crisis or the full intention of all parties to permanently resolve the conflict. The trend of reducing the number of officially registered IDPs<sup>68</sup> continues but there remain many problems and differences between the governmental controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk (GCA)<sup>69</sup> and the areas not controlled by the Government (NGCA). Furthermore, the challenges occurring due to the influx of IDPs remain to the utmost extend on the shoulders of hosting municipalities and civil society institutions.

<sup>68</sup> The current number of officially registered IDP in the three Oblasts is about 250.000

<sup>69</sup> The current number of officially registered IDP in the GCA is about 780.000



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Indeed, since 2013/2014 the civil society has significantly grown up in Ukraine, in terms of numbers and areas of activities. While the so-called *Maidan Revolution* was also an expression of civilian self-confidence – and one of the triggers for the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine –, the rapid and effective engagement of volunteer initiatives – after the conflict had broken out – for addressing urgent, humanitarian needs in the IDP crisis demonstrated the potential power of a functioning civil society. Although the civil society, in particular in eastern Ukraine, politically is diverse, it certainly is a factor that initiatives aiming at good governance should and can build on.

With the armed conflict having entered its fifth year, humanitarian needs still demand high resource allocations through the international community (mainly for GCA Luhansk and Donetsk). The political discourse about the so-called *Nexus* between Humanitarian Aid and Development has been ongoing since 2016, at least. Yet, not enough attention is paid to the necessity of structure building measures; nor do well-elaborated and coordinated development strategies for the conflict-prone regions exist, which such measures could build on in the large scale. Thus, the successful development of decentralised (service) structures to a high degree depends on the local setting; for instance, on resources available for re-structuring service provision and on the commitment and interests by local actors.

### B/ THE PROGRAMME

#### *Theory of Change and Programme Content*

IDPs require social and administrative services. For these, municipalities are their first point of contact. GIZ was commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in 2015 to implement two TDA projects to strengthen host communities in the three Oblasts Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. The objective of the two TDA projects is to strengthen the social infrastructure as well as to capacitate and strengthen Ukrainian communities to host IDP. All projects combine measures of short-term, effective assistance with advice on processes and measures aimed at structural and sustainable changes in the partner system. Essentially, the results achieved so far can be summarized as follows for all projects:

- (Re) production of basic infrastructure and provision of social public services in the education, health and care/social service sectors, public administration;
- Improving the performance of partners, in particular for service delivery to the population, through conceptual and technical advice, qualification of personnel and technical equipment;
- Advice on governance processes in the respective partner communities by advising on reforms at selected partner institutions;
- Training of multipliers;
- Measures to strengthen dialogue and social cohesion.

The “Strengthening Ukrainian communities hosting IDPs” project is addressing four areas of action:

- **Field of Action 1:** by strengthening the capacities of state and non-state actors in the municipalities, they have the necessary skills to provide improved services for IDP and the resident population.
- **Field of Action 2:** by training municipal administrations, it enables and motivates them to increase citizens' participation in planning and implementation processes of public.
- **Field of Action 3:** By advising and supporting state and non-governmental institutions, improved and tailored offers for psychosocial support is offered to IDPs and other vulnerable parts of the local population.
- **Field of Action 4:** the conflict-reducing dialogue between IDPs and the resident population is moderated professionally.

The project is implementing its activities in more than 50 municipalities, with local and regional (Oblast) structures, ministerial structures (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Policy, Ministry of Education, etc.) and local population, including IPDs.

One of the project’s core principles for strategizing cooperation is to **strengthen the interaction of existing municipal/state and non-governmental structures for the benefit of IDP and the host population**. The project promotes the capacity development of people, organizations and society. Processes for capacity development go hand in hand with the modernization of technical equipment

## PR 4.1 Ukraine Case Study

(while this sound principle in the beginning of the implementation, due to the budget allocation, had to be dealt with in a flexible way). The project creates links to improve relations between state and social forces and to strengthen the mutual trust of the populations now facing each other. Through professional support and greater networking for improved service provision, resilient capacities are built up in the target communities, the foundation for their further development is strengthened and people and institutions are better prepared to cope with future crisis. Since 2017, at request of the BMZ, cooperation structures have been extended to the government-controlled areas (GCA) of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, which are east of the project's core areas and near to the line of conflict.

The project combines measures that both benefit vulnerable populations and foster local and regional governance structures. Processes and infrastructure of municipal/state and non-governmental service providers are strengthened. The coexistence of IDPs and local populations shall be improved through inclusion and integration and improved and better accessible services for all populations. Thus, the potential for conflict is reduced.

### *Results:*

People from more than 50 municipalities are benefiting from the work being carried out in eastern Ukraine. In three-and-a-half years, the project has provided equipment for 250 facilities and training for 1,600 staff at relevant institutions. 51 newly equipped Administrative Service Centres have improved their social and administrative services. Among other things, GIZ has developed a better learning environment for 8,000 children and young people through the procurement of new furniture and IT and sports equipment in 27 preschools, schools and sports facilities.

Training courses have helped teachers and educators learn how to integrate children with disabilities into their classes. Mobile theatre groups at schools also promote the inclusion of these children, as well as the integration of children from conflict regions.

GIZ has equipped more than 100 medical facilities with modern devices, furnishings and medical kits. 600 doctors and nursing staff have been given professional development training to facilitate doctor-patient communication and have also improved their computer skills.

Meanwhile some 850 specialists staff learned new methods of providing psychosocial support and to deal more effectively with burnout risks. In addition to advanced training, they were also supported by professional supervision. As well as improving their own work, they serve as facilitators, passing on their new knowledge and skills to their colleagues. Modern care and nursing equipment have been provided to 22 social institutions, such as nursing homes, psychotherapeutic facilities and orphanages for children with disabilities. As a result, some 2.000 people are now receiving more appropriate care in these institutions.

21 youth centres have been opened in cooperation with municipalities and voluntary youth workers. An average of 7.800 children and young people take part in self-organized training, cultural events and other leisure activities at these centers every month, thus becoming active participants in community life.

70 local social service centres (in all 5 Oblasts) are being supported through trainings, supervision and equipment to fulfill their mandate of family mediation.

Some 33.500 people, 15.000 of them IDPs, have been brought together over the last years through projects promoting integration and dialogue. The projects are frequently conducted in cooperation with NGOs – these partnerships also play an important role in strengthening civil society, thus helping to overcome the social and societal consequences of the armed conflict in the long term.

### **C/ CHALLENGES**

- **Absence of political will** and/or **political power games** in municipal/state institutions and administrations impede reform processes
- **High turnover of staff** is reducing the chances that trained staff can use its new skills and abilities to sustainably improve services in the respective institutions/administrations
- **Insufficient funds** make municipalities to a big extend dependent on foreign development aid funds

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- **Inability of partners to identify most urgent needs and demands** due to insufficient evidence-base
- **Overlap in general of mandates by national ministries** and their administrative sub-structures regarding target groups, sectors and territorial competencies (regarding MHPSS / Mental Health and Psychosocial Support; GCA Luhansk and Donetsk)
- **Overlap in specific of the IDP topic by other processes** (decentralization, health sector reform, etc.) **Citizens are still not used to participatory processes** which results in partially low interest and participation
- **Donor coordination**

### D/ KEY LESSONS LEARNT

- Institutional change and capacity development within official structures cannot be achieved by trainings only. But continuous support for the leadership through mentors will make a difference.
- Apart from a very few exceptions the **needs of IDP do not differ to the needs of other vulnerable groups**. Addressing them together (inclusive approach) is reducing the risk of social exclusion or creating parallel worlds.
- Keeping **flexibility regarding topics/local needs** and include – if necessary – new target groups and topics into activities and operational plan, e.g. ATO veterans, people with disabilities.
- Keeping **flexibility regarding overarching (national) political partner setting**, by creating strong work relations at regional and local level.
- Even if **strengthening civil society structures** is not a primary goal, it should be set as secondary goal (e.g., via cooperation with NGOs and volunteer initiatives as implementing partners), as long as civil society is crucial not only for dealing with emergency situations but also for building structures of resilience in communities.

## PR 4.6 Role-Play Scenarios

### Instructions:

- 1) You have been assigned as a group one of the scenarios presented below. As a group, you need to imagine a real-life situation where the issue presented in the scenario is demonstrated. You can decide how many characters are in the role play, who they are and their script. The scene should not last more than 5 min.
- 2) Once role-play is finished, present the following information (prepared in advance):
  - What is/are the main characteristics of women / youth as social groups that you tried to depict through the role-play?
  - What is/are the main challenges facing women/youth in playing the role(s) which you tried to depict?
  - What is/are the role(s) of local institutions to empower women / youth in fulfilling the role(s) depicted which you tried to highlight?

### Scenarios:

**Group 1:** in a crime-ridden slum of a large sprawling city, inhabited by rural migrants from different ethnic groups and religion, neighborhood disputes can easily escalate into full blown street battles involving armed youth. Local community leaders seem unable to act as youth increasingly do not respect customary laws and elders' authority and they, themselves, do not talk to each other to overcome divisions. The municipality and police avoid getting involved in this neighborhood as they provide basically no services to these people and are not welcome by residents. Women from different background still meet each other when going to the market or when trading themselves. A small group of them has decided to try and tackle the spiraling violence situation, as it impacts heavily on their capacity to maintain their households and provide care of their children. This small group is meeting today to decide an action plan. They are meeting outside of the market. Several passers-by listen to their discussion and some decide to get involved in the women's discussion. The Deputy-Mayor himself, accompanied by the Head of the SIDA Office in the country, happens to visit the market on that day (it was just rehabilitated with SIDA funding).

**Group 2:** this country has been going through a major political and security crisis for the last 4 years, after a brief transition from dictatorship to democracy, which failed in establishing stable democratic institutions. Armed militias, recruiting among unemployed youth, have taken over entire cities and regions. There are still a few civil society organizations active in the country, some of them led by youth (usually from the elite class). One of these NGOs is leading an outreach campaign on reconciliation, democracy and the rule of law. They enter the main garrison where the militia elements of their city are stationed in an attempt to convince them to lay down arms and join peaceful civic action instead. It happens that the militia commander, who's also sitting on the municipal council (he was elected before the conflict started), is present that day in the garrison.

**Group 3:** this country has entered a post-conflict phase after long years of civil war, which spread into a regional conflict with neighboring countries. Armies from different states regularly invaded the city where this scene is happening, in addition to local militias representing different rebel groups. This is an area of high ethnic diversity. All sides have used sexual violence on women systematically to impose their rule. In the post-conflict time, a movement of women victims of sexual and gender-based violence has emerged, asking for justice, reparations for victims but also as a political force bridging ethnic lines. They have created their own political party (All Women's Congress for Peace AWCP) and intend to run in the upcoming local & regional elections. Today, they're holding their first electoral meeting and invited several community leaders from different groups.

**Group 4:** this country is undergoing a protracted conflict that has lasted for decades. As a result of the conflict, there are long-term IDP camps around major cities. Nevertheless, democratic institutions have been gradually established, in particular at the local level and civic liberties have improved. All municipalities now have elected councils. However, IDPs do not have voting rights in local elections of their host communities Municipal Councils are usually dominated by older men from wealthier families and powerful clans. As a result, the policies they adopt and the management of municipal affairs is largely patronage-based and benefiting first of all the clans of councilors. Municipalities do not invest

## PR 4.6 Role-Play Scenarios

in developing infrastructure and services in IDPs camps, and some municipalities even put more restrictions on IDP to open businesses or find local jobs. Tensions are running higher in IDP camps as the country is undergoing a serious economic downturn after years of relative prosperity. The National Union of University Students has decided to become involved in local governance as they see it as a critical entry point to change governance and fight corruption in the country. They also want public policies to be much more supportive of the youth, and in particular young IDPs. They have decided to establish shadow youth municipal councils in every city. They would like to be able to do this in partnership with municipal councils so as to be able to influence the way they function. Today, a delegation from the Students' Union is visiting a youth club in one of the largest IDP camp to try and get them to join their initiative. It happens that, on the same day, the Mayor is also coming to the community center where the meeting is taking place, to hand over a few sporting equipment to the youth club. He's seeking re-election and, even if IDPs cannot vote, he wants to show local residents that he's trying to do something to reduce tensions mounting from IDP camps, which also generate tensions with the local population.

### ANNEX

#### WOMEN AND SOCIAL COHESION

- promoting gender equality reinforces the **building of horizontal social relations**, critical for social cohesion, rather than reinforcing vertical command chains, which are male-dominated.
- increasing women's access to decision-making and rights is an essential objective to **reduce social exclusion** that feeds societal divisions.
- **women are more prone to negotiations** than violence to settle disputes and display better skills than men at bridging across groups.
- women are **strong influencers in their households and communities**; they can shape perceptions of future generations on the need to overcome divisions peacefully and on the role of the state (due to their use of social services).
- women are usually **inclined to civic engagement** because they face a harder time accessing political power through formal channels.
- combatting SGBV and other security risks on women means opening **greater access for women to the public space**, hence allowing them a greater social, political and economic role, which is critical for a society's recovery.

#### YOUTH AND SOCIAL COHESION

- Social, economic or political **marginalization of youth** is a major source of social and political contest that can lead to violence.
- Youth can be more easily **mobilized by spoilers into disruptive or violent action** if not given opportunities to use their 'energy' and vent their frustrations constructively.
- Youth are more prone to **horizontal equality-based human relations** than vertical / hierarchical ones.
- Youth demonstrate **openness to change** and tend to be more future-oriented, idealistic, innovative and willing to take risks.
- Youth have a strong desire and **sense of innovation and creativeness** that can be harnessed through the arts, culture, tourism, sports and education to build bridges between divided communities.
- Youth are more likely to have the **educational level** needed to conduct civic awareness campaigns for peaceful social relations.
- Youth have a **desire for self-realization** which makes them prime engines for community entrepreneurship where social cohesion outcomes are put on the same level than economic outcomes.

## PR 4.7 Programming Scenarios

**Directions:** Based on the short description of the crisis context case assigned to your group, you need to identify to develop the outline of a programmatic response to improve social cohesion in these localities. Use the template on p. 3 to record your suggestions. Remember to think of activities that foresee a role for local formal institutions, alongside others that may rely mostly on non-state actors!

### Context 1: The City of Sonsonate, in El Salvador (2011)

El Salvador underwent a ruthless civil war from 1979 to 1992 which took the life of 75,000 people. If the country has not experienced any new bouts of armed political conflict since then, it was, in 2011, the second most dangerous country in the world with (70 homicides per 100,000 in 2011) and its development was severely constrained as a result of the exploding crime and violence.

The City of Sonsonate, with a population of nearly 75,000, was in the 2000's among the most dangerous in the country, with a homicide rate of 145/100.000 in 2008 (against an average of 53.8 for the country that same year). Citizen security was also highly threatened by other types of crime such as thefts, extortion, rape, threats, kidnapping, etc. The city was in chaos – public space was invaded by informal trade, drug, alcohol and small arms trafficking and municipal rules were ignored; public infrastructure was decrepit. Public trust towards the municipality and the police was very low; community participation almost unheard of. Public services were dysfunctional, especially power supply and waste management. The municipality lacked skills, a mandate and the resources to act on the spiraling violence. Cooperation between the central government and the municipality was absent, due to their being led by historically opposed political parties. As a result, the city showed serious human development gaps, with the average length of schooling at only 5.8 years, a third of the population lacking decent housing and access to potable water. 34% of households were women-headed and children and young people (7 – 25 year-old) represented nearly 40% of the population.

The main challenges faced by the City of Sonsonate to maintain citizen security, as identified through a strategic planning process supported by UNDP in 2009, were at that time:

- Weakness of institutions to address the issue of violence and insecurity, in particular due to the multiplicity and lack of coordination of actors and a lack of reliable and comprehensive data.
- Concentration of violence in 6 neighborhoods, mostly the poorest of the city.
- Attitudes among the citizenry, including the sale and consumption of alcohol, drugs trafficking and consumption, violence against women and children, among others – which encourage the use of violence as a means to solve interpersonal conflicts.
- A high rate of involvement of youth as victims and perpetrators of violence, with also violence routinely taking place near educational centers, in addition to the conspicuous presence of youth gangs across the city.
- Indiscriminate use of fire arms by private citizens
- High rate of death and injuries due to traffic accidents.

### Context 2: Mon & Kayin States in South-Eastern Myanmar

Mon and Kayin States in South-Eastern Myanmar (border with Thailand) are characterized by great geographic and ethnic diversity and long-standing and widespread state-society and armed conflict. Both States are highly conflict-affected; contain large ethnic nationality populations; host a number of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs); and contain parallel administrative structures maintained by Government and EAOs. The states have benefitted from bi-lateral ceasefire agreements between the Government of Myanmar (GoM) and EAOs and are now part of an ongoing national peace-making effort. Mon and Kayin, along with other states and regions in the South-East, are home to significant populations of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnees from Thailand. Both states fare relatively well against socio-economic indices in comparison to national averages, though pockets of poverty and under-development exist. There are significant income inequalities within the states and across different communities. In general, there is still a dearth in resources and skills, particularly for commercial livelihoods and profitable industries, and this is compounded by a dearth in livelihood infrastructure. Communities are vulnerable to conflict, poverty, land-grabbing and natural resource exploitation, with evidence pointing to systemic prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence, both conflict-related and

## PR 4.7 Programming Scenarios

otherwise. The conflict and humanitarian and relief phases have also created income-generating activities that are dependent on external funding and less responsive to market conditions, which does not bode well for their sustainability.

While all these problems may be amenable to aid interventions, the underlying issues are often political/political-economic in nature. Conflict and authoritarianism legacy have fostered strong mistrust between different groups and communities. A recent conflict analysis conducted by the UN has underlined that the most critical issues threatening the current fragile peacebuilding efforts are:

- Lack of trust: between and across key stakeholders and groups in Mon and Kayin. This is a legacy of conflict and of authoritarianism. Mistrust also prevails between the GoM and EAOs and Government and CSOs, as well as between decision-makers and communities. Many stakeholder groups in Mon and Kayin also mistrust external actors, including international donors and organizations and out-of-state investors.
- Multiplicity of stakeholders, multiplicity of systems, and lack of interaction and dialogue between different stakeholder groups
- Limited information, information-sharing and transparency: local groups and communities are largely excluded from peacebuilding, governance and local development activities. This is largely due to the limited trickle-down of information from decision-makers; limited information sources available to communities; and relatively weak channels for citizens' participation.
- Limited capacities for engagement, facilitation, dialogue and peacebuilding
- Anticipated refugee and IDP returns, lack of durable solutions, under-served areas and pockets of vulnerability and under development.

### Context 3: IDP Hosting Cities in Northern Jordan (2014)

The northern Governorates of Jordan have witnessed a large population increase with Syrian refugees since the civil war in Syria erupted in 2011. By 2014, while the total population of the Kingdom had increased by 10% due to the crisis, the rate of increase reached respectively 21% and 45% for Irbid and Mafraq governorates, the two main entry points to the country from Syria. In Mafraq City alone, population increase was 133%. This situation has created extraordinary pressure on service delivery, including municipal services (garbage disposal, traffic control, water distribution, sanitation) as well as social services provided by the government. Schools and hospitals have become overcrowded and the quality of services declined. Driven by difficult livelihoods conditions, economically active Syrian refugees have been seeking employment, primarily in local and informal settings, creating direct competition with vulnerable Jordanian workers, and in particular the working poor (and in particular women-headed households) for low paying unskilled jobs. The housing sector, already facing serious problems with keeping up with the high demographic growth in the country, has been one of the most significantly impacted by the crisis. A city like Mafraq faced in 2014 a huge housing demand that equals 12,600 units, i.e. 19 times the regular average housing need of 660 units. Rents have been spiking (as Syrian families mostly seek to reside in urban areas rather than camps) and the availability of affordable housing for low-income Jordanians, already insufficient prior to the crisis, has plummeted.

Socio-economic problems created by the influx of refugees have exacerbated already existing feelings of marginalization and vulnerability among communities in the North of the country. Jordanians feel that their previous living environment has deteriorated, first with Iraqi refugee wave in the 2000's, and now with Syrian refugees. The later find themselves isolated, discriminated against and with very limited access to spaces of positive social interaction outside of direct family and friend networks. This is hitting Syrian children and women particularly hard, as they cannot manoeuvre their new living environment with the same level of autonomy as adult men (outside of the Greater Amman area, there is a real dearth of child-friendly and women-safe public spaces in Jordanian cities). Tensions between Jordanians and Syrian refugees have been notably increasing.<sup>70</sup>

The influx of refugees has had a direct impact on the capacities of municipalities and, ultimately, on the credibility of the newly elected municipal councils and mayors, many of whom had inherited municipal

<sup>70</sup> An opinion poll conducted at in 2014 indicated that a majority of Jordanians disapproved of continuing the policy of open reception of Syrian refugees (73 %) and that 87 % thought that Syrians should be transferred to camps.

## PR 4.7 Programming Scenarios

administrations in bad shape. The crisis delayed implementation of development programmes promised during electoral campaigns. Jordanian residents felt left out and neglected, seeing that a massive international aid effort was directed to Syrian refugees, and expected a more prominent response to their own needs from local authorities. This, combined with a general feeling that corruption remained widespread in public authorities was affecting trust in local governance processes, especially since meaningful citizen participation was not yet the norm and the social accountability of local authorities undeveloped.

### Programming Checklist

What are the main <b>threats</b> to social cohesion?	
What is the main <b>strategy</b> proposed to rebuild / protect social cohesion?	
What type of activities directly targeting <b>social cohesion</b> (as in the quality of human relations) are suggested?	
How should programme activities pertaining to <b>service delivery</b> be adapted to build social cohesion?	
How should programme activities pertaining to <b>local economic development</b> , including land & natural resource management, be adapted to build social cohesion?	
How should programme activities pertaining to support to <b>security and access to justice</b> be adapted to build social cohesion?	
How should programme activities pertaining to <b>local institution-building</b> be adapted to build social cohesion?	



The tools presented below represent a large array of approaches to social cohesion measurement in fragile and conflict-affected settings, both from a content and methodological point of view. Some focus more on a specific dimension of social cohesion, others are more comprehensive and also discuss the role of the state-society relation in building social cohesion.

The three tools presented in this Toolbox are:

- 1) UNDP Social Cohesion Index (used in the Arab Region)
- 2) UNDP Score Index
- 3) WB Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire

All tools have been formatted in a summary version (extracts). Links are provided to the original tool.

### **1. UNDP Social Cohesion Index (Arab Region)**

[http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/Dem\\_Gov/developing-a-social-cohesion-index-for-the-arab-region.html](http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/Dem_Gov/developing-a-social-cohesion-index-for-the-arab-region.html)

#### **What is the Social Cohesion Index (SCI) and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?**

The Social Cohesion Index was developed by UNDP Regional Programme in the Arab World as part of its regional project launched in 2015: “Promoting Social Cohesion in the Arab Region”. The Project encompasses peacebuilding; equal citizenship; trust among citizens as well as between citizen and state; respect for human rights and for economic and social equality; and pluralistic acceptance of “the other”, of different faiths, confessions, ethnic backgrounds and political ideologies. The Project addresses the question of social cohesion through knowledge generation to better understand and measure this concept, taking into account regional, national and local contexts, while benefiting from the international experience in this regard. Building upon existing research on social cohesion which emphasizes the multidimensionality and complexity of the concept, UNDP set forth the process of developing and operationalizing a multileveled indice on social cohesion, the Social Cohesion Index.

In situations where the relationships between citizen and state, as well as among various social groups in some countries, have deteriorated, the question of how to restore social cohesion is more acute than ever. Disaffections and group tensions vary among countries in a same region, as in the Arab World. What takes the shape of sectarian/confessional civil strife in a particular country, may be more political in another one. At the same time, supranational ideologies, conveyed by radical groups, influence people’s notion and practice of tolerance and inclusivity, especially the youth. Better understanding the dynamics that influence attitudes and collective action is an absolute necessity for decision-makers, development practitioners and other stakeholders, in order to identify the most effective entry points and strategies for peace-building projects.

#### **What can the SCI help development practitioners do?**

The SCI provides a set of indicators and a methodology which can be utilized to measure changes in certain dimensions of socially cohesive behavior, as well as of a socially cohesive society over time, and in response to policies and programmatic interventions. In particular, the SCI can be used to:

- understand the present state of social cohesion in target geographies and populations, including at local, national and regional levels;
- track future improvement or deterioration in social cohesion; and
- offer an explanation for these changes.

Indicators used in the SCI take into account both context and data availability. The framework for measuring social cohesion also takes into consideration issues related to refugee populations and internally displaced persons, including refugee participation within host societies, and the host community’s responses to refugees.

## PR 4.8 Social Cohesion Measurement Tools

### How is the SCI organized?

The SCI follows a three-tiered approach to measure social cohesion, comprising of core, medial and peripheral indicators. There are specific questions supporting data collection against each tier, tailored to the country's context (in the sample below, for Lebanon).

- **Core indicators:**
  - *Attitudes:* citizens' perceptions of the different social group components with which they interact (horizontal attitudes) and their perceptions of state and local authorities (vertical attitudes). Citizens' positive or negative evaluations of other groups and state authorities are likely to have a direct impact on social tensions and the potential for social conflict.
  - *Collective action:* citizens' tendencies for collective action against specific outgroups (horizontal) or state authorities (vertical) are a direct measure of potential conflict (and lack of social cohesion).
- **Medial indicators:** the second tier in the SCI model includes intermediate variables that bear a direct link to when and how core measures of social cohesion increase or decrease.
  - *Identities (belonging):* Identity dynamics are thus central to understanding intergroup conflict and collective action. The groups with which we identify have direct implications on which groups we consider as our antagonists. There are different dimensions in a process of sociopolitical identification (e.g. for the Arab Region: family; municipality/region; sect/ethnicity; nation; pan-national (Arab/Islamic); and self only). These basic dimensions can be further expanded (e.g. separating sect and ethnicity) or reduced (e.g. removing the regional dimension in surveys of city-states).
  - *Emotions (motivation):* Emotions are dynamic psychological mechanisms that guide an individual's coping efforts in context. Anger and fear are two emotions that have opposite effects: while anger is a clear positive predictor of collective action (fight response), fear has an opposite effect (flight response). Other emotions are important to understand social cohesion levels: contempt, hate, respect, empathy/compassion and affection.
  - *Trust:* important element in cementing relationships and estimating reactions to interpersonal interactions. Individuals who perceive the world as an unfriendly place, where people cannot be trusted, are also more likely to perceive outgroups with suspicion. The SCI uses a two-dimensional approach for trust: (i) global social trust (horizontal), and (ii) trust in vertical structures (government, justice, security forces, media).
- **Peripheral indicators:** they provide a contextual understanding of social cohesion.
  - *Perceptions of threat (human security):* Human security can be measured both objectively and subjectively. It is, however, the subjective perceptions (of threats) that are likely to have the greatest impact on social cohesion and they constitute a powerful predictor of mobilized social action: negative attitudes and emotions toward outgroups are intuitively associated with the degree to which specific outgroups are perceived to constitute a potential threat.
  - *Justice:* justice principles have long been held as core values motivating individuals and groups to action. Justice perceptions are tied to vertical dynamics, as citizens monitor how authorities distribute resources (distributive justice), implement the same administrative procedures for all citizens (procedural justice), and interact with citizens in a fair and dignified way (interactional justice). Authorities that are perceived as violating any of the three dimensions listed above are likely to be negatively evaluated, which may increase the potential for protest action.
  - *Contact:* two important dimensions to consider: (i) contact quantity, i.e. the frequency of contact between members of various groups; (ii) contact quality, i.e. whether it is positive or negative contact. Both dimensions interact to affect intergroup perceptions and relations.
  - *Levels of participation and representation:* participation can be objectively measured by assessing voter turnout at regional or national elections, representation can be subjectively measured by asking citizens about the degree to which they feel represented in local and national assemblies. Citizen participation in socio-political events and organisations is also an additional measure of social capital.

## 2. UNDP Score Index:

<http://www.scoreforpeace.org/eng>

### **What is the SCORE Index and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?**

The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index is a smart tool designed to measure peace in societies around the world. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, SCORE examines two main components of peace – reconciliation and social cohesion – and their intricate relationship. Reconciliation refers to the harmonious coexistence between groups that were previously engaged in an event of dispute or conflict, while social cohesion refers to the quality of coexistence between people within their own group and with the institutions that surround them. In addition to measuring reconciliation and social cohesion, SCORE also looks at culturally-specific components of peace that vary across different contexts and help complete and enrich the analysis.

SCORE was developed in Cyprus through the joint efforts of the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) and UNDP-ACT with USAID funding. SCORE is designed as a very adaptable tool that is well-suited for multi-ethnic societies that have experienced conflict and are now facing simultaneous peace-building and state-building challenges. As such the SCORE is currently being implemented in Cyprus, Liberia, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nepal.

### **What can the SCORE Index help development practitioners do?**

The SCORE index can provide a good snapshot of what the relationships within and between groups are in a country at a specific point in time. This is done by providing scores on a number of dimensions, such as social cohesion and reconciliation, for different groups, for various demographic categories within these groups and at the sub-national level. Such level of analysis can provide stakeholders and peace practitioners with much needed information to better target their programmes and maximise efficiency.

With the SCORE index, development practitioners have access to a tool that can be used to: a) map social cohesion and reconciliation, b) track levels of social cohesion and reconciliation over time when SCORE is administered at multiple points in time and c) assess social cohesion and reconciliation as predictors of various outcomes (e.g. readiness for political settlement between former adversaries). Tracking the levels of social cohesion and reconciliation over time is particularly useful when it comes to assessing the effectiveness of peace-building programmes and the influence of exogenous events.

### **How is the SCORE Index process organized?**

The SCORE index utilizes only SURVEY data, collected through a participatory survey, using an open-ended questionnaire, from representative and randomly-selected samples of the target population. This questionnaire forms the main tool of the SCORE index.


As social cohesion and reconciliation are theoretical and multi-faceted dimensions and not observable behaviours, social cohesion and reconciliation cannot be measured by a single indicator and need multiple indicators. These indicators themselves are still abstract constructs themselves (albeit of lesser complexity) and need to be broken down into smaller components (sub-indicators), which are then directly measured via questions in the SCORE questionnaire. The relationship between dimensions, indicators and sub-indicators is best expressed (in statistical modeling terms) through the second-order factor model. The figure below gives a representation of this model, applied to the ‘reconciliation’ dimension.

As the SCORE index has a vocation to be used at the global level, the indicators and questionnaire questions (items) are general and as far as possible, ‘universal’ and meaningful across multiple settings. However, a process of local adjustment or calibration is always needed before the SCORE index can be rolled out in any given country / context.

## PR 4.8 Social Cohesion Measurement Tools

A/ Indicators of Social Cohesion: the SCORE Index mostly focus on indicators of social capital, and less so of social inclusion.

1. **Trust in institutions:** the extent to which people trust important institutions like the judicial system, parliament, and the police.
2. **Feeling adequately represented by institutions:** the extent to which people feel that their concerns are represented by institutions such as; like parliament, and politicians and that they were part of the decision making process.
3. **Human security:** how secure people feel in their everyday lives, in terms of personal security (feeling safe from violence), economic security (having a secure basic income, being able to cover their needs) and political security (the ability to associate freely and express own views).
4. **Satisfaction with civic life:** satisfaction with various elements of public life, such as the administration of justice, the state of the economy, and the direction of the peace talks.
5. **Freedom from corruption:** the extent to which people perceive public life to be free from corruption.
6. **Satisfaction with personal life:** satisfaction with life in general (e.g., personal life, work life, their health levels).
7. **Ethnic group identification:** importance of membership of a particular group to an individual's identity. Participants are asked whether being a part of their chosen group is something that is important to their self-image and something that they feel glad about.
8. **Civic engagement:** levels of involvement in civic life (e.g., taking part in political protest, membership of a political party or other organisations).



B/ Indicators of Reconciliation:


1. **Negative stereotypes:** the extent to which individuals think members of adversarial groups are, for example, violent, lazy, or unfriendly.
2. **Intergroup anxiety:** whether individuals anticipate experiencing negative feelings of threat, unease, or anxiety, if they find themselves alone with members of adversarial groups.
3. **Social distance:** acceptance of a variety of social relationships with members of an adversarial group. For example: having a member of the other group as a close relative by marriage, as a next-door neighbour, as a co-worker, or as a boss.
4. **Perceptions of social threat:** the extent to which individuals consider their own group's way of life to be potentially threatened by adversarial groups. Respondents are asked whether they think that members of such groups would, for example, corrupt the religious values and degrade the language of their own group, or whether they would affect the ingroup in other negative ways, for example, reducing job opportunities or causing an increase in crime.
5. **Active discrimination:** explicitly discriminatory behaviour towards members of adversarial groups. Such behavior may include telling distasteful jokes about the other group, refusing to help someone because s/he was a member of the outgroup, or not wanting to be in the same room as members of the outgroup.
6. **Positive feelings:** the extent to which individuals have warm (as oppose to cold) feelings about members of the other group.
7. **Cultural distance:** the extent to which respondents feel that aspects of their own culture are dissimilar to aspects of the culture of the other ethnic group. The cultural elements considered include: music, food, values and religious and spiritual beliefs.

## PR 4.8 Social Cohesion Measurement Tools

8. **Propensity for forgiveness:** the extent to which respondents feel the way to resolve a dispute is by forgiving the other side.
9. **Propensity for retribution:** the extent to which respondents feel that the only way for a dispute to be concluded is through retribution.
10. **Intergroup contact:** the amount of interaction a respondent has with members of an adversarial group.

Next, comes the process of ‘factor loading’, which is basically understanding how questionnaire items can be best combined to come up with a sub-indicator value, and how these sub-indicators, in turn, most faithfully combine to provide a dimensional indicator. There are three things that are important when it comes to factor loadings:

- a) Their significance: a predictor is only meaningful when it significantly predicts the factor that it is supposed to predict.
- b) Their strength: this is indicated by the value of the loading: the closer the value is to 1, the stronger the relationship between the predictor and the predicted variable, and the closer the value is to 0, the weaker the relationship. For example, the two strongest predictors of reconciliation are intergroup anxiety and social distance.
- c) Their direction: loadings can have either a negative or a positive value. A negative value means that the higher the mean of the predictor, the lower the mean of the predicted



The figure beside shows the factor loading protocol for the reconciliation dimension.

All scores presented on the SCORE platform represent scores of Dimensions or Indicators. These scores range from zero (0) to ten (10). What each value means depends on the valence of the indicators.

### 3. World Bank Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/515261468740392133/pdf/281100PAPER0Measuring0social0capital.pdf>

**What is the Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire (SC-IQ) and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?**

The Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ) is a core set of survey questions exploring the various dimensions of social capital to be integrated in regular household surveys (such as the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey).

The SC-IQ was designed for use by researchers, evaluators, and managers of projects and programs, those conducting poverty assessments or national social capital surveys, and those developing national poverty reduction strategies. It is especially designed for incorporation into other large household surveys, such as the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS).

**What can the PEA tool help development practitioners do?**

- **Strategy setting:** the social capital module is usually added to national-level Living Standards Measurement Surveys in preparation of poverty reduction strategies. But the module can also be

## PR 4.8 Social Cohesion Measurement Tools

added to any survey measuring household-level political, social and economic descriptors related to conflict drivers and peace engines in a specific situation, and is therefore also useful to measure the correlation between social capital and conflict risks.

- **Programme design:** the SC-IQ is also useful in the design and implementation of development projects. If there is a desire to obtain baseline data on social capital prior to launching a project, the SC-IQ could be used in combination with other data collection at the project level aimed at providing a baseline of socio-economic information.
- **Evaluation:** often baseline data is collected in anticipation of a future evaluation of the project's impact. Successful project evaluation requires multiple rounds of data collection. Adding the SC-IQ to each round of data collection would make it possible to assess the impact of the project on social capital, or conversely, to assess whether areas with high levels of social capital have more successful project implementation.

Importantly, however, the SC-IQ is not for first-time researchers; it presumes a solid grasp of social research methods in general and survey research tools in particular, as well as familiarity with the core themes and debates in the social capital literature. This methodological and conceptual knowledge is needed to make the necessary in-context adjustments and modifications to the survey instrument suggested in the methodology.

### How is the SC-IQ used?

The SC-IQ does not collect data on social capital at the level of the community. All questions are addressed to individuals, in the context of a household survey, and the objective is to obtain information about the participation of household members in groups and associations, perceptions of trust and empowerment, household participation in collective action, etc. Some of the questions do ask about the respondent's perception of certain community attributes, such as the community's ability to come together to cope with calamities or to address issues of common concern. This is different of course from obtaining community-level data on social capital, such as the density of associational life or the frequency of community collective action.

The SC-IQ is organized around 6 dimensions.

1) **Groups and Networks:** this is the category most commonly associated with social capital. The questions here consider the nature and extent of a household member's participation in various types of social organizations and informal networks, and the range of contributions that one gives and receives from them. It also considers the diversity of a given group's membership, how its leadership is selected, and how one's involvement has changed over time.

### Questions

1. Which groups or organizations, networks, associations to which you or any member of your household belong. These could be formally organized groups or just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. Of how many such groups are you or any one in your household a member?

2. Of all these groups, which one is the most important to your household? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Thinking about the members of this group, are most of them of the same....

A. Religion                      B. Gender                      C. Ethnic or linguistic background/ race/caste/tribe

4. Do members mostly have the same...

A. Occupation                      B. Educational background or level

5. Does this group work with or interact with groups outside the village/neighborhood?

1. No                      2. Yes, occasionally                      3. Yes, frequently

6. How many close friends do you have these days?

7. If you suddenly needed to borrow a small amount of money [RURAL: enough to pay for expenses for your household for one week; URBAN: equal to about one week's wages], are there people beyond your immediate household and close relatives to whom you could turn and who would be willing and able to provide this money?

1. Definitely                      2. Probably                      3. Unsure                      4. Probably not                      5. Definitely



## PR 4.8 Social Cohesion Measurement Tools

### Questions

17. There are often differences in characteristics between people living in the same village / neighborhood. To what extent do any such differences characterize your village/neighborhood?

1. To a very great extent      2. To a great extent      3. Neither great nor small extent  
4. To a small extent      5. To a very small extent

18. Do any of these differences cause problems?

1. Yes      2. No → go to question 21.

19. Which two differences most often cause problems?

1. Differences in education      2. Differences in landholding  
3. Differences in wealth/material possessions      4. Differences in social status  
5. Differences between men and women      6. Differences between younger and older generations  
7. Differences between long-term / recent residents      8. Differences in political party affiliations  
9. Differences in religious beliefs      10. Differences in ethnic or linguistic background/  
race/caste/tribe      11. Other differences

20. Have these problems ever led to violence?

1. Yes      2. No

21. How many times in the past month have you got together with people to have food or drinks, either in their home or in a public place?

22. [IF NOT ZERO] Were any of these people.... (Yes, No)

- A. Of different ethnic or linguistic background/race/caste/tribe?      B. Of different economic status?  
C. Of different social status?      D. Of different religious groups?

23. In general, how safe from crime and violence do you feel when you are alone at home?

1. Very safe      2. Moderately safe      3. Neither safe nor unsafe      4. Moderately unsafe  
5. Very unsafe

6) **Empowerment and Political Action.** Individuals are “empowered” to the extent they have a measure of control over institutions and processes directly affecting their well-being. The questions in this section explore household members’ sense of happiness, personal efficacy, and capacity to influence both local events and broader political outcomes.

### Questions

24. In general, how happy do you consider yourself to be?

1. Very happy      2. Moderately happy      3. Neither happy nor unhappy  
4. Moderately unhappy      5. Very unhappy

25. Do you feel that you have the power to make important decisions that change the course of your life?

1. Totally unable to change life      2. Mostly unable to change life  
3. Neither able nor unable      4. Mostly able to change life  
5. Totally able to change life

26. In the past 12 months, how often have people in this village/neighborhood got together to jointly petition government officials or political leaders for something benefiting the community?

1. Never      2. Once      3. A few times (<5)      4. Many times (>5)

27. Lots of people find it difficult to get out and vote. Did you vote on the last state/national/ presidential election?

1. Yes      2. No



#### 4. UNICEF Social Cohesion Baseline Analysis (Pakistan):

<http://www.dmeformpeace.org/educateforpeace/compilation-of-tools-for-measuring-social-cohesion-resilience-and-peacebuilding/>

##### **What is the Social Cohesion Baseline Analysis (SCBA) method and how can it contribute to sustainable development results?**

In Pakistan, UNICEF implements the Social Cohesion & Resilience Programme which focuses on the peacebuilding role of education and formal / informal institutions involved in the provision of educational services. In order to measure the programme's impact on social cohesion among children and youth located in communities where the programme is implemented, UNICEF developed the SCBA. Through this tool, UNICEF was able to mostly validate the theory of change underpinning the programme: *“one's sense of common belonging, self-confidence, trust and respect for others would broaden through opportunities to interact with individuals from different communities, age groups, school status, gender and languages”*.

The SCBA deals principally with the social capital dimension of social cohesion, but it also considers the perceptions of potential inequalities, both from those that may suffer from these and those that are more privileged.

##### **What can the SCBA help development practitioners do?**

The SCBA provides an interesting and rather straightforward approach to measure the social capital dimension of social cohesion building. It is easily adaptable to different contexts and target publics, hence making it useful for a wide range of programmes involved with rebuilding social cohesion in divided societies. As it produces an aggregate score, it is easy to use for comparing different groups or regions within a country.

The SCBA can be used as part of a problem identification assessment, for establishing a baseline or for measuring programme impact.

##### **How is the SCBA process organized?**

The SCBA uses mixed qualitative and quantitative research methods. It produces an overall score as an aggregate of 5 indices reflecting the five following domains:

1. Belonging and Inclusion: having a common vision and a sense of being part of a wider community, in all facets of life: cultural, social and economic; and those from different backgrounds having equity and equal access of opportunities.
2. Participation: the involvement of an individual in social activities, for school, community, political and civic life. This requires both the wider group to promote participation and the individual to demand, recognizing both the will and responsibility for involvement in civic life.
3. Tolerance: the ability or willingness to tolerate the existence of opinions or behavior that one dislikes or disagrees with. It is a first step towards, and minimum requirement, for promoting diversity and respect and strong and positive relationships developed between people from different backgrounds.
4. Trust: the belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength attributed to relationships between and within social groups (families, friends, communities, etc.). It is one of the most widespread ways in which “social capital” (one of two key dimensions defined above) has been defined and studied, and is a key domain as a building block for a socially cohesive society, especially where violent conflict persists.
5. Recognition and Legitimacy: involves valuing diversity of people's different backgrounds and respecting differences by all groups, protection from discrimination and harassment, and a sense of safety. Legitimacy in one's ability to be recognized lies in the capacity of institutional arrangements to foster this.